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This dissertation aims to make sense of xenophobia as a specific idea of belonging and 
exclusion based on the idea of foreignness. I provide a conceptual and normative framework 
to help us understand xenophobia in terms of its origins, expressions, moral harms, and effects. 
The secondary aim of this dissertation is to determine how our individual and political identities 
contribute to individual xenophobic prejudices and acts of discrimination, as well as the 
construction and upholding of a xenophobic social and political order. Towards this latter aim 
I argue for a narrative conception of identity, and show how narratives can be xenophobic, but 
how they can also be conducive to creating a non-xenophobic world. To achieve these dual 
aims, my argument is worked out in five phases. Firstly, I distinguish xenophobia from racism, 
arguing that xenophobia differs in its origins and in its effect, which also constitutes its moral 
harm. The harm in xenophobia lies in a specific form of civic ostracism that excludes particular 
groups from benefits of civic membership based on ascriptions of foreignness that in turn is 
based on ideas about belonging. Secondly, I show that xenophobia’s origins lie in our ideas 
about foreignness and belonging, and it manifests in the prejudices that result from ingroup-
outgroup differentiation. This is a response to the fear we feel in the face of strangers and the 
unfamiliar, a remnant of our evolutionary history. I suggest that in our early days as a species, 
antagonism toward the outgroup gave the ingroup the evolutionary advantage. Xenophobia is 
therefore a reaction to insecurity about our place and existence in the world, and the third phase 
of my argument considers place, belonging, and the harms of displacement. These themes are 
approached from the perspective of the xenophobe and the victim of xenophobia. Regarding 
the former, I show how a sense of the precariousness of one’s own belonging can lead one to 
seek belonging in the false home offered by nationalism and other exclusionary identities and 
groupings, with xenophobic discrimination as the result. This excludes the victim of 
xenophobia from the possibility of belonging, making them vulnerable to the particular harms 
of displacement. The fourth phase considers the narrative theory of identity, connecting our 
sense of belonging to our identities and to the narratives we tell about ourselves, our groups, 
outsiders, and the places we are situated in. The narratives we share and the identities which 
result from them can be more or less xenophobic, and in the final phase of this dissertation I 
analyse xenophobic narratives and provide directions that counternarratives can follow to 
counter xenophobia, on the institutional and individual level. A novel direction for 
implementing such narratives is provided, inspired by xenophobia’s origins in human 




collaboration. If xenophobia is a response to apprehensions of belonging, as this dissertation 
argues, a solution to xenophobia needs to be found rethinking our identities, our place in the 







Hierdie verhandeling streef daarna om sin te maak van xenofobie as ’n spesifieke opvatting oor 
tuishoort en uitsluiting, gegrond op die idee van vreemdelingskap. Ek bied ’n konseptuele en 
normatiewe raamwerk om xenofobie te probeer verstaan in die lig van die oorsprong, morele 
kwaad en uitwerking daarvan. ’n Verdere doel is om te bepaal hoe ons individuele en politieke 
identiteite bydra tot individuele xenofobiese vooroordele en dade van diskriminasie, asook tot 
die konstruksie en instandhouding van ’n xenofobiese sosiale en politieke orde. Daarom 
argumenteer ek ten gunste van ’n narratiewe opvatting van identiteit. Ek toon aan dat 
narratiewe xenofobies kan wees, maar tog ook kan meewerk tot die skepping van ’n nie-
xenofobiese wêreld. Om hierdie tweeledige doel te bereik, verloop my argument in vyf fases. 
In die eerste plek onderskei ek xenofobie van rassisme ten opsigte van oorsprong sowel as 
uitwerking (wat ook die morele kwaad konstitueer). Die kwaad van xenofobie lê in ’n vorm 
van sosiale uitbanning, waardeur spesifieke groepe uitgesluit word uit die voordele van 
burgerlike lidmaatskap, op grond van die vreemdelingskap wat aan hulle toegeskryf word, as 
gevolg van spesifieke idees oor tuishoort. In die tweede plek toon ek aan dat xenofobie se 
oorsprong lê in ons opvattings van vreemdelingskap en tuishoort, en dat dit gemanifesteer word 
in die vooroordele wat voortvloei uit ingroep-uitgroep-differensiasie. Dit is’n respons op die 
vrees wat ons ervaar teenoor vreemdelinge en die onbekende, wat ’n oorblyfsel is van ons 
evolusionêre geskiedenis waarin antagonisme teenoor die uitgroep stellig vroeër die ingroep ’n 
evolusionêre voordeel gegee het. Xenofobie is daarom ’n reaksie op die onsekerheid oor ons 
plek en voortbestaan in die wêreld. Daarom handel die derde fase van my argument oor plek, 
behoort en die skade van ontworteling. Dit word benader vanuit die oogpunte van die 
vreemdelinghater sowel as die slagoffer van xenofobie. Wat eersgenoemde betref, toon ek aan 
hoe die wisselvalligheid van jou eie gevoel van behoort daartoe kan lei dat jy tuiskoms soek in 
die skyntuistes wat gebied word deur nasionalisme en ander uitsluitende identiteit en 
groeperings, met xenofobiese diskriminasie as resultaat. Dit sluit dan die slagoffer van 
xenofobie uit van die moontlikheid om te behoort, sodat hulle uitgelewer word aan die skade 
wat ontworteling aanrig. Die vierde fase kyk na die narratiewe teorie van identiteit. Dit verbind 
ons gevoel van tuishoort aan ons identeite en aan die narratiewe wat ons vertel oor onsself, ons 
groepe, buitestaanders en die plekke waar ons leef. Hierdie narratiewe en die identiteite wat 
daaruit voortvloei kan in mindere of meerdere mate xenofobies wees. In die laaste fase van 
hierdie verhandeling analiseer ek daarom xenofobiese narratiewe en dui ek die rigtings aan wat 
teennarratiewe kan volg om xenofobie teen te werk, op institusionele sowel as individuele vlak. 
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’n Nuwe rigting word ook aangedui om dit te implementeer, geïnspireer deur die oorsprong 
van xenofobia in menslike evolusie: spel as strategie wat bevordelik is vir die vorming van 
verhoudings en samewerking. As xenofobie ’n respons is op vrese oor tuishoort, soos in hierdie 
verhandeling beredeneer word, dan moet ’n oplossing daarvoor gevind word in nuwe denke 
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Men of Fire1 
 
Black men.  
The kind uncomfortable with their dark and night, 
gathered around a fire 
they’d used their own lives to ignite. 
 
These men knew everything about fire: 
They spoke with black labels lacing their breath 
spirits warming their chests 
it is fire they would ingest, 
whenever their paraffin-lit homes exploded, 
fuelled by their black-man fire 
their black-man stress. 
Homes overheating 
kids choking 
whenever these fathers of fire  
were inside. 
 
For a long time 
their mighty black bodies were mere containers of fire. 
Routinely, they swallowed blazing disasters 
                                                 




sat fuming, having fiery arguments about who was better –  
amaZulu okanye amaXhosa? 
 
Of these fiery confrontations they never grew tired; 
instead, these welded them together. 
 
Collectively, tribally, 
as they shared their stories of disaster-eating 
as they nurtured their anger about everything 
their collective fire kept growing. 
 
In unison, they practised. 
They went from coughing smoke to spitting balls of flame. 
Black dragons, 
it was with fire they secretly played 
until they swallowed the blaze again. 
 
This was not enough: 
they needed witnesses 
needed the world to know they had found work 
that they were hard at work. 
 




if they didn’t create something of brilliance 
they created a Burning Man 
who was foreign to their fire 
so he stood no chance. 
 
Men of fire, 
black men who show other black men flames. 
What does sizzling skin look like? 
To you, does charcoal and their dark tone look the same? 
What about the smoke? 
Ha mosi o siya mollo…mmele2 
do you have to cover your nose? 
How much petrol does a human body need? 
How much of your flame did Ernesto Nhamuave need? 
  
                                                 






All sorrows can be born if you put them into a story or tell a story about them. 
(Dinesen in Arendt 1998: 175) 
We begin with a story. The story of a man called Ernesto Nhamuave, a name that may not be 
familiar to all, a man known to the world because of a series of photographs. Ash, fire, smoke. 
A charred body, alive, sitting, crouching, later down on the ground. In the foreground and 
background police officers, some with guns, some with fire extinguishers. They came too late. 
The date: 17 May 2008. The place: Ramaphosa informal settlement, Gauteng, South Africa. 
The context: part of the country-wide attacks against foreigners that started in Alexandra on 11 
May 2008 and quickly spread to other communities (see Misago, Landau & Monson 2009). 
Nhamuave’s last moments spread across the globe in photographs, videos, articles. There 
would have been those who were shocked, disgusted, horrified. But doubtless there were many 
who were not, many who supported this act of violence. It is, after all, only one such instance 
among many. One attack among many, only one life lost. In democratic South Africa, violence 
against ‘outsiders’, ‘foreigners’, is the norm. As South African poet Katleho Kana Shoro (2017: 
25-26, my emphasis) asks in her poem ‘Men of Fire’, “How much of your flame did Ernesto 
Nhamuave need?” She asks these questions because she realises that the violence directed at 
Nhamuave, the fire, was not ignited by Nhamuave (here standing in for the countless other 
victims of xenophobic violence and discrimination). The fire burns within the attackers (“…a 
fire / they’d used their own lives to ignite”; “Routinely, they swallowed blazing disasters”). 
Shoro identifies the source of the fire: old tribalist animosities (“who was better - / AmaZulu 
okanye amaXhosa?”); the indignities suffered at the hands of an oppressive and racist regime, 
and the racism these men may have internalised (“Black men, / The kind uncomfortable with 
their dark and night”; “their black-man fire / their black-man stress”; “their stories of disaster-
eating”). Not knowing how or where to go with this fire, this trauma, but knowing something 
should be done with it: “Feeling like they would burn out / if they didn’t create something of 
brilliance […] a Burning Man / who was foreign to their fire” (ibid.). 
The story of Ernesto Nhamuave is actually two stories, intertwined: the man who was burned, 




belong. How these stories are told, interpreted, believed; how they inspire us to act and, 
specifically, how they contribute to our political realities is one of the two main concerns of 
this study. The other is the phenomenon of xenophobia – its origins, its meaning, its causes, its 
different manifestations (beliefs, attitudes, acts, attacks). The two concerns – xenophobia and 
stories – are intimately linked, in ways I will explore in the chapters to come.  
Humans have always been storytellers. It is one of the ways in which we make sense of the 
world and define our place within it. However, in a celebrated lecture entitled: “The dangers 
of a single story” (2009), novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie warns of the personal and 
political perils that arise when a single, dominant story takes hold. Single stories are dangerous 
because they can dispossess, malign, and destroy people’s dignity. They reduce humans to 
representatives of a single idea and deprive them of the possibility of imagining themselves 
differently. Yet Adichie goes on to argue that stories can also restore that dignity; they can 
empower and humanise. This dissertation is an inquiry into the power of stories to shape our 
lives in both negative and positive ways – specifically, the way in which narratives of exclusion 
and inclusion shape political worlds.  
When we tell stories of who we are as a people, we draw distinctions between ourselves and 
others: some people are included and others are excluded from the “we” of the story. This 
dissertation is primarily concerned with a particular form of exclusion, namely xenophobia. 
My aim here is to develop an account of xenophobia as a distinct phenomenon (i.e. not merely 
a variant of racism or prejudice in general) and to investigate specific exclusionary narratives 
as a feature of xenophobia. This lays the groundwork for the constructive part of my project, 
which is to work out how and to what extent different kinds of narratives are able to counteract 
xenophobic attitudes and practices.  
1. The threat of xenophobia 
The end of Apartheid in South Africa was a violent and fraught time, but also a time of hope. 
A new government, new freedoms, and a new constitution that poetically promises that ‘We, 
the people of South Africa […] [b]elieve that South Africa belongs to all who live in it’ 
(Republic of South Africa 1996a; my emphasis). Even if this statement did not reflect the reality 
of the time, as a promise it created hopes of a future in which this will be true, in which the 
country will belong to everyone, and everyone living within the country’s borders will belong. 




and many are still waiting on the promise. Indeed, the statement remains just as inaccurate now 
as it was then. The reality is that the story of South African democracy is also a story of rising 
xenophobia and violence toward outsiders. If we were hopeful before the last decade, the 
widespread violent xenophobic attacks in 2008 destabilised the country and confronted us with 
an ugly truth: South Africa does not belong to all who live in it. The events of 2008 were 
repeated in the years that followed. Most recently, in August and September 2019, protests 
against foreigners in Johannesburg and Tshwane lead to large-scale violence and destruction, 
with the threat of retaliation from foreigners. 
In South Africa, anti-immigrant attitudes have been on the rise since 1994 (see SAMP 2001, 
2008), with the majority of South Africans adopting a ‘South Africa First’ policy (Nyamnjoh 
2006: 37). The rise in xenophobic or anti-immigrant sentiments is not unique to South Africa. 
Migration is increasingly becoming a central issue in political debates, campaigns, and 
commentary worldwide. Two of the leading world-powers – the United States of America and 
the United Kingdom – recently swore in leaders who are known for their explicit anti-
immigrant or anti-foreigner sentiments (among a host of other anti-others sentiments they 
hold). Right-wing movements are gaining popular support and seats in governments across the 
globe. In South Africa’s most recent general elections (May 2019), the far-right Freedom Front 
Plus almost doubled their support. There are multiple reasons and causes for the resurgence of 
right-wing populism, but globally it has the same results: xenophobic attitudes are rising, 
xenophobes are becoming more violent, and xenophobia is being normalised.  
The harms of xenophobia will be explained in more detail in the chapters to come, but to 
understand why xenophobia is a problem, and a phenomenon that deserves closer study and 
attention, I will briefly consider the May 2008 attacks in South Africa: 
During more than 2 weeks of deadly violence that started in Alexandra, 
Johannesburg, but soon spread across the entire country, 62 people were killed, 
many more were wounded or raped, while countless homes and foreign-owned 
business were looted or destroyed. In the end more than a hundred thousand people 
were displaced from their homes. For the first time since the end of Apartheid, the 
South African government – after initially downplaying the violence – ended up 




For the moment, I do not want to focus on the motivations behind these attacks. I want to focus 
on the consequences: 62 dead (Ernesto Nhamuave being one of them), many more injured 
(physically, psychologically), property stolen or destroyed, more than a hundred thousand 
displaced. Reading such a brief description of the attack, we may think that those who lost 
lives, property, homes, those who were injured, are the only victims. Yet these attacks had a 
profoundly negative effect not only on those who were directly harmed, but also on other 
foreigners residing in South Africa and on the South African citizenry itself. Not all of the 62 
people who were killed were foreign – some were South African citizens mistakenly identified 
as foreign. The conditions of insecurity and violence that reigned for those two weeks 
endangered everyone living in Alexandra and the other sites of violence, not only the intended 
targets of the attacks. Furthermore, the attacks destabilised the country as a whole. Xenophobic 
violence does not only endanger the lives and property of the people directly concerned, but it 
also poses a very real threat to the economic, social, and political stability of the country and, 
consequently, to the survival of South Africa’s democracy. The fact that such events occur also 
says something about the kind of country South Africa is and the kind of people we are. The 
moral harm in murder, in oppression, and in exclusion is not only directed at the victim, but 
also at the perpetrator.  
The harm of xenophobia lies in the kind of moral world and political realities it creates – a 
world in which there is little security or trust. Our very basic ability to live together, to work 
and create and interact and exist, is threatened by xenophobia. Hannah Arendt (1976: 155, 206) 
uses the metaphor of a boomerang to explain how oppressive ideologies and rigid identities are 
harmful not only to those who are excluded, but also to those who are initially included. If 
belonging is rigidly defined and policed, the circle of who ‘truly belongs’, whether to a nation, 
a country, an ethnic or racial group, will inevitably become smaller and smaller, and the 
violence visited upon the outsiders eventually returns to destroy the insiders.3 
The rise of xenophobia in South Africa is not disconnected from the normalisation of 
xenophobia globally. Nor should my language – ‘rise’, ‘normalisation’ – fool us into thinking 
there was ever a time when xenophobia was not present in human societies. Xenophobia in 
South Africa is a product of our very specific history, but it is also a manifestation of a global 
                                                 
3 Arendt also uses the metaphor in reference to imperial violence (throwing the boomerang out) and the violence 





trend that forms part of the story of human history. When I speak of xenophobia, I therefore 
speak both of local instances and a more general human tendency. I will specify which, where 
necessary, but this dual nature of xenophobia should be kept in mind. Xenophobia, I will show, 
manifests in different ways in different contexts. It is even motivated by different reasons, fears, 
or desires. It is a multifaceted problem, and any attempt at a solution will have to look at both 
the specific and the broader contexts. Where I write about particular contexts, I choose to focus 
on South Africa because it is the context from which I am writing, and because the specific 
way in which xenophobia manifests in South Africa problematises our common conception of 
the broader phenomenon, and casts light on the misconceptions we have when thinking about 
xenophobia.  
While xenophobia is by no means a new phenomenon, it has received comparatively little 
attention in academic philosophy. Where xenophobia is discussed, it tends to be incorporated 
into broader discussions on racism, nationalism, or ethnic violence (see Bekker and Carlton 
1996; Kim and Sundstrom 2014), and mostly in fields such as sociology or political science. It 
is the purpose of this study to address this deficiency in the philosophical literature. We need 
a conception of xenophobia that recognises its relation to other forms of oppression, especially 
racism, while also providing us with a definition of xenophobia as a distinct phenomenon. 
Conceptual clarity is necessary if we are to identify xenophobia. Equating it with racism may 
blind us to specific instances of discrimination, while also blinding us to the particular kinds 
of harm victims of xenophobic discrimination face and experience. 
Against this background, this dissertation aims to make sense of xenophobia as a specific idea 
of belonging and exclusion as it applies to societies. This idea is not only a feature of individual 
beliefs and attitudes but is also feature of a xenophobic social order. My secondary focus, then, 
is on how a xenophobic social order is sustained by exclusionary narratives. This is not an 
empirical enterprise, in which I attempt to make sense of the material conditions that lead to 
xenophobia in specific contexts. I rather provide a conceptual and normative framework within 
which political philosophers can engage with the issue, from the perspective of political 
narratives. Where I do focus on specific contexts, the aim is to illustrate points made or to show 
how our preconceptions about xenophobia may not fit reality. 
The importance of narratives in fashioning individual and collective lives has long been a 




1989, Arendt 1958, 1968, 1982, and Rorty 1989a, 1989b, Schechtman 1996, 2007). Such 
narratives can comprise stories (e.g. in novels or biographies), but also artworks, images, 
games, public discourse, propaganda, political speeches and codified law. My theoretical 
starting point here is narrative theories of identity, specifically the narrative self-constitution 
view developed by Marya Schechtman, according to which “we constitute ourselves as persons 
by forming a narrative self-conception according to which we experience and organize our 
lives” (Schechtman 2007: 162).  
This is true for individual lives, but it is just as applicable to political lives. The narrative 
approach to identity can also help us understand our group identities, and how they were 
formed. By “political lives” I mean our relationships with others that are mediated by the 
public, political norms of a society – including laws and other institutionalised rules of 
behaviour that define specific social roles. These laws and norms are, in a sense, the 
codification of implicit beliefs and attitudes that circulate in a society, and therefore also 
contain identity-shaping narratives. My claim is that these beliefs and attitudes include the 
narratives we tell and that, once a particular set of norms of behaviour has been 
institutionalised, it also helps to shape, delimit and inform the kinds of narratives that are 
possible to tell in future and the kinds of identities we will have. The narratives that underlie 
our group identities and political norms, especially our membership norms, determine our 
attitude toward foreigners. 
My diagnosis of exclusionary narratives as a feature of xenophobia will therefore be 
supplemented with an inquiry into the kinds of narratives that might foster inclusion rather than 
exclusion, belonging rather than ostracism, hospitality rather than resentment. To this end, I 
provide directions for new narratives, and provide a strategy for adapting the kind of language 
that we use in our narratives to counter the kinds of essentialist thinking exhibited in 
xenophobic narratives and their accompanying prejudices, attitudes, and beliefs. For this I rely 
on the work of Leslie (2007, 2017), who looks at the way in which we make generalisations, 
and how that contributes to us ascribing essentialist characteristics onto other groups. I also 
follow Arendt (1982) and Nussbaum (1995) in connecting narratives and narration to the 
imaginative transposition into the lives of others and the ability to judge their lives from a 
position beyond the confines of their immediate interests. For Nussbaum, we develop this 
ability primarily through an engagement with literary narratives. Arendt, in turn, treats this 




“teaching the imagination to go visiting” (Arendt 1982: 18), which depends on engaging with 
narratives of all kinds. These models of narrative judgment, I will argue, provide us with a way 
forward: they enable us to let go of restrictive stereotypes, to imagine ourselves in the place of 
the foreigner, and to imagine a world in which foreigners also have a place.  
The final contribution of this study is to provide two contexts in which anti-xenophobic 
narratives can be told and narrative judgment be implemented: in our education system and 
curricula, where both our approach to teaching and the content of our curricula should be 
approached narratively. One way of doing this is through guided play, and indeed this is a 
narrative tool which can be implemented not only where children are concerned, but in contexts 
ranging from private homes, companies, sports clubs, and public institutions. The incorporation 
of play is not arbitrary, for we will see that it is a strategy which humans and other animals use 
to diffuse tension between ingroups and outgroups. This tension, and the aggression which 
often accompanies it, is part of our earliest development as a species, and xenophobia as we 
know it today may merely be a contemporary expression of our primal fear of strangers. Yet 
instead of seeing the latter as an eternal condemnation, or adopting a Hobbesian view of human 
nature, our equally primal playful instinct shows us that there are alternative possibilities of 
dealing with such tensions. Where xenophobia is a reaction to our apprehensions about 
belonging, play situates us in positive relation to those around us. 
2. The material aspect of xenophobia 
This dissertation approaches the explanation of xenophobia predominantly from a conceptual, 
psychological, and political perspective. This requires justification, as there is a strong link in 
scholarship and popular literature on xenophobia between socio-economic difficulties and 
xenophobia. I therefore want to note from the outset that I do not argue against such 
explanations of xenophobia, nor do I doubt their relevance and importance. It is crucial that we 
understand the material conditions that contribute to a rise in xenophobic attitudes and 
outbursts of xenophobic violence, not only for the sake of explanation but also for that of 
successful efforts to combat xenophobia. Very often, xenophobic violence is the expression of 
frustrations felt by the attackers due to their own struggles to provide for their families and 
meet their basic needs (as the poem by Shoro indeed illustrates). What follows below should 
not be taken as the explanation of xenophobia, but as a contribution to our overall 
understanding of the phenomenon. We should approach the study of xenophobia holistically, 




I offer two main motivations for my decision to shift my focus from the material question, to 
other aspects of xenophobia. Firstly, it is an established fact that xenophobia and other forms 
of exclusion, discrimination, and accompanying violence increases in times of economic 
insecurity, political instability, and social transformation. People who suffer seek explanations 
for their suffering, and as we will see in Chapter 1 foreigners often become the scapegoat. This 
connection has been well-documented in academic literature, and for that reason I feel that I 
cannot make a new contribution. Several studies that look at xenophobia from this perspective 
are cited in this dissertation, and those scholars illuminate this aspect of xenophobia better than 
I can. I found the work of Neocosmos (2010), Landau (2006, 2011) and Nyamnjoh (2006) 
especially illuminating in this regard, while Misago (2009, 2011) and Hågensen & De Jager 
(2016) provide us with us with a thorough explanation of the ways in which local social and 
micropolitical factors contribute to the prevalence of xenophobic violence in specific 
communities.  
My second motivation for having a slightly different focus than other studies on xenophobia is 
my belief that relying only on material or socio-economic explanations of xenophobia is 
limited. As important as such insights are, the question of why we specifically target or 
scapegoat foreigners (rather than other groups) remains unanswered. This is the main question 
I am concerned with in this study – why, in times of economic distress, do we choose to hunker 
down and exclude ‘outsiders’? To answer this, we should look at the political conditions that 
enable us to exclude others in this way (Chapter 1), and at the psychological factors and 
historical and evolutionary realities which gave rise to this tendency (Chapter 2). This study 
should therefore be read alongside literature that focus on social, economic, and local political 
explanations of xenophobia. 
3. A note on language  
The concept of xenophobia will be defined and fleshed out in the first two chapters of this 
study, but the following should be noted from the outset: I use ‘xenophobia’ to refer not only 
to acts of violence against foreigners, or to attitudes and actions of individuals. Xenophobia 
can be present on the individual (personal), group (e.g. citizenry), and institutional levels. 
Attitudes, beliefs, feelings, and actions can be xenophobic. Where necessary, I will indicate 
whether I am referring to xenophobic violence, attitudes, prejudices and beliefs, or the effects 




I also refer to xenophobia as a ‘phenomenon’, meaning, a thing we experience and perceive in 
the world. Our self-experiences form part of this, as our thinking about self-identity and the 
identity of others can contribute to xenophobia. At other times, I refer to xenophobia as a form 
of oppression, recognising the ways in which xenophobic attitudes and prejudices can be 
institutionalised and used to hold people down. In this regard, we should think of xenophobia 
as we do about racism and sexism – as social realities and phenomena that manifest (overtly or 
covertly) in the world and have specific effects and practical consequences, that are themselves 
xenophobic or racist or sexist.  
As we will come to see, our language has a profound effect on how we perceive others. This is 
something one should be especially careful of when writing about xenophobia. However, as I 
discovered, it is difficult to write about xenophobia without in some way relying on the very 
distinctions that are constitutive of xenophobic attitudes: us and them, citizen and foreigner. 
To write about xenophobic violence in South Africa without using the words ‘South Africans’ 
and ‘foreigners’ becomes confusing. I could not think of a way to overcome this difficulty, 
other than admitting it upfront and using it to show how ingrained in our language such 
distinctions are. So I use the word ‘foreigner’ to refer to those who are considered alien, 
outsiders, or those who are legally foreign or have a different nationality.  
Writing from within the South African context, I also speak of ‘us’ and ‘our Constitution’, not 
to be possessive of South Africanness, but to alert readers to the ways in which their lives are 
also enmeshed in the conditions that contribute to xenophobia. We run the risk, when speaking 
of such matters, of blaming others while not asking ourselves whether we too are xenophobic, 
or benefit from a xenophobic system, or are complacent in a way which allows xenophobia to 
flourish in our communities. This is neither helpful nor responsible. 
4. A note on methodology 
Since this is a dissertation in philosophy, my focus is conceptual and evaluative rather than 
empirical. That is, I intend to clarify the concepts of narrative identity and xenophobia, so as 
to establish when and under what conditions the former might be conducive to the latter. Once 
we have a clearer definition of xenophobia, it will be possible to identify instances or examples 
of xenophobia and xenophobic political narratives. This will enable me, in turn, to develop an 





Existing narratives (e.g. newspaper articles reporting on the xenophobic violence in recent 
years; etc.) will be analysed to identify common or recurring themes (Chapter 5). The aim of 
my research is to evaluate the concepts xenophobia and political narratives, and not to provide 
a case study of specific instances of xenophobia or xenophobic narratives. Given that my 
concern is with political narratives as a feature of xenophobia, I will limit the analysis of 
narratives to narratives found in public spheres (such as the media, legislation, and politicians’ 
statements). I will mainly, although not exclusively, focus on xenophobic narratives in South 
Africa.  
This dissertation remains a philosophical investigation into narrative identity, the phenomenon 
of xenophobia and questions of belonging and membership. Where empirical evidence is 
required (e.g. prevalence of xenophobia in specific societies, examples of specific instances of 
xenophobic attitudes or violence), I will rely on relevant published literature (e.g. SAMP 2001, 
2008, Crush and Pendleton 2007, Nyamnjoh 2006). The choice of scientific literature was 
determined by a wide reading on the subject, where I found the same studies were repeatedly 
referred to or relied on. I therefore take these studies to be authoritative.   My aim is to develop 
an appropriate conceptual and evaluative framework for understanding the empirical 
phenomena, and not to engage directly in empirical research. On the other hand, while this is a 
philosophical and academic text, the themes I am addressing are relevant outside academia and 
theoretical thinking. My concerns are not merely academic. For this reason, I attempt to write 
in a language that is as accessible to those outside academia as possible and rely on sources 
that are also clear and accessible. Xenophobia poses an immense threat to the safety and 
stability of society, and for this reason it should be a topic of serious conversation and debate 
in all sectors of society. This is my contribution. 
5. Summary of chapters 
In Chapter 1, ‘Xenophobia and Racism’, I provide an overview of the relationship between 
xenophobia and racism, with specific reference to xenophobia in South Africa and its origins 
in our colonial and Apartheid history, before arguing for a distinct conception of xenophobia. 
I argue that, while xenophobia and racism often go together and are mutually reinforcing forms 
of oppression, they differ in origin and in effect. I consider David Haekwon Kim and Ronald 
Sundstrom’s (2014) definition of xenophobia as civic ostracism, and while agreeing with them 
that the moral harm of xenophobia lies in such ostracism, I argue that civic ostracism alone 




when xenophobic, is based on an idea of foreignness and accompanying ideas about belonging. 
In contemporary societies this finds expression in how we think about citizenship, and I 
therefore return to South Africa as an example, showing how citizenship and belonging is 
linked with indigeneity and origin, therefore precluding the possibility of foreigners belonging. 
This places foreigners in a peculiarly vulnerable position, which allows us to use them as 
scapegoats for all manner of societal ills. The commonly accepted link between xenophobia 
and scapegoating is therefore considered in this chapter, but I argue that we still need to ask 
why specifically foreigners are targeted, which brings us back to the question of belonging. 
Understanding xenophobia in this light points us toward the distinct origins of xenophobia, 
which I investigate further in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 2, ‘Searching for the Origins of Xenophobia’, builds on the previous chapter which 
argued that xenophobia can be distinguished from racism based on its origins. This chapter 
therefore looks at xenophobia not as it manifests in contemporary times, but rather at its 
prepolitical and psychological motivations and origins. Firstly, I consider it as a form of 
prejudice, and I analyse four prominent theories that seek to explain prejudice: social identity 
theory, cultural socialisation theory, contact theories, and group threat theory. All of these 
theories can illuminate xenophobia for us in some way. I argue that individual instances of 
xenophobic discrimination, or individual prejudices, can be motivated with different reasons, 
and that these theories show us the role identity formation plays in xenophobia, but also the 
role that fear plays. I therefore then turn my attention to the question of fear, situating the 
origins of our fear of strangers in our evolutionary history. While our seemingly inherent 
tendency to be fearful of strangers may seem to general to be of use to our understanding of 
xenophobia today, I argue that by looking at how animals handle outgroup hostility may 
provide us with novel ways to reduce our own hostilities, an idea which I develop further in 
Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 3, ‘Belonging and Home’, I link our underlying fear of strangers with our fear of 
being displaced and our apprehensions about belonging. Xenophobia, by excluding some, also 
makes a claim about belonging: I belong, you do not. Related to this is the notion of place, and 
of having a place in the world. Belonging also calls up notions of home. Home, place, 
displacement, and replacement are the dominant themes in this chapter. I argue that having a 
place in the world is a precondition for freedom, and that being displaced is harmful as it robs 




xenophobe and the person against whom xenophobia is directed. Xenophobia is inextricably 
linked to nationalism, which is born out of isolation and a longing for home. Nationalism 
provides a false home, but one that is homogenous and demands absolute loyalty. For this 
reason, belonging can be exclusionary. The consequence of this is the displacement of those 
who we do not think belong. Foreigners are displaced from their own homes yet struggle to 
find a new home in host countries. I consider the harms of displacement with reference to the 
dangers of statelessness, homelessness, and Cara Nine’s (2017) work on homes as extensions 
of our cognitive functioning. This chapter illustrates not only why we value belonging, and 
how that could lead to apprehensions of belonging, with dire consequences, but also why we 
should ensure belonging for everyone. This chapter also serves as a bridge between the 
preceding analysis of xenophobia, the first aim of this study, and the following investigation 
into narratives and narrative identity, with the aim of achieving the second end of this study. 
Chapter 4, ‘Narrative Identity’, is primarily concerned with the role that stories and narratives 
play in our conceptions of our individual and group identities. Such identities are not removed 
from the groups and places we belong to but shape our thinking about belonging. How we think 
about ourselves and about others determines how we treat others. As the narrative theory of 
identity is usually applied to questions of personal identity, I start my discussion there. I 
investigate Marya Schechtman’s theory of narrative identity and argue that it can be extended 
to explain group or political identity. I argue that narratives and storytelling are devices that 
people rely on to give shape and order their worlds and to give meaning to their worlds, while 
also being normative with regards to the future. The content and structure of our narratives 
therefore has a profound effect on the shape of our world, and who we choose to include and 
exclude. I consider several points of critique levelled against the narrative view, but ultimately, 
I conclude that these can be overcome.  
The final chapter of this study, ‘New Narratives’, is in part a response to two possible criticisms 
of my argument that I identified in the previous chapter: that story-telling is limited in its ability 
to bring about real change, and that people can tell false narratives. As examples of false 
narratives, I consider common narratives in South African discourse that I would categorise as 
xenophobic, and indicate how these narratives are based on ignorant, false, or unfounded 
assumptions. I make suggestions on how we can counter this. In the second section, I address 
the question of institutional change, and suggest directions that our narratives can take that 




to achieve this is to sever the ties between citizenship and indigeneity, and between belonging 
and territory. I consider this with reference to Joseph Carens (1987, 2000, 2016) and others. 
While providing directions which new narratives can take, or themes they can address, I devote 
the rest of the chapter to practical ways in which we can adapt our narratives and implement 
them. I suggest that we change our language, specifically when making generic statements 
about groups of people (Leslie 2007, 2017), for xenophobic narratives exhibit essentialist 
thinking, which Leslie shows is a product of the ways in which we use language to categorise. 
In the third section, I move from the kinds of narratives we should be telling, to how we should 
incorporate them into our institutions. I establish a link between narrative, the imagination, and 
judgement, based on the work of Martha Nussbaum (1995) and Hannah Arendt (1982). A 
narrative approach to judgment, both legal and political, will ensure that our judgments reflect 
the fullness of human life, while also being sympathetic toward the challenges faced 
specifically by foreigners. In the fourth section, I discuss the possibility of incorporating 
narratives into our education system, by approaching teaching the curriculum narratively, but 
also by including the narratives suggested earlier in the chapter in curriculum content. Finally, 
I consider a novel way to reduce xenophobia: through play. Play not only teaches us 
cooperation and trust, but it can also take on a narrative form. It is therefore a useful tool that 
can be utilised in all walks of life – schools, personal interactions, company training sessions 






Chapter 1: Xenophobia in Contemporary Society 
 
Introduction 
Detailed analyses of xenophobia in philosophy are rare. Studies of this phenomenon are more 
common in other, more empirical disciplines. Such studies usually investigate xenophobia in a 
specific context, often with the aim of explaining the social and economic causes behind a 
particular instance of xenophobia. At other times, xenophobia is a theme in studies on 
immigration, refugeehood, or nationalism. Across all disciplines, xenophobia is most 
commonly equated with racism, or seen as a specific form of racism. The aim of this study is 
to take xenophobia seriously as a phenomenon in its own right; to understand it as a historical 
phenomenon, as a concept, and as a feature of contemporary society, and to imagine ways in 
which its negative effects can be counteracted. To this end, we first have to understand how 
xenophobia is similar to and distinct from other forms of discrimination, especially racism, and 
what its possible defining characteristics are. That is the purpose of the present chapter. 
While many instances of xenophobia will also be instances of racism, I will show that we 
nevertheless have good reason to treat these as distinct concepts, both for the sake of our 
understanding of xenophobia and of our anti-racist efforts. My discussion takes its lead from 
the work of David Haekwon Kim and Ronald R. Sundstrom (2014), in which xenophobia is 
defined as ‘civic ostracism’. Kim and Sundstrom’s work is relevant because (i) they offer one 
of the few discussions in philosophy in which xenophobia is the main focus; (ii) the relationship 
between xenophobia and racism is of central concern in their work; and (iii) they offer an 
account of xenophobia that helps us to make sense of individual and institutional forms of 
xenophobia, as well as the different ways in which xenophobia manifests in different 
communities or societies. Kim and Sundstrom’s work therefore provides focus and a 
framework for this chapter. While their focus is on xenophobia in the United States specifically, 
the context-sensitive nature of their theory makes it applicable to other contexts as well, 
including South Africa. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. In Section 1, I consider the relation between 
xenophobia and racism, looking at the overlaps but ultimately arguing that we need a distinct 
definition of xenophobia. Section 1.1 deals with the undeniable link that is often found between 




provides us with examples of xenophobia applied in a racist way, but also problematises the 
too easy explanation that ‘xenophobia is a form of racism’. This requires a historical account 
of xenophobia in South Africa, that, I will show, is in part a product of our colonial and 
Apartheid history, but that is also not entirely removed from global trends and influences. I 
draw mainly on the work of Francis B. Nyamnjoh (2006), Michael Neocosmos (2010), and 
David Mario Matsinhe (2011). Yet even as xenophobia in South Africa is racist in its 
application, in Section 1.2 I argue that we should also focus on the points of divergence between 
the two phenomena. To do this, I call upon the work of Kim and Sundstrom, specifically their 
argument that our national narratives of race make us blind to forms of discrimination that do 
not fit those narratives. The consequence of this, if we see xenophobia merely as a form of 
racism, is that racism shelters xenophobia (Sundstrom 2013). Xenophobia and racism differ in 
their origins and also their effect, and a failure to distinguish between them may blind us not 
only to instances of discrimination that do not fit our national narratives, but also to ones where 
race does not play a role. The rest of the chapter will therefore be devoted to developing a 
distinct understanding of xenophobia in terms of its origins, its effects, and of the distinct 
political realities that enable and uphold it. 
Section Two engages with Kim and Sundstrom’s definition of xenophobia. They argue that 
xenophobia is distinct from racism in its effect – xenophobia places certain groups in 
vulnerable positions by excluding them from the civic mainstream. This they call ‘civic 
ostracism’, which they identify as the core and distinguishing characteristic of xenophobia. 
This understanding of xenophobia helps us to realise how pervasive xenophobia is, in the sense 
that it affects every aspect of the foreigner’s life, from how they socialise and with whom, to 
whether they have a political voice. The moral harm in xenophobia lies in this exclusion, as 
exclusion also prevents foreigners from accessing public goods. I link this discussion to 
Hannah Arendt’s warning about the dangers of exclusion and statelessness. Understanding 
xenophobia as civic ostracism helps us to recognise the particular ways in which foreigners are 
targeted and affected, and is useful in conceptualising the moral harm in xenophobia. However, 
I challenge Kim and Sundstrom’s claim that civic ostracism is the core or distinguishing feature 
of xenophobia, as it could be argued that other forms of oppression also ostracise certain groups 
in this way. I argue that civic ostracism is the consequence of xenophobia, that has at its core 
an idea of foreignness, which in turn is shaped by how we think about belonging. This provides 
us with the reason or motivation behind xenophobia. Our ideas about belonging and 




objectification. Once ‘foreigners’ have been identified, they are ostracised. This creates a 
condition of perpetual foreignness, in which inclusion or membership is precluded. 
In the final section of this chapter, I look at how our ideas about belonging and foreignness 
find political expression in our membership norms and conception of citizenship, which in turn 
creates the kind of political conditions under which xenophobia can flourish. I discuss 
Neocosmos’s (2010) four theses on citizenship, xenophobia, and political identity, in which he 
explains how South Africans, individuals and the state, see citizenship as something given and 
something dependent on indigeneity or being originally from South Africa. This conception of 
citizenship effectively excludes foreigners (even those who are naturalised citizens) from true 
belonging and the benefits of full citizenship. This shows how political factors contribute to 
the vulnerability of foreigners, which in turn makes them easy targets for discrimination and 
violence. The second part of this section deals with a common explanation of xenophobia: the 
scapegoat theory. I show how the scapegoat mechanism works, with reference to the work of 
René Girard (1986), but I argue that scapegoating itself requires an explanation. We are able 
to scapegoat foreigners, precisely because of the political circumstances created by our ideas 
of foreignness.  
Ultimately, this chapter establishes the link between racism and xenophobia in specific contexts 
but shows that we are dealing with two distinct phenomena with different origins. The origin 
of xenophobia in contemporary society lies in our ideas about belonging and the idea of 
foreignness, and this determines how we treat foreigners and also how we think about 
membership to political communities.  
1. Racism and xenophobia: connections and distinctions 
In academic literature, media reports and editorials, government communications and various 
organisations’ websites we often come across the phrase ‘racism and xenophobia’. Racism and 
xenophobia fuel anti-immigrant protests in the United States, racism and xenophobia underlie 
anti-refugee sentiments in Europe. ‘Racism’ is often named and discussed independently – 
indeed, there is a wealth of literature on this topic. Yet by comparison we rarely read about 
‘xenophobia’ on its own. This seems to be due to an assumption that our understanding of race 
and racism adequately captures what there is to know about xenophobia. So, for example, the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, on their website for reporting hate 




prejudice or hostility towards a person’s race, colour, language, nationality, or national or 
ethnic origin” (OSCE ODIHR n.d., my emphasis). The connection between xenophobia and 
racism is often emphasised in this way, to the extent that xenophobia is sometimes equated 
with racism. We cannot deny that xenophobia and racism intersect in a myriad of ways, or that 
they are often “mutually supporting forms of oppression” (Yakushko 2009: 47). Much of this 
chapter focuses on these intersections. In Section 1.1, my discussion of the South African 
context will illustrate the ways in which xenophobia and racism intersect. Nevertheless, as we 
will see in Section 1.2, there are also important reasons for distinguishing xenophobia from 
racism.  
1.1 Racism and xenophobia in South Africa 
Comparing xenophobia to racism seems more helpful than the broad ‘fear of strangers’, as it 
indicates to us that there is something about the stranger that is feared. Xenophobia is not 
merely a reaction to strangers, but to specific kinds of strangers. It is not aversion to all 
strangeness, but to certain forms of strangeness.4 It is the fear or hatred of strangers, but with 
added cultural baggage and political significance. Very often, the ‘stranger’ is a racial stranger 
or other: 
Although xenophobia and its ills seem to infect just about all societies experiencing 
rapid social change, not every foreigner, outsider or stranger is a target. Instead, 
nationals, citizens or locals are very careful in choosing who qualifies to be treated 
as the inferior and underserving ‘Other’, and such choices depend on the 
hierarchies of humanity informed by race, nationality, culture, class and gender. 
(Nyamnjoh 2006: 38, my emphasis) 
Who qualifies as the hated stranger differs from context to context. In South Africa, for 
example, the victims of xenophobia are predominantly black “and are targeted for their very 
blackness by a society where skin colour has always served as an excuse for whole catalogues 
of discriminatory policies and practices”, writes Francis Nyamnjoh (ibid. 49) in his 
comparative study of xenophobia in Southern Africa. Nyamnjoh illustrates the complex nature 
of the xenophobic attitudes and, specifically, the xenophobic violence so common in South 
Africa: that it is directed almost exclusively at black African nationals. Asian nationals 
                                                 
4 In Chapter 2 I will consider the phenomenon’s origins in a more general fear of strangers, but it is important to 




(Chinese, Pakistanis, for example) do experience xenophobic discrimination, but to a lesser 
extent. White foreigners are almost never the targets of xenophobia.5 Following the 2008 
attacks and the increase in xenophobic violence ever since, South Africa has become known 
for its animosity towards other Africans. The country’s treatment of foreigners and its 
immigration policies has earned it the reputation of an aggressive state that ‘lives up against, 
rather than with, its neighbours’ (Vale 2002: 10). 
Xenophobia in South Africa is therefore particularly interesting for two reasons: (i) it 
undermines the idea that xenophobia can be simply equated with racism, as xenophobic 
violence is often directed at black Africans, and often perpetrated by black South Africans6, 
yet (ii) race does seem to play a significant role in determining the victim of xenophobic 
violence or discrimination, here and elsewhere. To understand this complex relationship 
between racism and xenophobia in South Africa, we therefore first need to ask how and why 
other African nationals are the targets. The following discussion will of necessity be brief. My 
aim is to use South Africa as an illustrative example. For studies that comprehensively deal 
with xenophobia in South(ern) Africa, see (Misago et al. 2009; Landau 2011; Nyamnjoh 2006; 
Neocosmos 2010; SAMP 2001, 2008).  
That South African xenophobia is mainly concerned with Africans is illustrated by the 
derogatory term used to indicate ‘foreigner(s)’: makwerekwere. This term refers almost 
exclusively to black Africans, who are seen as barbaric, backwards, “the darkest of the dark-
skinned [and] less enlightened even when more educated than the lighter-skinned South 
African blacks” (Nyamnjoh 2006: 39). Unlike much of racist terminology, which started out 
as neutral description in one language but gradually came to be used in a derogatory way, the 
term makwerekwere was derogatory form the outset, with the purpose of denying black African 
immigrants “a name of their choice” (Nyamnjoh 2006: 14). The term not only denies other 
                                                 
5 Where white foreigners are targets of violence, it is mostly a case of opportunistic crime rather than an attack on 
them because they are not South African. 
6 Note that black South Africans are not the only xenophobic demographic in South Africa. Xenophobia is 
commonly seen in this way, especially in the media, because of the perpetrators of the 2008 and 2015 xenophobic 
attacks. However, harmful xenophobic attitudes are held by the majority of South Africans (see Crush & Pendleton 
2007 for an in-depth study). We also tend to think only of certain forms of violence as ‘xenophobic violence’, 
where the intentions are explicitly anti-foreigner. However, foreigners can be the victims of violent attacks and 
such attacks can be xenophobic even if the intention behind the attack is not. An example would be violence 
toward undocumented farm labourers or domestic workers. Such violence is xenophobic in the sense that the 
victims are not protected by the laws and state institutions in the same way as citizens would be. Undocumented 
foreigners often have no recourse to the law (i.e. they cannot report crimes against them, for fear of detection). 




Africans a name, but also an intelligible language – it is an onomatopoeic reference to how 
other African languages sound to the ears of South Africans. Nyamnjoh (ibid. 39) suggests that 
the term is “perhaps reminiscent of the Boers who named the local black communities 
‘hottentots’ to denote ‘stutterers’”. In this sense, it is also reminiscent of the origins of the word 
‘barbaric’, from the Greek barbaroi/barbaros, meaning foreign or not Greek, also an 
onomatopoeic reference to the speech of non-Greeks. A similar word exists in Sanskrit 
(barbara – stammering). Creating names for community outsiders is one of the most basic 
ways in which humans discriminate (and have discriminated throughout history), in which we 
put up barriers between us and them. It is effective, because it allows us to ignore others’ plight 
and attempts at communication or forming relationships. 
To deny people an intelligible language also infantilises them, or even dehumanise them by 
implicitly comparing their language to the noises of animals. It also serves to preclude any 
form of contact or interaction, as well as any responsibility toward the other – if your language 
is unintelligible, I cannot understand anything you say and, consequently, you cannot ask 
anything of me. This is not mere name-calling, like bullies in a playground. To call people 
makwerekwere is to exclude them not only from the political community, but from humanity 
itself. Hannah Arendt (1998: 3), who identified our ability to speak with our political nature, 
argues that when one is excluded from the polis, one is deprived of a place in which one’s 
speech makes sense or where one’s voice can be heard. Naming a foreigner makwerekwere 
amounts to excluding them from the political, social, and moral sphere.  
We are familiar with historical examples of the link between names and violence. Zimbabwean 
poet Tariro Ndoro (2019: 63) poignantly expresses this in her poem ‘Black Easter 
(reflections)’, which deals with her personal experiences of xenophobia in South Africa: 
I say, each life matters 
           you speak of liberty, emancipation 
& other Pan-African rhetoric 
but you invented words like kwerekwere 
& expected the necklacing not to happen 
I tweeted no to xenophobia 




Ndoro highlights the fact that the way we speak about others, the language we use determines 
how we see them and, consequently, what we think we are justified in doing to them. Think, 
for example, of the language used by the Hutus to refer to the Tutsis in the time leading up to 
the 1994 Rwandan genocide: Tutsis as snakes, or cockroaches. In naming them so, some Hutus 
came to see their compatriots not as fellow citizens, neighbours, or simply human beings, but 
as pests that need to be eradicated. In using this kind of language, specific associations are 
made. Snakes are associated with danger, cockroaches are unhygienic. There is also the 
association with specific practices – killing snakes before they kill us; eradicating cockroaches 
before they spread disease. The association between the words used and specific practices in 
turn enabled and inspired violent actions (Beaver & Stanley 2019: 506). In Chapters 4-5 I 
discuss this relationship between ‘words and machetes’ with reference to narrative theories of 
identity. 
The dehumanisation and infantilisation that takes place when we use words such as 
makwerekwere is not unconnected to race and South Africa’s history of racism. The term 
makwerekwere does not only mean someone who speaks gibberish. It is also used to point out 
a foreigner from an economically and culturally ‘backward’ country, and somewhere far distant 
(Nyamnjoh 2006: 39). White foreigners are assumed to come from rich and culturally 
sophisticated countries. The link between xenophobia and racism here is clear, as this 
application of the term makwerekwere follows the logic of white supremacy, a legacy of the 
colonial and Apartheid regimes. It is also a consequence of what has been dubbed ‘South 
African exceptionalism’ – an idea or ideology not wholly separate from the colonial legacy. 
The underlying idea is that South Africa is unlike (i.e. better than) other African countries, and 
therefore not really ‘African’, but rather “somehow more akin to a Southern European or Latin 
American country”, with higher levels of industrialisation and a more liberal democracy 
(Neocosmos 2010: 4). 
The assumption is that South Africa is economically stronger, has more developed industries, 
is culturally more sophisticated, and also more peaceful than the rest of Africa. Dubious 
assumptions, to say the least. Even granted how developed our industries are, Neocosmos (ibid. 
5) rightly points out that foreign migrant labour was and still is crucial in the development of 
our industries. South African exceptionalism is also in part the product of Apartheid narratives, 
which saw South Africa as the last standing white-led government, a bastion against the 




“accidentally and […] irritatingly” at the foot of the “dark continent” (Lazarus 2004: 610). That 
white South Africans hold this view is unsurprising. The xenophobia of white South Africans 
is very intimately linked with racism toward all Africans/people of colour. Historically, the 
belief that the land belongs to the Afrikaners, as God’s chosen people, played an important role 
in Afrikaner identity (an aspect of which some still cling to). This idea crops up in discussions 
about land distribution and restitution, but doubtlessly also plays a role in xenophobia toward 
outsiders (i.e. those not ‘of the land’).  
South African exceptionalism as an ideology or national myth is also present, however, in the 
black South African social unconscious, as the colonised “idealise themselves in the image of 
the coloniser” (Matsinhe 2011: 301). Matsinhe refers to Fanon’s Black Skins, White Masks 
(2008), where Fanon theorises about the internalisation of racism in the colonial subject. 
Internalised racism leads the individual to unconsciously “distrust what is black in me” (ibid. 
148). Such self-loathing, argues Matsinhe (2011: 302), leads the self-loathers to “loathe those 
who resemble them the most”, as they serve as reminders of their own current or historic 
oppression. Here we see, and not for the last time in this study, that xenophobia has more to do 
with the xenophobe and generally very little with the reality of the person(s) at whom 
xenophobia is directed. 
Nyamnjoh (2006: 40) links the striving of South Africans to prove themselves better than other 
Africans to modernisation and the exclusion, for much of the country’s recent history, of black 
South Africans from the benefits of modernisation. For a very long time, black South Africans 
were not considered (both in the minds of white South Africans, and legally) as citizens of 
South Africa, but rather “foreign natives” (Neocosmos 2010: ix). This condition of foreignness 
was initially introduced by the British colonial administration in 1913 with the Native’s Land 
Act, and subsequently formulated by the Apartheid government, who declared indigenous 
South Africans as foreigners in their own land. Following the implementation of the 1913 Act, 
Sol Plaatjie (2007: 21) wrote: “Awaking on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African 
Native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth.” Legally, this 
foreign status was ended when full citizenship was extended to all South Africans, but 
effectively many South Africans still find themselves in a precarious position. The influx of 
other Africans becomes “a nightmare from the past, for South African blacks eager to prove 
their modernity and harvest the benefits of full citizenship for long mystified by whiteness” 




‘Other’” (ibid. 38), South Africans therefore still follow the logic of Apartheid racial 
hierarchies, where a lighter skin is understood to mean a better, more civilised, person. Taking 
this into account, it is undeniable that racism and xenophobia are mutually supporting and 
reinforcing forms of discrimination and oppression.  
Xenophobia in South Africa, and more broadly in post-colonial Africa, is also linked to the 
history of liberation struggles on the continent, and the anti-Apartheid struggles in South 
Africa. During the early days of the liberation struggles, the reigning conception of citizenship 
was “unifying, inclusive” and not based on birth (or indigeneity), but residence, and was the 
product of a kind of nationalism that sought to unite different factions against the colonial 
power (Neocosmos 2010: 9). This was also supported by Pan-Africanism and calls for 
continental unity, to see Africa as “one Africa”, rejecting “any kind of partition”, an Africa that 
is “one indivisible” (Nkrumah 1963: 217). As nations started gaining independence, however, 
this shifted. Fanon discusses this in depth in The Wretched of the Earth (2017: 165-166). 
Fanon’s concern was with the rising national chauvinism and resultant xenophobia, but also 
with tribalism and ethnic conflicts (his predictions here were sadly realised in the decades 
following the liberation struggles). He develops an account of how a liberating, inclusive 
nationalism can degenerate into national chauvinism precisely as a result of the drive for 
national – i.e. supra-tribal or ethnic – unification.   
A strong call for unification, even if it is for a good cause, may lead to unjust exclusions. South 
Africa’s post-Apartheid ‘rainbow nation’ building exercise illustrates this very well. Granting 
the necessity of trying to build a ‘new South Africa’ and reconciling black and white citizens, 
this project ultimately contributed to the increase in xenophobia since 1994. This is due, in part, 
to our failure to come to terms with, and to fix, the injustices of our past. The vaunted unity of 
the ‘rainbow nation’ papered over instead of unmaking the logic of Apartheid, which helps 
explain why the latter is still so prevalent in South African xenophobia. As Fanon shows, the 
shift from unification to chauvinism is due, in part, to the fact that pre-colonial territoriality 
(and its accompanying enmities), and the differences between the urban bourgeoisie and the 
rural classes, were ignored. To understand xenophobia in Africa, these histories need to be 
understood.  On a broader level, and of more direct concern in this study, these examples show 





Xenophobia in South Africa is therefore in part a product of colonial group relations, informed 
by our specific history and context. For Matsinhe (2011), this means that xenophobia in South 
Africa is not a particular instance of a universal phenomenon, but that what we call xenophobia 
is actually Afrophobia (ibid. 298). This accounts for the post-Apartheid rise in xenophobic 
sentiments and violent attacks, as “the victimisation of black South Africans [by the white 
government and populace] is being replaced by the victimisation of African foreigners” (ibid. 
296). Xenophobia in South Africa confuses us, as there seems to be no real visible difference 
– physical, or in terms of socioeconomic status – between the in-group and the out-group: “In 
many cases, they share ancestries, traditions and languages” (ibid). Like racism, xenophobia 
often focuses on supposed physical differences. The police and citizens identify ‘foreigners’ 
based on physical markers such as skin colour (with darker tones indicating foreignness), 
hairstyles, dress, how they walk, how they talk, and even what their inoculation marks look 
like (ibid. 303; Desai 2008: 52). Matsinhe (ibid. 297) calls this the “narcissism of minor 
differences”, a term he borrows from Freud. Antagonism between people who have a partially 
shared history and culture is possible, as are antagonistic relations between people who look 
alike.  
Remembering his earlier point on self-loathing, Matsinhe (ibid. 302) concludes that from the 
viewpoint of the South African xenophobe, “African nationals are feared, hated and distrusted 
not because they are different but because they resemble the former victims of apartheid”. 
Other African nationals remind black South Africans of their own ‘inferiority’. It is therefore 
African nationals’ bodies that allow them to be identified. Citizenship includes certain bodily 
ideals, bodies regarded as familiar. On the other side of this coin there are “fantasies of 
strangeness” (ibid.). Deviation from the former and conformity to the latter draws negative 
attention to an individual, often with dire consequences. Matsinhe views bodies as the building-
blocks of the nation, and the selection of the ‘correct’ bodies as a form of patriotism. Those 
who do not have the ‘correct’ body “are rejected, labelled coarse and strange, and denied 
belonging and usefulness” (ibid. 303). The similarities here with colonial and Apartheid 
ideologies surrounding ‘correct’ bodies are clear.  
On the one hand, the link between racism and xenophobia is enforced here, as Matsinhe 
suggests that the latter is a product of a system that was held up by racist ideologies and 
distinctions. Racism and our racist history can go some way towards explaining why the 




crucial to understanding the phenomenon. However, I hope to show that it does not fully 
explain why we are xenophobic, nor does it account for all instances of xenophobia. What 
Matsinhe’s discussion indicates is the imperfect fit between racism and xenophobia. Granted 
that racism and xenophobia very often go hand in hand, one has the feeling that there is some 
difference, even if it is difficult to put a finger on it. This will be investigated in more depth in 
the later sections of this chapter. 
What Nyamnjoh, Neocosmos, and Matsinhe all make clear is that is that the victims of 
xenophobia are not randomly chosen, but that there are historical and political reasons why one 
group of foreigners is discriminated against rather than another within a given context. Given 
that colonialism and imperialism changed the shape not only of South Africa or Africa, but the 
whole globe, it is unsurprising that race and xenophobia go hand-in-hand in other contexts as 
well. For this reason, I am sceptical about claims like Matsinhe’s that xenophobia in South 
Africa is wholly different from xenophobia elsewhere. I think it is more helpful to understand 
xenophobia as a global phenomenon that takes on different forms in different contexts. For the 
rise of xenophobia in South Africa is not only linked to the building of the rainbow nation – it 
is also linked to economic difficulties, a global problem, and the rise of anti-immigrant and 
anti-refugee sentiments worldwide. To see xenophobia in South Africa as something unique 
and separate would mean that we don’t see similar things happening elsewhere, yet we do. In 
Europe and the United States, in Brazil and Australia, we see a rise of right-wing nationalism 
and populism fuelled by xenophobic attitudes. We are not isolated from these trends.  
Part of understanding xenophobia would be to consider contextual factors and political 
circumstances, as I have done above. An account of xenophobia that does not investigate its 
ties to racism would be incomplete, especially if applied to the South African context. That we 
tend to see xenophobia as a form of racism is due to the undeniable link between the two 
phenomena, but also perhaps due to an attempt to indicate that xenophobia is as morally 
harmful as racism, as we tend to treat the two differently even as we equate them: 
In the one hand, racism is regarded today as totally inexcusable, so that, for 
example, people are held responsible for any casual racist slur in the public arena. 
On the other hand, xenophobia does not rank high on the list of moral faults, and 





Comparing racism, which is morally condemned, with xenophobia, which is often not, may 
therefore help us realise that xenophobia is also wrong. Drawing a moral analogy between 
racism and xenophobia can be a useful strategy, yet we should be careful lest in comparison, 
we oversimplify this relationship, equating the one with the other. Racism, as we will see, 
means different things in different contexts, depending on the specific history of that context. 
Racism in South Africa is understood, in a commonplace sense, as something perpetrated by 
white people against black people, both on and individual and on a structural level. This 
understanding of racism (which I do not dispute) implies that black people cannot be racist. If 
we equate racism with xenophobia, we will have to conclude that black people cannot be 
xenophobic. This leaves us with no conceptual tools to interpret or condemn certain instances 
of xenophobic violence in South Africa. What we need is a way to talk about xenophobia that 
recognises the role that racism plays in identifying the target of xenophobia, but that can also 
be identified despite our everyday ideas about what racism entails. I do not deny the necessity 
of analysing xenophobia through the lens of racism (in the way done above), but rather want 
to show why we should be wary of relying only on this lens when examining xenophobia.  
1.2 National narratives of race 
That xenophobia and racism inform and mutually enforce each other in most contexts is 
undeniable; yet it would have become clear that there is not always a perfect overlap between 
these two phenomena. There are a number of reasons why we should distinguish between the 
two. Firstly, equating xenophobia with racism prevents one from making sense of the fear of 
the stranger who belongs to the same race. The conflation may blind us to specific instances of 
discrimination or forms of oppression because they do not fit our understanding of racial 
discrimination. Above, we saw that this can be explained in certain contexts by the 
internalisation of racism and its accompanying insecurities (Fanon), yet it cannot be expected 
that every xenophobe in the world, every ‘man on the street’, is well-versed in theories and 
philosophies of race and racism. In everyday public discourse, people’s views on racism may 
be informed by less nuanced understandings of race.  
Kim and Sundstrom (2014: 21, see also Sundstrom 2013) explain how our thinking about race 
‘shelters’ xenophobia, making it difficult or even impossible for us to recognise certain 
instances of discrimination, or forms of oppression directed at specific groups, as 
discrimination or oppression. This is due to our nationalised rhetorics of racism and our 




the context is “significantly, if not uniquely, national” (ibid.). When we speak of ‘racism’, we 
are actually referring to a variety of forms of racism, each unique to a context. So, for example, 
Kim and Sundstrom (ibid.) argue that racism against Native Americans is genocide-based; 
racism against African Americans is slavery-based; and racism against Jews is based in anti-
Semitism. In South Africa, racism against black South Africans differs from racism toward 
other people of colour, both in its extent and its roots. It is the racism of colonial subjugation 
and fear of the primitive (perhaps akin to the racism directed at indigenous Americans), 
whereas the racism directed at brown/Coloured people will perhaps in part be slavery-based, 
and racism toward Indians and other Asians a product of the system of indentured labour, and 
also more connected to xenophobic ideas of the ‘foreignness’ of Asians in Africa.7 An analysis 
of these potential differences is not directly relevant to my broader study, but suffice to say that 
the hierarchy of races found in Apartheid logic illustrates the point that we are dealing with 
racisms, not Racism.  
Certain forms of racism will be more prevalent in certain contexts, which in turn gives rise to 
a nationalised rhetoric of racism and national narratives of racism. Nationalised narratives of 
racism refer to all the various narratives around race found in a specific nation, whereas the 
nationalised rhetoric of racism refers to “those dominant narratives that shape monumental 
history or mythistory of the nation” (Kim & Sundstrom 2014: 21). In modern states, this 
rhetoric is officially anti-racist, as it is the product of that nation’s specific history of racist 
transgressions. So the dominant narrative of racism in Germany is that of anti-Semitism, for 
obvious reasons. In South Africa, the dominant narrative would be of white (European, settler, 
colonial, Boer) racism against black (African). The nationalised rhetoric of racism to a large 
extent determines what counts as racism and what does not, and it serves “nationalistic 
purposes”, as it tells the story of the overcoming of racism in the nation (so the idea of a ‘new’ 
South Africa, the ‘rainbow nation’, and ‘born frees’ forms part of this rhetoric).  
Both the rhetoric and narratives of racism may seem unproblematic, as they highlight injustices 
and discrimination (in the case of the latter) and are anti-racist or attempts to overcome racism 
                                                 
7 Nyamnjoh’s (2006: 56-63) discussion of xenophobia towards South African Indians illustrates this point. He 
refers specifically to a song by artist Mbongeni Ngema, ‘AmaNdiya’ (‘The Indians’), in which Indian South 
Africans are reduced to “Makwerekwere with citizenship” and accused of not assuming their national 
responsibilities. Their belonging is provisional, in a way that the belonging of black South Africans is not. Kim 
and Sundstrom (2014: 28) identify something similar in the USA, where Asian Americans find themselves in a 




(the former). However, Kim and Sundstrom (ibid. 22) alert us to the fact that such narratives 
may blind us to incidents of discrimination or forms of oppression that do not fit our public or 
national narratives of racism. In South Africa, our focus on racism by white people against 
black people may prevent us from seeing instances of race-based discrimination, such as the 
racism that Indian South Africans may direct at black South Africans, or the prejudices black 
South Africans hold toward black Africans. This supports my earlier point that even as we see 
xenophobia as a form of racism, we are unable to condemn xenophobia in the way in which we 
condemn racism. Homogenised, dominant understandings of racism obscure the very particular 
experiences of discrimination faced by immigrants or foreigners and, as Kim and Sundstrom 
(ibid. 21) point out, this is sometimes intentional. It creates a “conceptual and moral loophole” 
(ibid. 22) that allows individuals, groups, and whole nations to continue to discriminate against 
a specific group of people, unchecked by the moral outrage directed at acts of racism.  
While it is crucial for the anti-racist project to identify racism in all its forms, this does not yet 
provide us with a full justification for distinguishing racism from xenophobia, as it could be 
argued that xenophobia is still just a form of racism, and what we need to do is to recognise the 
narrative of race that informs it, and incorporate that into the nationalised rhetoric of race.8  
However, there are further reasons to justify the distinction. Some reasons relate to the features 
or characteristics of xenophobia, which I turn to in Section 2. Both xenophobia and racism 
function to exclude specific groups and targeted individuals from communities, opportunities, 
and privileges. However, the history of racism is closely tied to that of imperialism, 
colonialism, and modernity. What we understand by ‘race’ now is largely the product of 
Enlightenment rationalism, imperialism, and industrialisation (Niro 2003: 15). It was only after 
these developments that the concept of race gained the “explicit ideological currency […] 
culturally and politically” (ibid.: 19) it has today, upon which ‘racism’ as we understand it 
today was built. Seeing xenophobia as a form of racism, therefore, would under this history of 
racism imply that xenophobia is a modern phenomenon. However, we know that enmity and 
discrimination among different groups existed before the advent of modernity and the nation-
state. My suspicion is that our fear of strangers (in general) precedes our fear of specific racial 
or national strangers. 
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My main concern, however, with the suggestion that we widen our nationalised rhetoric of race 
to include the possibility (in the South African context) of black South Africans who participate 
in xenophobic violence, or who hold xenophobic attitudes where other African nationals are 
concerned, is that this may be misunderstood in public dialogue on racism. In a country where 
there is still often the denial of racism or discrimination based on race (from white South 
Africans), and where those on the right make claims to ‘reverse racism’ (e.g. in referring to 
affirmative action policies), I think we should be careful of opening the door to this possibility. 
The ‘reverse racism’ refrain is heard across the world, an example of which is the right-wing 
narrative of ‘replacement’ that I will discuss in Chapter 2. What we need are narratives and 
rhetorics that illuminate all forms of discrimination, without making room for ones based on 
imaginary harms while denying existing harms. For this reason, I think it is important to 
conceptualise xenophobia independently from race, as something which stands alongside 
racism rather than being subsumed by it. We have a precedent for this kind of distinct-yet-
connected analysis in intersectional feminism.  
My second overall reason for drawing a distinction is simple: even if racism and xenophobia 
coincide most of the time, and in most contexts, one can still imagine a situation in which racial 
differences do not come into play, or do not exist, yet where there is some form of antipathy 
towards the stranger in our midst – the casual, mutual xenophobia of the English and the 
French, perhaps. This may seem trivial, in our current context, but the joking stereotypes and 
small frustrations have their root in a bloody, conflict-ridden history (which, importantly, is 
not a product of a history of racial discrimination). This indicates that xenophobia requires 
further explanation. As I suggested at the start, we should rather view xenophobia and racism 
as mutually reinforcing forms of oppression with “distinct features in regard to their origins, 
targets, and typical expressions” (Yakushko 2009: 48).  This will be the focus of the rest of the 
study. 
2. The distinctiveness of xenophobia  
Yakushko suggests that xenophobia differs from racism on several grounds, and in an attempt 
to define xenophobia we can approach it from any, or all, of these perspectives. We can look 
at what causes xenophobes to be xenophobic – their attitudes, beliefs, fears, motivations, and 
drives – and how this differs from the origin of racism. We can ask what, if anything, it is about 
foreigners that makes them targets, or what the external or political conditions are that enable 




expressed, and the consequences thereof. The latter approach is taken by Kim and Sundstrom 
(2014), who argue that xenophobia differs from racism in the effect it has on those it is directed 
against, and that that effect captures the unique moral harm of xenophobia. The core of 
xenophobia, according to them, is civic ostracism. In what follows, I will briefly consider their 
reasons for identifying civic ostracism as the distinguishing core of xenophobia, arguing that it 
can indeed help us to understand why and how xenophobia is harmful (Section 2.1). However, 
I do not fully endorse their definition. I will argue that while civic ostracism is part of 
xenophobia, it is not unique to xenophobia nor does it help us understand why specific groups 
are chosen, or why where the origins of our tendency to be xenophobic lies. To fully understand 
xenophobia, we should not only look at moral harm, but also at the attitudes and beliefs that 
lead to harmful actions. Kim and Sundstrom does address the question of why foreigners are 
ostracised, but the deeper question of the origins of xenophobia, and the attitudes and beliefs 
people hold that makes them xenophobic, remains unanswered. They do argue that we ostracise 
based on ascriptions of foreignness, leading me to question why they did not identify this as 
the core of xenophobia (Section 2.2). Finally, in Section 2.3, I will argue that the heart of 
xenophobia lies the motivating idea of foreignness and an accompanying sense of belonging, 
which explains both the target and typical expressions and effects of xenophobia, but also 
points us in the direction of where xenophobia’s origins may lie, which is the direction Chapter 
2 will take. 
2.1 Xenophobia as civic ostracism 
The argument for xenophobia as civic ostracism is framed by two points of departure: 
i.  “the normative context for xenophobia is the ethical relations of the polity” (ibid. 23), 
and 
ii. “life within groups is profoundly formative of the self” (ibid.) 
Kim and Sundstrom (ibid. 24) argue persuasively that inclusion in the mainstream civic life is 
both a condition for us to access certain other social goods, including various kinds of social 
relations, and a social good in itself. This allows them to identify the unique moral harm of 
xenophobia, which for them is what distinguishes xenophobia from racism. Xenophobia is 
harmful because it excludes certain groups of people from the possibility of accessing certain 
social goods necessary for a full life. But what exactly is it that they are excluded from? To put 




(i) secures individual agency, which provides individuals with “an abiding sense of meaningful 
possibilities of action, identity, and relationship formation within institutions, associations, and 
public spheres generally” (ibid. 24); (ii) it ensures that the individual has political agency, as 
well as access to “goods, jobs, relationships, and statuses”; (iii) allows the individual to feel 
that they have a legitimate claim to rights and protection; and finally (iv) civic inclusion leads 
to “confidence in the cultural legitimacy of historically non-normative identities and practices” 
(ibid. 24-25). In short, civic inclusion fosters the sense in individuals that they belong, that their 
words and deeds matter (to use Arendt’s formulation), that they are connected (through their 
relationships with others in the civic community), and that their identity, even if it is ‘different’, 
is accepted. Importantly, the individual can only feel that their identity has legitimacy and they 
have agency within the specific context if the broader community in which they are situated 
approves and accommodates that identity and agency. This leads Kim and Sundstrom to 
identify another social good, which requires group-belonging or civic inclusion: “the enabling 
sense of meaningful possibilities in a modern polity” (ibid.). 
For now, I will take the importance of belonging to a community or a group as a given. I will 
give a more in-depth account of the importance of belonging and ‘home’ in Chapter 3. The 
importance given to belonging, recognised by communitarian theories, need not be at odds with 
more cosmopolitan, universalist, or individualist theories. Even more individualistic societies 
are individualistic because of a certain form of group relations. And in highly individualistic 
societies, people still seek group-belonging, even if this does not mean the traditional groupings 
of nation, religion, etc. Group belonging is important for us because there are certain things that 
we value that cannot be found or achieved on our own. As Charles Taylor (1994: 58) puts it, 
certain goods, friendship for example, can only be “sought in common” and they are, therefore, 
“irreducibly social”. Group membership can also be crucial to identity formation – we define 
ourselves in relation to others, we are inspired to be or act in a certain way by others. This does 
not mean that belonging to a single group is necessary, important, or desirable. Nor am I saying 
that group membership to a nation or a specific country is a given. It may be important in the 
way in which the world is structured and divided now, but we can imagine a world in which 
national citizenship is not the only kind of group-belonging that could ensure social goods and 
a political voice. Furthermore, it is possible to recognise the importance of groups and 
communities, while also being critical of the kinds of groups and communities that are 
exclusionary (e.g. countries with completely closed borders) or claim that membership of that 




fully for the sake of unity, erasing their individuality). Understanding group-belonging in this 
sense gives recognition to the social good of belonging, while also precluding the possibility of 
the unquestioned acceptance of a single group identity as the whole of one’s identity (as in 
nationalism). 
Xenophobia as civic ostracism therefore entails the exclusion from the group or civic 
community and the exclusion from meaningful possibilities, agency, social goods, 
relationships, and acceptance offered by group membership. To explain the potential effects 
of civic ostracism, Kim and Sundstrom (2014: 25) draw on Arendt’s discussion of 
statelessness, and specifically her insight that the refugee or stateless person has fewer rights 
than a criminal:  
Only as an offender against the law can he gain protection from it […] The same 
man who was in jail yesterday because of his mere presence in this world, who had 
no rights whatever and who lived under threat of deportation, or who was 
dispatched without sentence and without trial to some kind of internment because 
he had tried to work and make a living, may become almost a full-fledged citizen 
because of a little theft. (Arendt 1976: 286)9 
Arendt’s point highlights the very specific form of vulnerability that results from civic 
ostracism. Not all instances of civic ostracism will be as severe as this, but whether the civic 
ostracism is on the other side of the scale from Arendt’s extreme example, or whether an 
individual finds him/herself in a situation of complete isolation and rightlessness, the 
motivation behind the ostracism is the same: “the attribution of the cultural alienness of a 
subject or the felt sense that the subject does not rightly belong to the nation” (Kim & 
Sundstrom 2014: 25). How formal this exclusion is depends on the context. In its less extreme 
form, it may simply amount to a person feeling out of place because of the ways in which 
those around them interact (or refuse to interact) with them. This would be similar to a child 
in school, even if they have the right to be there and are accepted by the teachers, feeling that 
they do not belong because they are being bullied by other children.  
More formal, and arguably more dangerous, forms of civic ostracism relate to ostracisms that 
are, officially or implicitly, sanctioned by laws and public institutions. Kim and Sundstrom 
                                                 




(ibid. 25-26) connect civic ostracism to Arendtian statelessness by indicating three ways in 
which the “exclusionary outlook” (i.e. the assumption of cultural alienness and non-
belonging) finds expression in law: 
i. Where rightful laws are generally and systematically applied only to those deemed 
culturally alien/foreign. 
ii. In morally problematic laws that are explicitly xenophobic. 
iii. Where laws are vague or ambiguous yet seemingly neutral, but that are and have 
historically been implemented exclusively or significantly against those deemed 
alien/foreign. 
Civic ostracism should also be distinguished from “actual ostracization” (ibid. 27) – i.e., when 
a person is literally expelled from the polity (denaturalisation and deportation). Such a form 
of ostracism is not free of xenophobia, but rather the extreme result of xenophobia. 
Understanding xenophobia as ‘civic ostracism’ allows us to identify its presence long before 
this extreme point. At this point we touch on an important aspect of xenophobia, one which 
will be of concern for the entirety of this study. Xenophobia is something that is both 
individual and institutional, something that sticks out its head on all levels and in all corners 
of society. To understand xenophobia, we need to understand both the motivations and the 
way it functions among people (individuals, groups, citizens) and in our institutions, 
specifically but not limited to political institutions. Any strategies developed to decrease 
xenophobic attacks and the xenophobic attitudes and beliefs that give rise to them, will have 
to recognise this (see Chapter 5). For Kim and Sundstrom (ibid. 26), both the formal 
exclusions (as above) and “ordinary exclusions, hierarchies, and indignities based upon 
ascriptions of a subject not properly belonging to the civic community” gives rise to “a 
xenophobic life-world”. Institutional xenophobia relates to laws and policies, whereas 
individual xenophobia (including the xenophobia of individuals who play a prominent role in 
institutions, such as political leaders) is when “a belief, affect, or more generally, an attitude 
or even agentive orientation takes some person or group as not a proper part of one’s nation” 
(ibid.). Both can and do lead to exclusions. 
2.2 The limits of ‘xenophobia as civic ostracism’ 
Kim and Sundstrom’s definition of xenophobia as civic ostracism provides us with important 




does in closing moral loopholes or identifying what is unique to xenophobia. I do not dispute 
that foreigners are ostracised in the way they suggest – this is undoubtedly true, and very 
harmful for the reasons given. The value of their definition lies in the moral harm it identifies 
in the effect xenophobia has – the loss of necessary social goods caused by ostracism. Yet it is 
not clear to me that this moral harm is unique to xenophobia, or that other forms of 
discrimination (including racism!) do not ostracise individuals and groups from the community 
in similar ways. For Kim and Sundstrom, this is the core of xenophobia, that which 
distinguishes it from racism. Yet we can easily think of other groups that are excluded from 
the goods of public life in this way.  
The South African case illustrates this point very well. One of the reasons often cited in the 
literature (see Nyamnjoh 2006) to explain the prevalence of xenophobia in South African 
society is that parts of the citizenry feel disenfranchised and left behind, with little to no access 
to services, jobs, or even the resources they need to survive. Constitutionally, they have a full 
range of rights and freedoms. In reality, those rights and freedoms mean very little. They are 
excluded from the privileges and opportunities richer or better situated citizens have, with very 
little chance of change. For all intents and purposes, these citizens are excluded from the 
benefits of being citizens. Not only are their rights and freedoms limited, but also their ability 
to participate meaningfully in the public sphere. It seems that civic ostracism is also a 
characteristic of classism and, given the correlation between race and class in South Africa 
(due to historical factors), racism. Similarly, sexism has also, and still does, exclude many 
women from fully enjoying their rights and privileges as citizens. Would not all forms of 
institutional discrimination and oppression be characterised by civic ostracism?  
As crucial as it is that we identify what is morally harmful about specific practices, acts, beliefs, 
or social and political phenomena, we cannot rely on this to give us an adequate definition of 
anything, nor can we truly judge an action or a situation by only looking at the effects. Kim 
and Sundstrom’s identification of xenophobia as civic ostracism leaves us with two questions 
– the one already given above, and the related question of what the motivation is behind the 
ostracization of foreigners. The question is whether there is something unique to being 
excluded from meaningful participation as a foreigner, as opposed to a poor person, a black 
person, or a woman. They do, in fact, provide us with the answer to this question, which makes 
one wonder why they did not identify this as the core of xenophobia, rather than civic ostracism 




foreigners is the ascription of foreignness, or the idea that the individual or group does not 
belong to the nation or community (see Kim & Sundstrom 2014: 25, 26, quoted above). In fact, 
they point toward this early on in their argument when they distinguish between racism and 
xenophobia based on the ‘driving idea’ behind each. The driving idea behind racism is the One 
Blood imperative, which is based on notions of racial purity and fears if miscegenation. 
Xenophobia, however, is fuelled by the One Mind imperative, where a nation’s culture is 
deemed superior to alien cultures (ibid. 24).10    
Xenophobia is therefore not only civic ostracism, but civic ostracism motivated by the 
ascription of foreignness based on feelings of superiority (of one’s own group) and the idea 
that the other group or individual does not rightly belong. Importantly, this belonging need not 
be national – other kinds of group-formations can also include and exclude based on their ideas 
of who belongs and who does not, such as nomadic groups. Kim and Sundstrom (ibid. 31) in 
fact distinguish between xenophobia and nativism, which is xenophobia in defence of the 
nation-state or with the aim of policy maintenance. This distinction is important, for it points 
toward the fact that xenophobia precedes nationalist projects even as it is closely tied to 
nationalism. To define xenophobia more narrowly is to miss instances of outsider-
discrimination where there is no nation or even state, but this also blinds us to affective, 
individual instances of xenophobia. This latter point also makes one wonder why they do not 
situate the core of xenophobia in its motivations, rather than in its expression or effects, for 
they state that the individual is xenophobic when he/she holds the belief or affect that the other 
person does not belong to his/her group. The individual is therefore xenophobic before any act 
of exclusion or ostracism, which means that civic ostracism cannot be the core defining feature 
of xenophobia.  
2.3 The idea of foreignness 
I therefore suggest that we should rather understand xenophobia as a belief (including 
prejudices), or attitude towards strangers based on the idea that they are foreign and do not 
belong to the group or community. Such beliefs and attitudes may be expressed or acted upon, 
and most often are, which results in formal and informal forms of civic ostracism and, in 
extreme cases, violence. This helps us to distinguish xenophobia from racism on the basis of 
                                                 
10 These two imperatives can both be present in an act of discrimination or oppression, as with anti-African 
xenophobia in South Africa or Islamophobia in Europe. Yet they can also diverge, with the nation allowing 




origin, as Yakushko suggests, while also still allowing us to recognise the important ways in 
which foreigners are excluded. Xenophobia and racism differ in the historical realities that gave 
birth them, and in their aims. Racism’s history lies in our history of slavery, colonialism, and 
later segregation/Apartheid, with the aim of domination and exploitation, with the dominating 
group amassing economic (capital) and cultural privileges. To truly subjugate another race, the 
belief in their racial inferiority has to be widely accepted. Xenophobia, on the other hand, is a 
reaction the influx of strangers into relatively established communities or groups, which leads 
to the members of the community feeling threatened. This feeling of being threatened becomes 
exacerbated in times of economic or political instability but has its origins in the earliest days 
of human group formation, as we will see in Chapter 2. Xenophobia therefore does not 
necessarily consciously seek to dominate, nor is it (like racism) part of expansionist projects – 
rather, it seeks to protect what is ‘ours’: 
Xenophobic prejudice typically emphasizes the discomfort with the presence of 
foreigners in a community and the infringement of these foreigners on the 
economic, cultural, and social capital of the host community (Yakushko 2009: 49)  
Why we feel discomfort when encountering strangers or outsiders still needs to be established, 
and I will do so in Chapter 2. What is important to realise now are the implications of 
understanding civic ostracism and any smaller, everyday instance of discrimination, as being 
motivated by the idea of foreignness. Firstly, the xenophobe is not concerned with the legal 
question of whether a specific individual is a citizen or foreign. Xenophobia has nothing to do 
with the actual legal status of the ‘foreigner’, but with the assumptions that insiders or citizens 
make about those who they perceive as foreign. This includes assumptions about the legal 
status of perceived foreigners, but the underlying question here is not primarily the political or 
legal question of citizenship, asylum, or residence, but the deeper question of belonging to the 
group one values (which I return to in Chapters 2 and 3). Landau (2006: 135), writing on the 
South African context, says that “the palpable fear of foreigners suggests a deep, existential 
apprehension over the meaning of belonging”. How we think about belonging and not 
belonging, about membership and strangeness or foreignness, informs how we draw these 
distinctions on the political and legal level as well.  
Certain groups of people will always be considered foreign, no matter how many generations 
of them have lived and been born in the country. Kim and Sundstrom (2014: 28) call this 




America) as examples. This is also called foreigner objectification, which refers to the explicit 
or implicit ways in which we label especially minority groups as ‘foreign’, regardless of their 
legal status, how long they have been in their country of residence, or their citizenship (Lee, 
Lee & Tran 2017: 143). Kim and Sundstrom see perpetual foreignness, or foreigner 
objectification then, as a result of civic ostracism, but to me it seems more like a vicious circle: 
we have ideas about who belongs and who does not (the idea of foreignness), which when 
expressed through foreigner objectification determines who we ostracise, which in turn creates 
“a group-modulated vulnerability” (Kim & Sundstrom 2014: 27) where some groups are and 
will always be vulnerable to exclusion because of their perceived foreignness, and on the basis 
of which we continuously reidentify them as foreign.  
Foreigner objectification takes place on many levels, from the seemingly innocent question 
‘Where are you (really) from?’, to surprise when a ‘foreigner’ can speak one’s language 
(remember the ‘unintelligibility’ of the makwerekwere), to more aggressive forms (e.g. a 
violent mob identifying someone as a ‘foreigner’ and attacking them). Foreigner objectification 
certainly plays a role in xenophobia in South Africa. A study conducted on citizen’s attitudes 
toward foreign migrants by Crush and Pendleton (2007: 68) shows that Southern Africans tend 
to assume that any foreign national, specifically those from the rest of Africa, are in the country 
illegally, and there exists a strong link in people’s minds between illegality and immigration. 
This does not only indicate confusion or ignorance about the law, but the rather the sense that, 
irrespective of the law, a person who is perceived as foreign cannot be anything other than 
foreign.  
The second implication of the idea of foreignness as the motivation behind civic ostracism 
follows from the first – if who we identify as outsiders is determined by how we think about 
group membership and belonging, this also relates to the question of our own origins. As our 
ideas about who belongs and who does not render certain groups perpetually foreign, it leads 
to what Kim and Sundstrom (2014: 28) refer to as “geographical malediction”. The term is 
based on the idea of corporeal malediction, the mismatch between one’s first-person experience 
of the body and the historical and social meaning that is laden on it by one’s condition, 
circumstances, and society. ‘Corporeal malediction’ is generally applied to people’s experience 
of racism, whereas ‘geographical malediction’ does not only look at the race of the other, but 
at the “historical and social meaning of race” (ibid.) in a specific context or location (this 




certain racial others are also seen as national/geographical others. Regardless of a person’s 
nationality (in the sense of citizenship) or their origins (in the sense of where they, as 
individuals, were born), and regardless of which political community they think they belong 
to, in the minds of the nation, the majority, or their host community, they will remain foreign. 
The assumption is that they will always have somewhere to go back to and that their loyalty is 
therefore divided, or that their loyalty lies elsewhere. This aspect of xenophobia indicates the 
strong link between xenophobia and racism, the ways in which they are mutually reinforcing, 
but it also shows us where the one differs from the other. Geographical malediction can, and 
often does, contain the idea of a racial other, but the core is foreignness and not racial otherness. 
To put it differently: xenophobia identifies its other on the basis of an idea of foreignness often 
based on the assumed connection between a place and a people, creating a strong link between 
belonging, origin, and indigeneity. Given how the world is currently divided into different 
states, our ideas about foreignness and belonging is expressed in political terms. Before I 
address the question of the pre-political and psychological origins of xenophobia in Chapter 2, 
I want to look at how the ideas discussed in this section – foreignness, belonging, place of 
origin – impact our current conceptions of political membership or citizenship. This will 
illustrate how these ideas are exclusionary and contribute to the ostracism of foreigners. 
3. The political dimension of xenophobia 
In this section, I will consider the political dimension of xenophobia from two perspectives. 
Firstly, I will look at how our conception of political membership is informed by our ideas 
surrounding belonging and foreignness, discussed in the section above. In South Africa, and 
arguably elsewhere, citizenship or membership to the political community is still strongly tied 
in our minds to origin and birth. This informs not only individual beliefs about who can be a 
citizen, but also the state’s conception of citizenship. The aim of the discussion is to show how 
xenophobia manifests in contemporary political contexts. Secondly, I briefly consider the 
scapegoat theory as an explanation of xenophobia and show how it is our particular political 
circumstances that determine who we choose to scapegoat.   
3.1 Xenophobia and citizenship 
In a recent lecture, Sisonke Msimang (2017) identified “the problem of xenophobia [in South 
Africa], and the ways in which it is particularly directed at African migrants” as a function of 




to say or do something against xenophobia, even when it erupts into extreme violence. 
Secondly, it is a failure of our political imagination – a failure not only to imagine the foreigner 
as a morally equal person, but also a failure to imagine a different kind of world, or to imagine 
belonging and membership in such a way that it is not linked to territory or individual origin. 
In his explanatory account of xenophobia in South Africa, Michael Neocosmos (2010) 
investigates precisely the question of the link between xenophobia, our ideas about foreignness 
and belonging, and our conception of citizenship. His full, complex argument, outlining the 
relationship between colonialism, neo-liberalism, and xenophobia in the South African context, 
cannot be considered here. I will focus on one of the key arguments in the text, as it can be 
applied to other contexts than South Africa as well. Neocosmos posits four theses on citizenship 
and political identity: 
i. “Xenophobia is a Discourse and Practice of Exclusion from Community” (ibid.: 13)   
ii. “This Process of Exclusion is a Political Process” (ibid.: 14) 
iii. “Xenophobia is Concerned with Exclusion from Citizenship which Denotes a 
Specific Political Relationship Between State and Society” (ibid.) 
iv. “Xenophobia is the Outcome of a Relation Between Different Forms of Politics” 
(ibid.: 15) 
The first thesis focuses on the fact of exclusion that (a) specific group(s) experience(s). This 
exclusion is both social and political. Socially, the group is excluded from community (e.g. the 
nation). Politically, the group is excluded from citizenship and its attendant rights and 
privileges. This is in line with an understanding of xenophobia as leading to civic ostracism. 
Importantly, Neocosmos identifies the reason for this exclusion: the existence of the 
community (‘we’) is predicated upon the existence of an excluded ‘Other’. This requirement 
is not unique to xenophobia. Toni Morrison (2017: 15) refers to the “social/psychological need 
for a “stranger,” an Other in order to define the estranged self”. She links it to our search for 
belonging to something greater than ourselves – if we identify others as “strangers”, it means 
there is a familiar, a place where we belong and they do not. We identify people as ‘foreign’ 
or ‘alien’, so that we can say that we are ‘normal’ (ibid.: 29).  
For Neocosmos, this tactic when applied within a political community reduces membership 
and specifically citizenship to indigeneity or autochthony. You are part of the ‘we’ if you were 




‘foreigners’ born in the territory, as both indigeneity and autochthony denote the original 
inhabitants (i.e. not only those born in the territory, but those descended from others born in 
the territory). This also means that citizenship is essentially something passive, something that 
is given to you by the state at birth. This understanding of citizenship precludes any possibility 
of outsiders gaining access to the rights and entitlements of citizenship. While Neocosmos’ 
focus is on the relationship between state and citizen, this point also holds for any kind of group 
where membership is seen as a given, passive, and inherited. The result of this is the perpetual 
foreignness of those who did not inherit. 
Neocosmos’s second thesis holds that the exclusion referred to above is a political process. It 
is political for two reasons: (i) the state plays a role, directly or implicitly, in the exclusion, and 
(ii) only political minorities are excluded. Concerning (i): the state determines who gets 
citizenship and determines the boundaries of citizenship. These boundaries are the product of 
the discursive debates between state and society and provide the framework of possibilities for 
political identities. The state’s ideology, especially as it relates to immigration and the presence 
of foreigners, will therefore have a profound impact on the lives of foreigners within its borders. 
Economic circumstances may have an influence on the discursive debates between society and 
state, but they are only part of a much larger debate, where the focus is instead on the definition 
of citizenship. The South African state, through its institutions and leaders, sometimes actively 
and sometimes implicitly promotes xenophobic attitudes. Xenophobic sentiments are rarely 
simply “an organic or spontaneous response to street-level tensions” (Landau 2006: 131). Such 
tensions bubble over because the xenophobic sentiments of the people are either shaped or, at 
the very least, legitimized by politicians.  
Neocosmos’s third thesis is a combination of the first two. Who gets excluded from the 
community will be determined by the conception of citizenship, and its attendant rights and 
duties, arrived at through the debate between state and society: “Xenophobia is thus intimately 
connected to citizenship, in other words to the fact of belonging or not belonging to a 
community, often but not exclusively to a nation” (ibid.). Neocosmos stresses another crucial 
point, on the question of belonging or not belonging, which supports my argument in the 
previous section: citizenship is not meant, or understood, in a legal sense. Citizenship here 
means who the people and the state think should be the citizens, not who (legally) are. The fact 
is that for the xenophobe, the legal status of the ‘foreigner’ does not matter. What matters is 




Xenophobia is about the denial of social rights and entitlements to strangers, people 
considered to be strangers to the community (village, ethnic group as well as 
nation) not just to ‘foreigners’ as conceived by the law. (ibid., my emphasis) 
A person only ‘belongs’ if they belong on two levels: politically, meaning that they have access 
to rights and entitlements, and subjectively, meaning that they fit the political identity of the 
group. This dual nature of belonging indicates how someone can be a citizen (as a legal status, 
as with naturalised citizens or even permanent residents), while not being considered a citizen, 
i.e. a ‘true’ South African, American, etc.  
Finally, Neocosmos’ (ibid.) fourth thesis: that xenophobia, in terms of its existence, character, 
and extent, is a product of the relation between state politics (or state subjectivity) and popular 
politics (popular subjectivity). The nature of the relation between the state and its people, 
between the formal politics of the former and the informal politics of the latter, can determine 
the extent to which xenophobia is present in a specific community. Neocosmos refers to 
popular political movements that push against African states’ tendency to be exclusionary by 
emphasising Pan-Africanism. The success of such struggles will mean a less xenophobic 
society, whereas a populace that is more submissive to state authority will tend to exhibit a 
kind of politics that is also exclusionary. If citizenship is passive, as suggested in the first thesis, 
the likelihood of popular politics following a more inclusive route than state politics is low. 
However, what Neocosmos does show us is the possibility of mutual influence – the state’s 
conception of citizenship shapes how citizens see themselves (or determines who consider 
themselves to be citizens) while popular politics can, if the citizens have political agency, 
change the state-given conception of citizenship. It is conceivable that both sides can be more 
or less exclusionary and influence the other side to become more or less xenophobic. 
How we define citizenship and the membership norms that determine inclusion and exclusion 
is therefore a product of our attitudes with regard to our own group-identity and our sense of 
belonging, and the ways in which such attitudes influence present and future political 
conditions and are influenced by pre-existing political conditions. Foreigners are the targets of 
our prejudices and discrimination because we view them as absolute outsiders and based on 
that we erect a world that excludes them in specific ways, which in turn situates them politically 




3.2 Scapegoating foreigners 
Popular explanations of xenophobia often rely on some version of the scapegoat theory: a local 
population finds some outsider group to blame for the socio-economic problems experienced 
by the former, leading to discrimination and even violence (see, for instance, Mbembe 2015; 
Nyamnjoh 2006). Landau (2006: 127) writes that foreigners in South Africa serve a dual 
purpose:  
as scapegoats they preserve the postapartheid project’s legitimacy by providing 
convenient explanations for widespread crime, disease, and unemployment. More 
significantly, a reified and dehumanized foreign “Other” underscores South 
Africans’ shared connection with one another and the national territory. 
I want to highlight two things here: the first is that foreigners become scapegoats, blamed for 
our own (or the government’s) failings; secondly, foreigners become sacrifices – their 
humanity is sacrificed for our unity. The scapegoat is a metaphor of sacrifice. Scapegoating is, 
however, not unique to xenophobia, but as we will see the way in which a specific group is 
chosen as scapegoats can be xenophobic. First, I want to focus on the idea of an individual or 
group being sacrificed for the unity of a larger or different group. We find this idea in the work 
of René Girard (1986). Girard is concerned with the way in which internal conflicts in 
communities are resolved, given that there exists rivalries and competition for the same 
resources between individuals and groups. How do we overcome this conflict and unite into 
cohesive and stable communities? Girard’s answer: through the sacrifice of a scapegoat. 
Instead of large-scale violence (e.g. civil war), violence on a smaller scale is directed at an 
individual or defined group, doing away with the need for more violence. An individual or 
group is blamed for the instability within the community, and consequently punished. 
Importantly, this scapegoat mechanism is not recognised as such by those doing the 
scapegoating. Scapegoating is not a utilitarian ‘sacrificing the one for the greater good of the 
many’, recognising that ‘the one’ is innocent. Girard (2000: 117) argues that those who 
scapegoat do not see their victims as innocent. Rather, they truly believe that their scapegoats 
are guilty, as “truly responsible for all the disorders and ailments of the community” (ibid. 14). 
In fact, scapegoating can only work as long as the victims are perceived as really evil or guilty, 
and so long as the scapegoaters remain unaware of what they are doing (Girard 1986: 101). 
Girard sees evidence of this scapegoat mechanism throughout history, and indeed considers it 




beyond the scope of my argument (and not strictly relevant). I think we can accept Girard’s 
explanation of scapegoating as a unifying act, and his insights into the motivation of 
scapegoaters, without assuming the historical accuracy of all his claims.  
While the scapegoat theory appears convincing at face value, it is incomplete, in so far as it 
assumes that any possible innocent group could have been used as scapegoats; that the choice 
was arbitrary. This approach allows us to evade the question of how a particular group was 
situated politically that made it possible for them, and not some other group, to become a target 
of xenophobic discrimination. Scapegoating therefore elides the specific political meaning of 
xenophobia by subsuming it into the larger (and familiar) narrative of scapegoating. Foreigners 
serve as easy targets for scapegoating because they are highly visible and vulnerable (Desai 
2008: 58), because socially and politically they are situated in such a way that only they can 
become the scapegoats. Even if those chosen as scapegoats are innocent of the crimes they 
stand accused of, there is nothing innocent in the choice of who we scapegoat. Their being 
situated in this way is also not innocent, but a product of institutional arrangements and 
discrimination and prejudice on the group and individual level. In this sense, scapegoats are 
not identified or picked at random, but created. 
The deficiencies of an overly simplistic scapegoat theory are clearly demonstrated by Hannah 
Arendt’s seminal analysis of anti-Semitism in Europe. Arendt (1976) argues that European 
Jews were specifically targeted not as one group among many, but as the only group situated 
in such a way – politically, socially, economically – that they could have been chosen. The 
Jews were perceived to be powerful (and therefore any failings of the state could be attributed 
to their supposed desire to destroy all social structures). They were seen as the “key to history” 
and “central cause of all evils” (ibid. 10) while in fact they had very little political power. Those 
who did have some influence – those with wealth – were only a small part of the total Jewish 
population, yet they came to represent the totality of the Jewish population (ibid. 15). Jews 
were believed to be rich and therefore powerful, but in fact they had no power; they “became 
an object of universal hatred because of [their] useless wealth, and of contempt because of 
[their] lack of power” (ibid.). Jews found themselves “underprivileged, lacking certain rights 
and opportunities that were withheld from the Jews in order to prevent their assimilation” (ibid. 
14). Those that the state used to protect because they were financially useful, lost their 




It was, in part, this perceived strength but actual weakness that opened the doors for anti-
Semitic violence. In other words, it was the political position of the Jews that made them 
available as scapegoats, and the scapegoating itself was informed by a dominant narrative of 
“us” and “them”. Another aspect of Arendt’s discussion on anti-Semitism should be 
emphasised here: her distinction between anti-Semitism as social discrimination and anti-
Semitism as political argument. Social discrimination (in this case, anti-Jewish feeling) turns 
into a political ideology when it combines with major political issues (ibid. 28). So, in the 
tensions and conflicts between the different strata of nineteenth century European societies and 
their states, the Jews came to represent the state and the elite. As conflict between state and 
society rose, anti-Semitism spread “until it emerged suddenly as the one issue upon which an 
almost unified opinion could be achieved” (ibid. 25). Because Jews were never fully part of 
the body politic, and because they retained their trans-national ties, they were also seen as 
disloyal to the nations in which they lived, and conspiracy theories about Jews secretly 
controlling all governments gained traction. It was only when anti-Semitism became politically 
expedient that the conditions were set for the annihilation of the European Jewry.   
This brief discussion of Arendt’s analysis of anti-Semitism and scapegoating indicates that 
merely identifying the fact that we scapegoat foreigners is not sufficient. As Michael 
Neocosmos (2010: 4) points out, foreigner in South Africa are the scapegoats, and can be the 
scapegoats, because of the political weakness of foreigners. This is a result of the exclusions 
based on our notion of citizenship discussed in preceding section. We need to acknowledge 
this ‘political weakness’, or the specific situatedness of foreigners, to understand why they (and 
not others) are blamed for a specific society’s ills. This also slightly shifts the blame of 
xenophobia, from those who perpetrate xenophobic violence to those who create the conditions 
in which such violence becomes possible and in which it will likely not be punished (although 
the former are, of course, not acquitted of moral blame). In saying that xenophobia is an act of 
scapegoating foreigners, we should also ask what their supposed crimes are, and who is really 
guilty of those crimes. Scapegoating is an act of shifting blame and shifting attention away 
from one’s own guilt or inadequacies. Girard’s point that scapegoating can only take place if 
the scapegoaters are unaware of the mechanism implies an alternative to this kind of response 
to foreigners and to personal or societal struggles and frustrations. In becoming aware of the 
reason why we choose to scapegoat a specific group, we also become aware of who should 




anti-xenophobic, we should unmask our own denial, and the denial of our governments and 
political institutions (e.g. police forces). 
Arendt warns that the scapegoat theory might make discrimination seem more 
neutral/inevitable than it is, and it might make us blind toward contextual differences and other 
injustices that accompany xenophobia. It seems almost dismissive to say, ‘they were just 
looking for a scapegoat’. We should ask why xenophobia is directed at a specific group and 
not another – why we choose to scapegoat not all foreigners, but only some. This question is 
especially important in South Africa, where xenophobia is mainly directed at African nationals 
and almost exclusively at people of colour. Merely stopping at ‘they needed a scapegoat’ denies 
the role that race and the country’s turbulent history plays in xenophobia in South Africa, but 
also the political nature of xenophobia – the ways in which nation-building, our understanding 
of citizenship, and our political institutions contributes to a xenophobic life-world. Every 
society has its scapegoats. Who they are and how they are chosen depends on the context.  
What we are dealing with here is a continuous process of foreigner identification and 
objectification that leads to ostracism and scapegoating, being shaped by the past but also 
shaping the future political circumstances in such a way that the process can continue. Even as 
this process takes place in our particular political and historical contexts and as it harms those 
made vulnerable by it, it is kept in place and driven by our ideas surrounding belonging and 
foreignness. 
Conclusion 
At the outset of this chapter I identified the conceptual confusion we have in our minds when 
we think about xenophobia. Conceptually, xenophobia seems to fade into other forms of 
discrimination: ethnocentrism, nativism, and especially racism. This indicates the close link 
between xenophobia and other forms of oppression, but instead of seeing them as mutually 
reinforcing and intersecting forms of oppression, we often treat them as being the same. I 
showed how this poses a problem both in our thinking and in our ability to identify and morally 
condemn instances of xenophobic discrimination. I provided a brief overview of xenophobia 
in South Africa to illustrate how it reinforces and is reinforced by racism, but also how it differs 
from racism. With reference to Kim and Sundstrom’s argument that nationalised narratives of 
race and racism tend to obscure certain forms of discrimination, I showed how xenophobia, 




form of racism. Because the national narrative of racism in South Africa sees racism as 
something perpetrated by white people against people of colour, and specifically black South 
Africans, equating xenophobia with racism leaves us without the conceptual tools to make 
sense of discrimination and violence when both victim and perpetrators are of the same race. 
The fact that xenophobia in South Africa is almost exclusively directed at black African 
nationals confirms its relationship to racism, but we realise that we need to distinguish between 
the two to make sense of the fact that many of the perpetrators of the kind of widespread 
xenophobic violence we saw in 2008, 2015, and 2019, were black South Africans. If we do not 
distinguish between racism and xenophobia, our national narrative of race will shelter 
xenophobia. Given the high levels of discrimination and life-threatening violence against 
foreigners, we desperately need to develop an understanding of xenophobia that will allow us 
to morally condemn such actions and to see it as a form of discrimination as serious and as 
morally reprehensible as racism. This will also help us to make sense of instances of 
discrimination or forms of prejudice against group outsiders in contexts where there is not a 
history of racism. I argued that xenophobia differs from racism in its motivations and origin, 
in its effect, and in the political circumstances that give rise to it. A comprehensive conception 
of xenophobia should address these three aspects. 
In the second section I tried to do just this, with reference to Kim and Sundstrom’s definition 
of xenophobia as ‘civic ostracism’. Regarding the effects of xenophobia, I indicated the harms 
of such ostracism: exclusion from the political community and lack of access to certain goods, 
including meaningful relationships and accepted identities. With reference to Hannah Arendt, 
I showed how such exclusion amounts to a loss of the foreigner’s voice, which could lead to 
their complete erasure from the political sphere. Civic ostracism creates a situation of 
vulnerability for certain groups, based on their foreignness (real or assumed), which renders 
them perpetual outsiders. We can therefore identify the moral harm in xenophobia in the effect 
it has on foreigners – in the freedoms it takes away, the actions it prevents, and in the identities 
it denies or erases. This happens in big and small ways, on all levels of life, and in every context 
the foreigner finds themselves in. This is why Kim and Sundstrom speak of a xenophobic life-
world. 
Kim and Sundstrom’s attempt to distinguish xenophobia from racism by identifying ‘civic 
ostracism’ as its core is, however, limited. They are correct in the identification of the moral 




limiting their definition to the question of moral harm. I argued that other forms of 
discrimination can also ostracise individuals and groups in this way. However, if one reads 
them carefully one can discern what I argue is the real core of xenophobia. Not civic ostracism 
– this is its effect – but civic ostracism based on an idea of foreignness, informed by our 
thinking on citizenship and belonging. This distinguishes xenophobia from other forms of 
discrimination, and is the motivation behind xenophobia. Our ideas about foreignness and 
belonging are expressed in our beliefs and prejudices, and they point to deeper questions about 
group formation and identity formation.  
These ideas, however, also shape our political realities. In the final section of this chapter, I 
showed how our individual and institutional conception of citizenship is shaped by our belief 
that belonging is linked to place and to origin, with reference to the South African context and 
Neocosmos’s analysis of it. Because we think of citizenship and membership in terms of 
indigeneity, the possibility of extending membership to outsiders is precluded, creating a 
condition of perpetual foreignness and, consequently, vulnerability. I discussed the role of the 
scapegoat mechanism in xenophobia, arguing that we are able to scapegoat foreigners precisely 
because they are situated in this vulnerable position that we created. Foreigners are harmed – 
killed, attacked, ostracised – because they can be harmed, because they are relatively 
unprotected due to the particular political circumstances they find themselves in.  
These circumstances come into existence and are kept in place because of the pre-political and 
psychological ways in which we think about belonging, attachment to place, and foreignness. 
These are the motivations behind xenophobia, expressed in our beliefs and prejudices. Yet we 
do not yet have an explanation of why we hold these beliefs, why we are prejudiced against 
outsiders. The question of the origins of xenophobia remains unanswered. In the next chapter 
I therefore consider the question of the origins of xenophobia in more depth by looking at 




Chapter 2: Searching for the Origins of Xenophobia 
 
 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I established the following about xenophobia: that racism and xenophobia are 
related and mutually supporting forms of oppression and discrimination, but that without a 
distinct conception of xenophobia we will be blind to certain instances or forms of 
discrimination and harm. I argued that xenophobia is distinct in its origin, and therefore also in 
its effect, and in the political circumstances that result from it. Xenophobia’s effect is civic 
ostracism inspired by an idea of foreignness and ideas about belonging, which in turn creates 
the kind of political world in which foreigners are situated in such a way that they are 
vulnerable to discrimination, oppression, and other forms of harm. Who is targeted by 
xenophobia and how it is expressed is therefore determined by who we think belongs to the 
group, and who is foreign to the group. For this reason, we can only fully understand 
xenophobia if we ask why we make distinctions between us and them, citizen and foreigner, or 
member and non-member.  
My main concern in this chapter is with therefore with the origins of xenophobia, i.e. in the 
ways in which it is present first and foremost in our thoughts and assumptions about our place 
in the world. This is not to say that studying xenophobic violence is not important, but I see 
such violence as a culmination, a climax reached under specific socio-economic and political 
circumstances, but with its origins in our pre-political tendency to be prejudiced toward group 
outsiders. For xenophobic violence to take place, we first need xenophobes and a kind of world 
in which said xenophobes can act with impunity. This world, Kim and Sundstrom’s 
‘xenophobic life-world’, exists long before there is violence. If our aim is anti-xenophobic, 
then we must ask where and why and how this world comes into being. That is the main aim 
of this chapter. 
In the first section, I look at xenophobia as a form of prejudice, and ask where our ingroup-
outgroup prejudices originate. Four prominent theories that explain the origins of prejudice will 
be considered: social identity theory, cultural socialisation theory, contact theory, and group 
threat theory. As these theories were not developed to explain xenophobia, but rather prejudice 
and accompanying forms of discrimination, broadly understood, they are of relevance to our 




they provide us with specific insights on the ingroup-outgroup dynamics that can give rise to 
xenophobia. My analysis of these theories is comparative, but I will not argue for the 
superiority of one over the other. This is not fence-sitting, or a kind of theoretical syncretism, 
but rather the recognition that a single, all-encompassing theory cannot explain all forms and 
every instance of discrimination. This would deny human plurality and our seemingly infinite 
ability to think of new ways and new justifications to harm, exclude, and discriminate. To my 
mind, each theory illuminates some characteristic of prejudice, while exceptions to each can 
also easily be found. This is most evident in the tension between the contact hypothesis and 
group threat theory, both of which are supported by empirical evidence. We will see that 
xenophobic prejudice originates in our identities as individuals and as groups, the value we 
attach to the group we belong to, and then our encounters with strangers who are different from 
us. Because we value our ingroup, differentiation from the outgroup takes the form of 
devaluing them through prejudice and stereotypes. We do this to affirm our own position, but 
also because we feel threatened by their strangeness. 
Section 2 therefore looks at this idea of the threat strangers pose, and at its origins in early 
human history. I discuss the common definition of xenophobia as a fear of strangers or 
foreigners and argue that we fear strangers because they challenge our world-views and 
position, but also because we see them (consciously or not) as a literal threat to our existence. 
This feeling of being threatened, I argue in Section 2.2, is a product of the way in which humans 
evolved. In early human history, when survival was a struggle and competition for basic 
resources fierce, aggressive groups outsurvived less aggressive groups. Outgroup hostility was 
therefore an evolutionary advantage, and over time it became ingrained in our psyches. As 
human societies developed, we added cultural and political meaning to this seemingly innate 
tendency. The fear and accompanying hostility to outsiders may seem too generalised to help 
us understand xenophobia in our societies, but I argue that studying what is called the 
‘xenophobia principle’ in the animal kingdom, and looking at how animals react to outsiders, 
can provide us with new avenues of thought and new strategies for countering xenophobia in 
human societies. While many animals also react with aggression, examples from the natural 
world will be provided of alternative reactions to outsiders or threats, such as cooperation and 
play. 
The following investigation into the origins of xenophobia will therefore help us to not only 




belonging in the world and our sense of identity. It is a reaction to insecurities, and while our 
tendency to react in this manner lies deep, other innate tendencies humans and other animals 
have – cooperation, play – give us hope that we can be different and that we can build less 
xenophobic societies and communities. 
1. Xenophobic prejudice and group formation 
In Chapter 1, I argued that xenophobic civic ostracism is motivated by how we think about 
ourselves and others in terms of belonging and foreignness. Xenophobia is therefore first and 
foremost a form of prejudice, which we can understand as “an attitude that regards the members 
of a salient group, qua members, as not entitled to as much respect or concern as the members 
of other salient groups” (Altman 2016), where the devalued salient group is the outsider-group, 
and the valued group is the one to which the xenophobe belongs. Such prejudices are not purely 
individual but shared within groups (as we will see below), and combined they influence our 
political institutions, as shown by the discussion of citizenship in Chapter 1. Prejudice is 
therefore also the precursor of discrimination, of which civic ostracism is a form.11 
As a form of prejudice, xenophobia shares certain characteristics with other forms of prejudice 
that find their expression in forms discrimination such as racism, nativism, or ethnocentrism. I 
now want to delve deeper into the theoretical explanations for the existence of discrimination 
and prejudice between groups. In this section, I will focus on four prominent theories that can 
illuminate these aspects of xenophobia: 
i. Social identity theory  
ii. Cultural socialisation theory  
iii. The isolation thesis and contact theories  
iv. Group threat theory  
All forms of prejudice fail to recognise others (whether the ‘other’ is a different race, 
nationality, or sex) as fully human and as bearers of human rights (Jelin 2003: 101). Therefore, 
when we express or act upon our prejudices this takes the form of exclusion or ostracism (as 
                                                 
11 For a discussion of the relationship between prejudice and discrimination, see (Altman 2016) and (Ely 1980). 
Most of the time, prejudice motivates discrimination. There can be exceptions, as with indirect discrimination, 
but such distinctions I cannot consider here. It may be possible that a person acts in a discriminatory way without 
holding explicit prejudicial beliefs, but the possibility of unrecognised or subconscious prejudicial beliefs or 




argued in Chapter 1) and dehumanisation. This chapter, however, is not primarily concerned 
with the effects of xenophobic prejudice, but rather the reasons why we hold prejudicial 
attitudes and beliefs. As we will see, our prejudices are closely tied to our group identities and 
to our psychological reaction to strangers and strangeness. 
1.1 Social identity theory 
Tajfel (1981: 255) defines social identity as “that part of the individual’s self-concept which 
derives from his knowledge of his membership in the social group (or groups) together with 
the value and emotional significance attached to that group membership”. The ‘group’ in 
question is defined by external and internal criteria. The former refers to outside designations, 
i.e. people being grouped together based on a shared profession or situation (hospital patients, 
trade union members). It is the internal criteria that concerns us, as this is how a group is defined 
by its members through the act of group identification. Tajfel (1982: 2) names two necessary 
and one associated component in identification: 
i. A cognitive component, requiring the individual to show some kind of awareness 
of their membership 
ii. An evaluative component, where the individual’s awareness of membership relates 
to a value the individual ascribes to membership or to the group 
iii. An emotional investment in the above components 
These components combine to form the necessary conditions for the internal existence of any 
group. Through a process of self-categorisation, individuals come to identify themselves with 
a specific group by emphasising similarities between them and members of the group (whether 
chosen or born into), while down-playing similarities and focussing on difference with out-
group members (Kumar et al. 2011: 349). So, for example, Norbert Elias (1994: xxxiv) argues 
that during intergroup interaction, or insider-outsider relations, the insider or ‘established’ 
group engages in a collective fantasy, in which the physical characteristics of the outsiders are 
identified as signs of their inferiority, while the established group’s physical characteristics are 





The in-group is seen as positive, due to individuals’ need to feel superior or simply the fact that 
they value themselves more than others, while the out-group is seen as negative. This gives rise 
to negative stereotypes and prejudice. A stereotype is 
an over-simplified mental image of (usually) some category of person, institution 
or event which is shared, in essential features, by large numbers of peoples [and] 
commonly, but not necessarily, accompanied by prejudices (Stallybrass 1977: 
601). 
However, the group’s ability to interact with other groups – i.e., its ‘outside’ existence – 
requires recognition from other groups that it exists. I want to highlight to implications of this 
understanding of group formation and relation. In Chapter 1 I indicated how xenophobia 
ostracises certain groups from the civic or political community, effectively curtailing certain 
possibilities of identity and relationship formation (see Kim & Sundstrom 2014: 24). Tajfel can 
help us understand how this is possible, as both internal association and external recognition 
are necessary for a group to be said to exist. If certain minority identities or relationships are 
not recognised by the majority or by the civic community, there is no way for those relating to 
those identities to meaningfully interact with other groups: “There can be no intergroup 
behavior unless there is also some ‘outside’ consensus that the group exists” (Tajfel 1982: 2). 
Conversely, individuals can be externally categorised into groups to which they do not relate 
(the internal component), for example when foreigners are bundled together under the blanket 
term makwerekwere, a group to which certain values are ascribed from the outside. 
In intergroup relations, stereotypes provide us with beliefs about other groups while “prejudice 
adds an attitudinal component, primarily negative, to stereotyping and is aimed at people who 
are not cultural insiders” (Kumar et al. 2011: 367). Add fear of strangers or outsiders into the 
mix, and prejudice becomes xenophobia (more on this below). Importantly, social identity 
theory can help us explain or understand discrimination, or in-group out-group conflict, but it 
is primarily a theory of group identity. In other words, there is no necessary link between social 
identity and discrimination. Tajfel (1982: 8) himself points out that attachment to the ingroup 
and negative attitudes toward the outgroup are “not related in any simple way”. Rather, 
“ingroup favouritism was “relatively independent” of outgroup attitudes” (ibid.). This is a 
hopeful finding, in so far as it contains the possibility of overcoming exclusionary forms of 
group identity. So discrimination based on assigning negative characteristics to the outgroup is 




there is great inequality of power, privilege, or material inequality; where different groups have 
to compete for certain goods; where group boundaries are seen as set in stone, or where 
attempts are made to blur such boundaries (ibid. 14). Some of these conditions can be changed 
through material (economic) changes, such as providing more equal access. Others can be 
changed through rethinking group identity and the borders separating one group from another. 
To see such divisions as permeable, as a product of social and political relations rather than as 
something ‘natural’ (as with nationalist emphases on blood and indigeneity), would be to 
understand identity as a fluid thing. In Chapter 4 I discuss the narrative theory of identity, 
which enables us to do just this. 
1.2 Cultural socialisation theory  
Like social identity theory, cultural socialisation theory looks at group prejudices and 
stereotypes to explain discriminatory attitudes and behaviour. The cultural and historical roots 
of specific prejudices held by dominant groups are analysed. Dominant groups create collective 
negative images of subordinate or low-status groups (Kumar et al. 2011: 350). These prejudices 
and stereotypes, while not set in stone, are passed on from one generation to the next. Through 
a process of socialisation – becoming part of their community – children pick up these 
prejudices. Children can distinguish on the basis of ethnicity or other differences from an early 
age, and the prejudicial behaviour of the adults in their community gives meaning to the 
differences they perceive. As they grow up and develop their capacity for reflective thinking, 
they are able to understand the implication of belonging to one group or another. Children from 
dominant groups then often come to prefer their group or assume the superiority of their group. 
Cultural socialisation theory has been used to explain how children learn to be racist, for 
example. Children acquire a prowhite bias, associating ‘white’ with ‘good’ and ‘black’ with 
‘bad’, “through the verbal learning of color symbolism, which would pertain primarily to 
human affairs” (Duckitt et al. 1999: 150).  
Importantly, cultural socialisation theory should not only be understood as an explanation of 
how children learn out-group bias. Here cultural socialisation corresponds to the social identity 
thesis. Bias toward the out-group is not necessarily the result of the child being taught to view 
the out-group societies negatively. One can imagine a child brought up in a relatively 
homogenous, isolated culture who may react negatively when encountering someone from a 
radically different culture wholly unfamiliar to them. Prejudice and negative attitudes can also 




group or social identity. Where this bias is strong, any divergence from the norms and customs 
of the in-group will automatically be viewed in a negative light. The mere fact of difference 
can be enough to cause prejudice: “the perception of belonging to two distinct groups – that is, 
social categorisation per se – is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in-
group” (Tajfel & Turner 1979: 56). Social categories are cognitive tools by which we order our 
social experiences, but they also act as “a system of orientation for self-reference” (ibid. 59), 
hence this also being a social identity. We often categorize in this way by relying on 
comparisons between different categories or groups, so that the self is in a sense necessarily 
understood in opposition to the other. Because we wish to maintain our self-esteem, we come 
to see ourselves and the groups we belong to as being better than the other groups. 
The cultural socialisation theory need therefore not be at odds with social identity theory. What 
we value in life can, in part, be determined by what we are taught to value. Children raised in 
a patriotic home, where rituals celebrating belonging to the nation are followed and encouraged 
(e.g. attending marches, celebrating public holidays like Fourth of July or Freedom Day along 
with ‘fellow countrymen’), and where symbols of national belonging are revered (a national 
flag outside one’s front door, a portrait of a political leader in the dining room), are  very likely 
to become patriots themselves. Such children will then be more likely to think of themselves 
as members of the nation (cognitive component), value that membership above membership to 
other groups they may belong to and value their group more than other groups/nations 
(evaluative component) and be emotionally invested in the nation (for what is patriotism if not 
this emotional investment?). 
We can easily see how children can acquire xenophobic beliefs in this manner. Indeed, research 
into xenophobic attitudes indicate that adults also form their beliefs on foreigners based not on 
direct experience with foreigners, but often on what they read/see in the media or on hearsay - 
the “verbal learning” referred to above (Crush & Pendleton 2007: 70, 75). ‘Knowledge’ about 
the foreigner is often based on stereotypes and stories rather than on experience or attempts to 
learn more about foreigners (e.g. who they ‘really’ are, their culture, etc.). Under such 
conditions of relative ignorance, our judgements rely on the little information we receive from 
sources we trust – from community leaders, parents, our favourite newspaper. When confronted 
with unknowns (such as ‘strangers’), authority and trust play an important role in our 




People believe information received from sources they trust (whether institutions 
or friends). Whom you trust depends on who you see as authoritative and 
legitimate. It also depends, of course, on whom you frequently interact with 
(Rydgren 2004: 125). 
The above captures both the impact of cultural socialisation (who you interact with) as well as 
social identity (whose authority you value; we tend to value the authority of prominent 
members of our own groups).  
1.3 The isolation thesis and contact theories (CT) 
In an early study of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa, Alan Morris (1998: 1125) 
suggests that “when a group has no history of incorporating strangers it may find it difficult to 
be welcoming.” Such a group is one that is relatively isolated, and therefore unused to and 
relatively ignorant about outsiders. Morris’s point is that South Africans are hostile toward 
foreigners because of the isolation imposed on South Africans by the Apartheid state – they 
were isolated from the rest of the continent, and also later the rest of the world due to sanctions. 
This isolation, enforced with strong borders, was further entrenched by a lack of knowledge or 
access to information about the rest of the world (due in part to censorship). From this we can 
develop the isolation thesis: that prejudice is the combined result of initial isolation, in the sense 
of a lack of contact and of information, and the encounter with strangers or outsiders. Isolation 
can be imposed, as in the case of Apartheid South Africa or North Korea, or it can be the result 
of a withdrawal due to negative contact with others. The isolation thesis is therefore correlates 
to, but is the inverse of, the contact hypothesis, or intergroup contact theory.  The contact 
hypothesis holds that “contact across interest-based and identitarian lines reduce[s] intergroup 
cognitive, affective, and behavioural biases” (Hayward 2007: 195). It follows, then, that where 
there is a lack of contact, biases or prejudices remain intact. To understand how isolation 
contributes to prejudice, I will therefore briefly consider how contact lowers prejudice 
according to contact theorists. 
Waldron (2006: 84) argues that our everyday interactions exhibit and promote cosmopolitan 
norms. Cosmopolitanism is often seen as the antidote to nationalist and xenophobic sentiments, 
with its emphasis on universal human rights and human equality. Increased contact of a 
mundane nature could work against negative, and often unfounded, stereotypes. Appiah (2006: 




getting used to one another is a by-product of sharing spaces and encountering one another on 
a daily basis. Social change, according to Appiah, is brought about when people gradually 
acquire a new way of seeing things through getting used to how different people/groups do 
things differently. However, as Benhabib (2006: 153) has pointed out, interaction in no way 
guarantees increased tolerance: empirical studies of past genocides show that violence takes 
place between neighbours, not distant strangers. And while xenophobic attitudes in South 
Africa are not necessarily the result of contact with foreigners, xenophobic attacks take place 
within communities where citizens and foreigners live side-by-side, often interacting every day 
(e.g. where spaza shops are owned and run by foreigners). 
It would therefore be simplistic to say that prejudice and discrimination are caused by isolation, 
and that any form of increased interaction will necessarily alleviate the problem. For example, 
Crush & Pendleton (2007: 75) have found that, in Southern Africa, increased personal contact 
between people of different nationalities lessens prejudice, while casual contact (e.g. economic 
exchanges, as with the spaza shop example) often has the opposite effect. Hence, the nature of 
the intergroup contact is key to either promoting or counteracting xenophobic attitudes. The 
aim of this chapter is not to provide solutions to xenophobic prejudice, but to determine why 
we are prejudiced in this way.   Prejudice is the result of a lack of contact or, where there is 
contact, the wrong kind of contact. Research on intergroup relations has shown that increased 
contact between different group effectively works against prejudice and promotes inclusion if 
certain conditions for interaction are met (Kumar et al. 2011: 352; see also Allport 1954). We 
can therefore look at these conditions and see how the failure to meet them contributes to 
prejudice and specifically xenophobic prejudice. Briefly, these conditions are: 
i. Equal status among groups within the specific context. This means that the groups 
interacting within that context needs to see each other as equal and feel that they are 
considered equal (Pettigrew et al. 1998: 66). This provides us with a difficulty when 
discrimination is the result of inequality, for example political inequality (because 
citizens are members and foreigners are non-members).  
ii. Pursuit of common goals. For example, as with athletic teams or team sports. When 
common goals are attained (e.g. when the team wins), the positive effect is strengthened 
(Pettigrew et al. 1998: 66). This is something I return to in Chapter 5. Pursuing common 
goals creates a sense of unity and often community, bonding people from different 




not have a shared goal initially. However, establishing a goal is made more difficult 
due to the ignorance that accompanies isolation, which may make it difficult for insiders 
to recognise possible shared struggles, drives, or dreams in strangers. 
iii. Intergroup cooperation. This condition assumes that the previous one is met – a goal 
needs to be identified first, before different groups can start cooperating with the aim 
of achieving it. Cooperation is effective because creates unity and builds relationships, 
but without a shared goal it is hard to achieve. Even if we see life in societies as a kind 
of cooperation game, the lack of a shared goal will in most cases mean that people 
compete (to each achieve their own goals) rather than cooperate. Groups who have been 
relatively isolated may also avoid cooperation or be unaware of its benefits, seeing 
themselves as self-sufficient. For the isolated group or individual, cooperation may be 
an alien concept. 
iv. A social climate which supports intergroup contact. This includes “explicit social 
sanction” from especially “the authorities, law, or custom” (Pettigrew et al. 1998:  66-
67). Critics of contact theory may claim that too much emphasis is put on individual 
contact, yet this condition calls for institutional support. It may be better to speak of the 
extended contact hypothesis or extended contact theory, to emphasise that it goes 
further than contact between individuals (Brown 2012: 429). It is the institutional or 
social sanction of the contact that creates conditions of equality necessary for positive 
contact. In Chapter 1, we saw how civic ostracism – which includes the denial of the 
‘legitimacy’ or possibility or support of certain kinds of relationships or contact – 
contributes to discrimination between the in-group and the out-group. 
Granted that isolation contributes to prejudice, including to xenophobic prejudice when it is a 
whole group, community, or nation that is isolated, it is by no means clear that contact will 
necessarily have the opposite effect. Where there is evidence of this, the contact is of a specific 
form, meeting the conditions indicated above. However, most interactions between insiders 
and outsiders will not take this form. Other studies suggest that contact rather contributes to 
prejudice. This brings us to our next theory. 
1.4 Group threat theory (GTT) 
Group threat theory can explain various forms of discrimination and prejudice, but it is 
especially applicable to the explanation of xenophobia. Hjerm (1998, 2005) holds that a threat 




a sufficient condition. He distinguishes between theories that explain discrimination by 
“assum[ing] that racism is guided by a set of assumptions of what minority ethnic groups 
deserve and how they should act” (Hjerm 2005: 296), which he calls symbolic theories (social 
identity and cultural socialisation theories would fall under this), and group threat theory which 
“assumes that conflicts and negative attitudes emerge because groups are competing for new 
opportunities” (ibid.). When we are faced with something that seems threatening, we either try 
to escape or withdraw (flight) or we react with aggression (fight) (Bauman 2006: 3). We may 
act fearfully, defensively, and often aggressively. In this case, the standard definition of 
xenophobia – a fear of strangers or foreigners – matches the explanation of discrimination 
offered by group threat theory. Dominant groups feel threatened (and become xenophobic) 
under the following conditions: 
…high visibility of the subordinate group, impermeable and rigid boundaries 
between groups, unstable economic times and conflicting political contexts, and 
competition for scarce resources (Kumar et al. 2011: 352) 
Group threat theory is therefore claiming the opposite from contact theory: that it is precisely 
when people are in contact, or when different groups share a space within which they must then 
compete, that conflict and prejudice arises. At the basis of group threat theory lies the 
assumption or feeling that one’s group is competing with another for scarce resources. This 
competitive aspect is not unrelated to our economic exchanges or our public interactions, for it 
is in such interactions that the distribution of resources is often determined. That xenophobia 
is fuelled by this kind of competition is clear in the kinds of beliefs people have about 
foreigners, or the kinds of justifications they give for their xenophobic attitudes and actions. 
Foreigners in South Africa are often accused of taking jobs and undercutting wages, in a 
country already struggling with unemployment and poverty (Nyamnjoh 2006: 37). They are 
also made guilty of “stealing South African women; overrunning hospitals, schools, and public 
housing” (Landau 2006: 131). The narratives underlying these beliefs will be further analysed 
in Chapter 5. For now, suffice to say that foreigners are perceived as a threat and competition 
for the many South Africans who find themselves in conditions of material scarcity, already 
struggling to survive and make ends meet. Yet foreigners are not only perceived as an economic 
or material threat, but also an existential threat or a threat to the continued existence of the 
nation, its culture, and the individual. In South Africa, this fear that foreigners threaten our 




involved in crime (including murder), and that they bring weapons and drugs into the country 
(Nyamnjoh 2006: 37).  
The fear or anxiety a person or group may feel when confronted with another group of strangers 
is called ‘stranger-shock’. Our encounter with a stranger is shocking because “their presence 
can also deepen social awareness; the arrival of a stranger can make others think about values 
they take for granted” (Sennett 2012: 38). Such an encounter can lead an individual to draw 
back into themselves out of denial or fear of the changes such a confrontation can bring to their 
world-view. Sennett uses the metaphor of donning a mask to describe this process of drawing 
back, specifically in the context of large, multicultural, and mostly urbanised contemporary 
societies. This masking is an attempt to protect oneself from possible overstimulation that 
results from constant exposure to new things, people, and cultures. Ultimately, this leads to 
individuals becoming uncooperative in shared spaces and projects. Because we “can’t manage 
[the] demanding, complex forms of social engagement” (ibid. 179) required by the scale and 
diversity of modern societies, we withdraw from the challenges posed by this society. In this 
view, it is diversity and not isolation that can give rise to a kind of laager mentality. This is the 
conclusion pushed by Robert Putnam (2007). Putnam’s studies indicate that the short-term 
effect of immigration and ethnic diversity is a kind of hunkering down, and a decrease in social 
solidarity and social capital even within groups. In other words, in communities characterised 
by racial or ethnic diversity, everyone is less social, even toward members of the same ethnic 
or racial group.  
The repercussions of this hunkering down are wider than just social isolation. Paul Collier 
(2013: 61) argues that mutual regard is necessary for the well-being of a society and its 
members in our modern economy. Mutual regard refers to a kind of sympathetic fellow-feeling, 
expressed through two kinds of behaviour: (i) “the willingness of the successful to finance 
transfers to the less successful” (ibid.), for example paying taxes for welfare programmes; and 
(ii) cooperation, especially in the provision of public goods. Where people feel mutual regard, 
they are more willing to cooperate because they trust each other more; there is also a sense of 
loyalty and solidarity that inspires us to take care of those in our community who are less 
fortunate. Such a regard can be built up over time, but it is possible that the ‘stranger-shock’ in 
times of mass migration and rapid transformation is so strong that these ties cannot be formed. 




The key damaging effect is not that immigrants and the indigenous population do 
not trust each other; it is that indigenous people lose trust in each other and so 
resort to opportunistic behaviour [such as looting]. (Collier 2013: 81). 
It seems, then, that immigration can have a destabilising effect on communities, not only due 
to the conflicts between the ingroup and the outgroup, but as a deeper threat to the very ties 
that bind a community. At the extreme end of far-right politics, there are those who see this 
possible short-term effect of migration as a threat of such magnitude that they argue against 
any form of migration. The hope is that closed borders will protect the national culture from 
the dangers of change. One such example would be the right-wing nationalist narrative of 
replacement, as expressed in the ‘replacement theory’ of French philosopher Renaud Camus. 
Camus (in Wildman 2017) sees ‘replacement’ as “the very essence of modernity”, something 
that happens in all contexts: “Objects are being replaced. Landscapes are being replaced. 
Everything is being replaced.” Camus is specifically concerned with the situation in France, 
where he believes the growing presence of Muslims will lead to the destruction of French 
culture and society. According to his theory, the pro-refugee, pro-Muslim policies advanced 
by the French government and the European Union amounts to genocide by substitution. 
Replacement is “the worst thing to happen since Nazism” (ibid.).12 
Replacement theory is a prime example of the fear of the stranger. The most important insight 
from group threat theory is that our fears and our reactions to those fears are triggered by 
perceived threats. While our perceptions may correspond to reality (e.g. to the presence of 
strangers in our midst), what is crucial to realise that our fear actually has less to do with the 
actual foreign person (or even people), and more to do with ourselves. To put it differently: we 
discriminate against foreigners not based on who or what they are (i.e. whether they really are 
criminal) but based on what we think they are and based on how we think about belonging to 
a community or a nation. If one is xenophobic, it says more about one’s self than about the 
feared other. This is why ingroup reappraisal is so important. When confronted with a stranger, 
we are asked to question our own assumptions. We can deny this and hunker down, as we often 
do, but in a sense contact theory provides us with the antidote to group threat theory. If our 
fears are based mostly on perceptions, and positive contact can change such perceptions, then 
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to take note of such theories and opinions as they express what I am arguing against, acquiring his work would 
have required me to support him financially (by buying or requesting the library to buy his book). For personal 




we can also face and hopefully curb our fear of the other. Accepting group threat theory as part 
of the explanation for xenophobia should therefore not make us reach for an anti-immigration 
conclusion. Rather, it points to the importance of devising immigration policies that mitigate 
stranger-shock, and the need to create and amplify the conditions for cooperation and the 
development of new forms of social solidarity over time (see Putnam 2007: 164).  
1.5 No one-size-fits-all explanation 
In the preceding sections I considered different possible explanations of prejudice, some (like 
CT and GTT) contradictory. Yet I do not think that any of these theories offer a better 
explanation than the others. I am sceptical of the possibility of offering a single explanation for 
all forms and individual instances of prejudice, given human plurality. There also seems to be 
contradicting empirical evidence in support of the different theories, which hints at the 
possibility that our prejudices can have different motivations or causes. As I also hoped to 
show, there are many overlaps between the different theories. Social identity theories and 
cultural socialisation theory are particularly closely connected, as both focus on the ways in 
which group identity is constructed and passed along to the next generation. Negative 
stereotypes and strong yet narrowly defined group identities create boundaries between groups, 
with people being less likely to initiate contact (CT and GTT). Rigid boundaries between 
groups, which might make others seem more threatening (GTT), would prevent personal 
contact between strangers (CT). If people feel more threatened during unstable economic times 
(GTT), it also makes sense that economic interactions will not have the positive effect other 
forms of contact has (CT). Each theory sheds light on a particular aspect of group-based 
discrimination. The first two theories illuminate our relationship with ourselves (i.e. our 
identities) and the groups in which we grow up, and the implications thereof for our attitudes 
towards and interactions with others. The latter two theories are concerned with the ways in 
which we relate, or fail to relate, to others who do not share our group identity. Therefore they 
help explain the social and political aspects of xenophobia, explaining inclusion and exclusion 
based on ideas about belonging.   
Having said this, all four theories seek to explain intergroup prejudice and the often-
accompanying discrimination and conflict as broad phenomena. None of them captures what 
is unique about xenophobia.13 Crush & Pendleton (2007: 75n) suggest that xenophobic 
                                                 




discrimination (or anti-foreign intolerance) can further be explained based on three sets of 
factors:   
i. Interactive: amount and character of personal exposure to people of different origin, 
specifically national origin (this corresponds to contact theories and group threat 
theory) 
ii. Cultural: linking to identity and national consciousness (as seen in social identity 
theory and cultural socialisation theory) 
iii. Material: referring to job and resource competition, relative deprivation, etcetera 
(corresponding to group threat theory) 
Regarding (iii): as set out in the introduction, the aim of this study is to provide an alternative 
framework for understanding xenophobia, which does not stand in opposition to socio-
economic explanations but which goes beyond that. I have briefly considered the material 
factors that contribute to xenophobia in particular contexts in the preceding sections, and also 
in Chapter 1. Providing a further discussion is beyond my current scope. Material factors 
contribute to xenophobia by acting as triggers for xenophobic violence, and by exacerbating 
people’s frustration with their situations, yet as my discussion of the scapegoat theory 
indicated, such explanations do not in fact explain why foreigners specifically are targeted.  
Points (i) and (ii) provide direction for Chapters 3 and 4, where I look at belonging (Chapter 
3) and identity (Chapter 4) and how these themes relate to xenophobia. However, we should 
not be too quick to assume that xenophobia is a relatively new phenomenon, linked to the 
emergence of the nation-state. We may think of foreigners, belonging, and citizenship in terms 
of nation-states now (as discussed in Chapter 1), but distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
‘member’ and ‘foreigner’ have been made throughout human history (and prehistory), and we 
would do well to know something of the pre-political origins of this phenomenon lest we think 
that it can be combatted solely by political or material means. In Chapter 5, I will consider 
different strategies we can follow to reduce prejudice and counter xenophobia. Some of these 
rely on political or material means, while others are inspired by the discussion below. In what 
follows, I situate our tendency to make ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinctions in our evolutionary history, 
but a closer examination of animal interaction will show us that such distinctions need not 




2. Xenophobia’s pre-political origins: fear and instincts 
In this section, I will show how contemporary forms of xenophobia have their origin in a 
generalised fear of strangers, expressed as a fear of foreigners, which is a result of the way in 
which humans as a specie evolved and came to form groups. It is this fear that underlies our 
prejudices, which causes us to seek safety in groups and to exclude those who we feel threaten 
the group. In Section 2.1 I will consider the role fear plays in xenophobia and show how our 
instinctive reactions to fear contribute to us becoming xenophobic. I will then consider the 
possibility that xenophobia is a product of our evolutionary heritage (Section 2.2) and argue 
that we can see it at play in the animal kingdom. Indeed, animal behaviourists and biologists 
speak of the “xenophobia principle” in animal interaction (Section 2.3). I argue that looking at 
the animal kingdom can help us understand how deep-seated our xenophobic tendencies are, 
but that examples from nature also provide us with hope for alternative ways of dealing with 
strangers (Section 2.4). In this I diverge from standard accounts of xenophobia, but as instances 
of xenophobic violence and discrimination increase worldwide, it is imperative that we 
consider all avenues and look for new ways to tackle the problem. 
2.1 The fear of strangers 
Group threat theory sees fear as the driving force behind prejudice, and indeed our common 
understanding of xenophobia echoes this. Xenophobia is commonly defined as an “intense or 
irrational dislike or fear of people from other countries” (Compact Oxford English Dictionary 
2005); “a fear or hatred of foreigners and foreign things” (The Chambers Dictionary 2006). 
Crush and Pendleton (2007: 66) defines xenophobia as a morbid dislike for foreigners. Phobia 
translates as ‘fear’, but as Kim & Sundstrom (2014: 23) points out, this can be misleading. 
Other emotions have been mentioned above – hatred, dislike, antipathy. Feelings of envy, 
resentment, disgust, or incongruity can also underlie xenophobic attitudes. This is an important 
point for two reasons: (a) it recognises that xenophobia is most often an emotional response 
(whether to the mere presence of something or someone foreign, or to socioeconomic 
difficulties) and not a rational response to reality (xenophobic stereotypes often have little or 
no basis in reality), and (b) it recognises that the emotions felt by the xenophobe are complex, 





Furthermore, recognising that xenophobia is a negative emotional response makes sense if it is 
considered from the perspective of group threat theory (the outgroup poses a threat, which 
gives rise to feelings of fear) and social identity theory (disgust or dislike of whoever or 
whatever is foreign, including cultural practices of foreigners, as a means to strengthen one’s 
own feelings of cultural superiority). It is important to note that the fear is not necessarily 
caused by an individual foreigner doing or being something specific, but rather what they 
symbolise. One may feel fear when confronted by a direct threat (as when someone is standing 
with a gun to one’s head), or in response to a more existential dread – the fear that one’s life 
has no meaning, for example, or the fear that one’s place in the world is under attack or being 
questioned (i.e. the fear of not belonging). Fear can also be a gut reaction to uncertainty. 
Hunkering down (Putnam) or putting on masks (Sennett) in reaction to diversity or difference 
are examples of this kind of reaction.  
We should be careful, however, of losing sight of the nuanced nature of our emotional lives. 
On a conceptual level, it may be possible (albeit difficult) to distinguish fear from hatred, 
antipathy, or disgust. In life, our actions and attitudes are rarely guided by a single emotion. 
Emotions such as anger and disgust can be fuelled by fear – whether recognised or not – or, at 
the very least, be very comfortable bedfellows with fear. It is, therefore, an emotion worth 
investigating. I recognise that a variety of emotions sit behind particular instances of 
xenophobia but an in-depth analysis of all such emotions is not possible here. I therefore limit 
my focus to fear. 
Humans and animals usually react in two ways to possible threats: we fight, or we try to escape 
(Bauman 2006: 3). Sometimes, we freeze (think of possums pretending to be dead when a 
raptor flies overhead, or a philosopher suddenly forgetting what they want to say at a 
conference). Whenever we find ourselves in an unfamiliar situation, our bodies prepare us for 
one of these reactions, because unfamiliarity and uncertainty causes us to feel fear. This we 
have in common with animals – the instinctive fear of that which is unfamiliar. However, fear 
in humans also manifests in a different way, what Zygmunt Bauman (2006: 3) calls second 
degree or derivative fear. Derivative fears are socially and culturally recycled; in other words, 
they are fears we have not in reaction to immediate threats (being chased by a lion), but rather 
due to our susceptibility to feeling insecure and vulnerable. We often react fearfully to 




danger. This reaction stems from our derivative fear, from what we were taught to fear and 
fearfully anticipate by our culture and socialisation.  
But what is this fear? For Bauman (2006: 2), fear “is the name we give our uncertainty: to our 
ignorance of the threat and of what is to be done – what can and can’t be – to stop it in its 
tracks – or to fight back if stopping it is beyond our power”. Or, as Rebecca Solnit (2014: 80) 
puts it, “adults fear, above all, the darkness that is the unknown, the unseeable, the obscure”. 
Fear is our emotional reaction to situations or encounters in which we feel lost, which we do 
not know how to navigate, in which we do not feel in control. Of course, material factors can 
and do exacerbate fear. We feel more threatened by strangers if, for example, our political 
contexts conflict or if we live in unstable economic times (Kumar et al. 2011: 35). We certainly 
have cause to fear specific strangers if we wake up with them standing over our beds, wielding 
knives. But our fear of strangers and strangeness has a deeper, more existential root, as alluded 
to above: the encounter with strangeness forces us to question our world-views and our place 
in the world, and it serves as a constant reminder of the limitations of our knowledge and our 
lives.  
This latter point goes to the heart of our fear of strangers. We fear strangers because we do not 
know what the result of our encounter with them will be. As we will see below, in the earliest 
days of human development the encounter with a stranger or a strange group was risky, and 
often resulted in violence. Those that survived were the ones who were best at eliminating the 
threat posed by other groups. 
2.2 Following our instincts 
The study of xenophobia has also been approached from the perspective of evolutionary 
biology (see Reynolds et al. 1987). In these investigations, xenophobia is often equated with 
ethnocentrism, or the two terms are used interchangeably. I would argue that these two 
phenomena may share a common origin, but that they are distinct in their modern 
manifestations. Ethnocentrism, as the name suggests, discriminates based on ethnicity, not 
nationality (i.e. on the basis of citizenship), as xenophobia in contemporary society often 
does.14 If nations were ethnically homogenous, ethnocentric discrimination would be the same 
                                                 
14 I want to re-emphasise a point made in Chapter 1 – that xenophobia is not always connected to ideas of 




as xenophobic discrimination. This, obviously, is not the case in most modern states. South 
Africans unite against foreigners, yet they do not share an ethnic identity. However, used in the 
context of studies of evolutionary biology, both terms have a broader meaning, referring to a 
more general approach to strangers or outsiders. In the early days of human development, 
discrimination against outsiders because they are outsiders occurred, but not necessarily 
because the insiders thought of themselves in terms of ethnicity (and certainly not in terms of 
nationality). When talking about this primitive form of discrimination, therefore, I prefer to use 
‘xenophobia’ as we use the concept not only to mean fear of foreigners (i.e. in terms of modern 
concepts such as nationality or citizenship), but also fear of strangers in general. However, 
where the theories I discuss prefer to use ‘ethnocentrism’ rather than ‘xenophobia’, I use their 
formulation.  
Van der Dennen (1987: 1) defines ethnocentrism as: 
a schismatic in-group/out-group differentiation, in which internal cohesion, relative 
peace, solidarity, loyalty and devotion to the in-group, and the glorification of the 
‘sociocentric-sacred’ (one’s own cosmology, ideology, social myth, or 
Weltanschauung; one’s own ‘god-given’ social order) are correlated with a state of 
hostility or permanent quasi-war (status hostilis) towards out-groups, which are 
often perceived as inferior, subhuman, and/or the incorporation of evil. 
Ethnocentrism sees in-group violence as negative and out-group violence as positive, 
necessary, or desirable. This enmity toward the out-group can possibly be explained (although 
not excused) by our development or evolution as a species. As group threat theory suggests, 
outsiders are often perceived as a threat to the safety and stability of a group. Xenophobia or 
ethnocentrism may be an instinctive reaction to this threat, and one with evolutionary 
advantage in primitive times, when competition for scarce resources was fierce. Through time, 
this instinct was given cultural meaning by portraying the in-group as good and the out-group 
as inferior or evil. 
2.3 The xenophobia principle in animals 
If xenophobia has its basis in evolutionary biology, it should be present in other species with 
relatively complex societies as well. Indeed, socio-biologists who study behaviours between 
groups of animals, whether within a specie or between different species, have identified what 




widespread phenomenon where in-group members react violently toward out-group members. 
Such violent actions include antagonistic chasing, target aggressions, cooperative attacks, and 
coalitionary killing (Antonacci, Norscia & Palagi 2010: 1). These reactions to strangers have 
been identified in various lemur, monkey, and other primate populations. In this sense, warfare 
can also be seen as a xenophobic action perpetrated by one of the larger primates, humans. 
What does it mean to say that animals are xenophobic? According to the xenophobic principle 
(above), resident animals cooperate violently to scare off or kill strangers. In animals, 
xenophobic aggression differs markedly from territorial aggression, or the aggression found 
within hierarchical social groups. The latter two forms of aggression are directed at animals 
that are familiar, although not necessarily part of the in-group. These forms of aggression can 
overlap with xenophobic aggression, but “[the] essence of xenophobia is an aggressive 
response towards a complete social stranger” (Van der Dennen 1987: 22). Furthermore, the 
latter two forms are often only for show (a display of aggression to remind everyone of their 
place in the social order), whereas xenophobia in animals usually involves lethal violence (ibid. 
22). 
It is not only primates that exhibit these ‘xenophobic’ tendencies. Some invertebrates (bees, 
ants, and a few other species of social insects) exhibit the trait, and several vertebrates have 
also been shown to be xenophobic. These include gulls, gerbils, hamsters, mice, rats, wolves, 
lions and deer (ibid. 20-21). Xenophobia is especially prevalent in relatively closed and 
hierarchical social groups and/or groups that are very territorial (ibid. 21). In contrast, species 
with relatively open societies generally do not exhibit xenophobic tendencies (e.g. bandicoot 
rats, migratory birds). 
The presence of xenophobia in other primates and animals offers a challenge to our 
understanding of xenophobia as a form of prejudice based on an idea of foreignness. We either 
have to assume that animals have some conception of belonging and not-belonging similar to 
our own or give a different name to this phenomenon in animals. The former is not too 
farfetched, if controversial, as many animals exhibit strong social tendencies. Think, for 
example, of a wolf pack or a tribe of lions. Of course, this way of belonging is very different 
from our sense of belonging to a political community, a nation, or a cultural group, and we do 
not have access to animal minds in a way that would confirm that thinking about belonging is 




something that is disputed). But animals, at least social animals, do belong to larger groups and 
on some very basic level attach importance to that belonging. We see evidence of this in the 
effect that ostracism has on animals (think of the ways in which we see them trying to regain 
the favour of the group, or follow the group, in nature documentaries) and in the ways in which 
animals (elephants, wolves) mourn the loss of members of their groups. If we recognise this, 
we can interpret nationalist thinking, or thinking in terms of foreignness, as humans’ distinct 
way of thinking about belonging – something that developed over time, as we became more 
complex psychologically, emotionally, and in terms of the structures of our communities.  
The other option – calling this behaviour in animals something other than xenophobia – is not 
something I wish to do, for various reasons. Firstly, the ‘xenophobia principle’ is a concept that 
is widely used and accepted in animal behaviour studies, zoology, and related fields. Secondly, 
I think it is important to realise how ingrained xenophobic thinking (and feeling!) is. To 
understand xenophobia, we need to investigate all possible avenues of explanation. To say that 
xenophobia has its origins in our evolutionary history is not to say that cultural, historical, and 
political explanations of xenophobia are wrong, nor to say that xenophobic attitudes and actions 
are inevitable. We understand enough of human evolution, instincts, genetic predispositions, 
etcetera, to know that our actions can diverge from what we were programmed to do by 
evolution. It would also be wrong to see ourselves purely as the products of culture. As 
Massimo Pigliucci (2010) argues, if we want to understand a complex form of human 
behaviour like xenophobia, “it is a category mistake to contrast cultural and biological 
explanations of behavior.” Rather, we can think of evolution and culture as ultimate and 
proximate causes of human behaviour. While evolutionary theory can explain something of the 
adaptive advantages of aggression towards outsiders or bias towards insiders, this is of little 
help in understanding the complexity of human behaviour and interactions. To explain 
particular instances of a general anti-stranger bias, and to explain the complexity (i.e. the many 
ways in which it manifests), we need the kind of proximate explanations (immediate causes) 
provided by a study of culture, politics, and psychology (as in the approach I followed in 
Chapter 1), 
2.4 An alternative reaction to fear 
Evolutionary biology can tell us why and even how our tendency to be xenophobic initially 
developed, but it cannot serve as a full explanation. Given this, it may seem trivial to emphasise 




has been on the moral, cultural, and political aspects (i.e. proximate causes). Yet I think 
recognising this aspect of xenophobia can be helpful not only for our full understanding of the 
phenomenon, but also for providing us with strategies to combat xenophobia by looking at the 
ways in which other animals act. So far, I have only mentioned examples of animals who act 
on their xenophobic instincts. However, nature provides us with examples of interactions 
between animals where there are clear tensions between ingroups and outgroups, but without 
it resulting in violence and, in some cases, with the tension dissolving and animals forming 
bonds across group divisions. We can think of how the relationship between (some) wolves 
and (some) humans changed, which led to the domestication of the wolf. The story of the co-
evolution of dogs and humans is one of cooperation where we would have expected conflict. 
Wolves and humans competed for the same food sources, after all. Yet at some point in history, 
in independent sites across the globe, these two species realised that cooperation is more 
beneficial for survival than competition, and from that came one of the most meaningful 
relationships between humans and other species (see Bradshaw 2012). But cooperation is not 
the only possible response to competition that animals in the wild have. A study on lemur 
behaviour suggests that lemurs manage xenophobia through play (Antonacci et al. 2010). In 
this study, the resource competed for was not only food but attention from female lemurs. 
Instead of engaging in a fight, ingroup males would initiate play with approaching outgroup 
males, which would ultimately dissolve the tension. I return to this study and the potential of 
play in Chapter 5.  
Understanding the role that our evolutionary history plays in how we act and interact today 
provides us with insight into kinds of interaction that we may not have considered (such as 
play) if we did not take evolution into account, or with evidence that we can act or interact 
differently in response to competition with strangers (cooperation). It also allows us to 
recognise xenophobia as a global phenomenon, which means that despite its complexity and 
the different ways in which it manifests, we can understand it as something which is and has 
historically been present in all societies. In Chapter 1, I expressed my scepticism about 
understanding xenophobia as wholly contextual or claiming that xenophobia in South Africa 
has nothing in common with xenophobia elsewhere. This latter understanding of xenophobia 
limits our access to resources that can help us combat xenophobia, for example strategies used 
by other societies or communities (either in the past, or somewhere else in the world) to 
promote cooperation and hospitality toward foreigners. We are also better able to understand 




this as a reaction that is instinctive or, at the very least, one that was coded into our psyches at 
a very early stage of human development. An encounter with a stranger or strangeness may 
trigger this reaction regardless of whether the stranger poses an actual threat or not. 
Importantly, this supports earlier claims that xenophobia is primarily motivated by ideas and 
prejudices and attitudes internal to the xenophobe, and not by anything specific about the 
foreigner other than the fact that they are a ‘stranger’. 
Conclusion  
In Chapter 2, I took a broader view of xenophobia, trying to determine where our tendency to 
be xenophobic originates. In Section 1, I considered and compared social identity theory, 
cultural socialisation theory, the isolation thesis/contact theories, and group threat theory. All 
of these theories seek to explain why we form prejudices on the basis of ingroup and outgroup 
membership. I argued that none of these theories can fully explain xenophobic prejudice or 
every instance of xenophobic discrimination, but that xenophobia can be motivated for a whole 
variety of reasons, and that these theories provides us with such reasons. The first two theories 
are closely linked, and they explain how we come to value our membership to our group 
(whether cultural, national, religious, etc.) and consequently come to devalue non-members. 
From my discussion on contact theory and group threat theory, I concluded that instead of 
being at odds with one another, they show us the consequences of the wrong sort of contact. 
When contact is negative, we feel threatened by others, thus confirming group threat theory. 
Contact is positive when participants feel they are treated equally, when they share a common 
goal and cooperate to achieve that, and when their cooperation is supported by the social 
climate, including institutions. This will be explored in more depth in Chapter 5, where I look 
at solutions for the problem of xenophobia. 
Section 2 considers common explanations of xenophobia that sees ingroup-outgroup 
discrimination as a mechanism of intergroup interactions since the earliest days of humanity, 
where outgroup hostility and aggression provided an evolutionary advantage. I first looked at 
our understanding of xenophobia as a fear of strangers and foreigners, and at the role which 
fear plays. I argued that this fear has many origins: our fear of uncertainty, our fear of losing 
our place in the world or of having to change our world-views, but also quite literally our fear 
for our existence. This fear is a product of our evolutionary history, where strangers posed a 
threat to our lives as everyone competed for scarce resources. In our early history as a species, 




We see this in animals, who exhibit what socio-biologists call the ‘xenophobia principle’. I 
suggested that recognising xenophobia as a product of the way we evolved as a specie does not 
mean that xenophobic attitudes and aggression are inevitable, but rather that we can see 
examples in the animal kingdom of other ways of dealing with strangers. Studying the ways in 
which animals handle strangers other than aggression may provide us with new avenues to 
explore in our own interactions. This is an idea that I develop further in Chapter 5. 
In this chapter I hoped to show how deeply ingrained xenophobic attitudes are. Xenophobia 
resides in our minds, our hearts, and our interactions. Our fears and desire to survive, our desire 
to see ourselves as superior and to protect what is ours, are the birthplaces of the kind of 
xenophobia we see in contemporary societies. This in no way excuses it, but rather illustrates 
the immensity of the task before us if we hope to create a less xenophobic world. Xenophobia 
touches on the deepest aspects of the human condition: our identities, as individuals and groups, 
and our belonging in the world. In the coming chapters, I will therefore shift my focus slightly 
from a conceptual and historical analysis of xenophobia, to looking at the importance of 
belonging and the harms of displacement in Chapter 3, and at identity formation and how 





Chapter 3: Belonging and Home 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we have seen that expressions and acts of xenophobia are centred on 
a core belief: You are foreign, you don’t belong here. Xenophobia is the reaction to the fear of 
being displaced or replaced, or of having no place, rooted in a primal fear about our own 
survival. Xenophobia is not only the fear of strangers, but also the fear of being (or becoming) 
a stranger in the world, and specifically being in a stranger where one should feel at home. In 
South Africa, for example, widespread xenophobic violence usually breaks out in 
economically, politically, and socially marginal communities – communities where jobs and 
other resources are scarce, and where constitutional rights and other entitlements mean very 
little. In such vulnerable communities, those who had been excluded from the benefits of full 
citizenship during Apartheid, and who were promised the world when democracy came, are 
still excluded from the full benefits of citizenship.  They may be citizens in name, but their 
situation has hardly changed. In Arendt’s (1973: 296) words, they are deprived of a place in 
which their words and deeds are significant, and therefore effectively deprived of their rights. 
In a sense, they are still excluded, and this gives rise to a “deep, existential apprehension over 
the meaning of belonging” (Landau 2006: 135).  
Across the globe, individuals and communities situated in this precarious space of not quite 
belonging, see foreigners as a threat. For example, very often, undocumented migrants from 
the rest of Africa settle in informal settlements or rural communities, as there is a smaller police 
presence and control over who lives there. This protects them to an extent, as it hides their 
presence in the country, but it also endangers them. Faced with these seemingly rich and 
privileged foreigners, citizens who feel (and are) disenfranchised feel even more marginalised, 
more alienated from the place to which they are supposed to belong. The only thing they can 
cling to is the fact that they belong here, whether by birth or legal citizenship. This status they 
brandish against the migrants or foreigners, who they firmly believe do not belong here. In the 
preceding chapters, I referred to the connections between a sense of belonging, an attachment 
to place, and xenophobia. Violent and virulent xenophobia is often justified by fears of being 
replaced (Chapter 2). People are included or excluded based on origin, with belonging closely 




It is therefore crucial that this notion of ‘belonging’ is investigated, if we want to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of both the drivers behind and the effects of xenophobia. 
Belonging calls up notions of home and being at home, and of place, displacement, and 
replacement. Xenophobia is a reaction to insecurity, and part of that insecurity is linked to a 
fear that one will cease to belong somewhere. As a result, people exclude others from belonging 
so that they themselves can belong. This creates a condition of insecurity for the ‘outsiders’, 
rendering them vulnerable to certain harms and taking away certain freedoms precisely because 
they do not belong.  
In Section 1, I will consider belonging from the perspective of the xenophobe. First, I will 
establish the connection between belonging and place, which is often interpreted in a territorial 
sense. I will show how places of origin influence our perceptions about ourselves and others, 
establishing a link between identity and place. I draw on the work of Jeff Malpas (1999) to 
show how places shape our subjectivities, and on Arendt (1998) to argue that part of this 
process of subjectivity-formation is also a product of the other people we encounter in shared 
places. In Section 1.2, I argue that the upshot of the connection between place, subjectivity, 
and identity is that being displaced or feeling that one does not belong is deeply harmful to the 
individual, but that this also has negative effects on society. I show how people become 
superfluous (Arendt), and how superfluous people seek meaning and belonging by excluding 
others. This is further explored in Section 1.3, where I argue that people who feel isolated from 
the world and from each other often seek belonging in larger groups that promise them a home. 
With reference to Benedict Anderson’s (2006) argument that the nation is an imagined 
community, I argue that people seeking belonging find a false home in the nation, with 
nationalism as a result. I then consider the link between nationalism and xenophobia, arguing 
that while xenophobia does not need the nation, nationalism is always in danger of being 
xenophobic. 
In Section 2, I consider belonging and home from the perspective of the outsider or foreigner 
trying to establish a new home in a host country. I argue that belonging somewhere, in the 
sense of having a physical place where one can exist, is a precondition for freedom. Relying 
on Waldron’s (1991) work on homelessness, I establish the link between freedom, place, and 
existence, and show how in this regard foreigners are similarly situated to the homeless, in that 
their ability to exercise basic freedom is curtailed because they often struggle to find a place to 




rootlessness: the dangers of displacement and statelessness. I show how easy it is for people to 
disappear, and intentionally so, when they do not have a secure place in the world. Section 2.3 
therefore deals with the question of having one’s own place, i.e. a personal home. I consider 
the feminist critique of home, but ultimately argue that the notion of home can be a regulative 
ideal (Young 1997), used to be critical of society where it fails to protect the lives and privacy 
of people. We need to ensure that people have some kind of home, some kind of place to exist, 
because being displaced is deeply harmful. I turn to the harms of displacement in Section 2.4, 
specifically the emotional and cognitive harms. I show how personal displacement, i.e. moving 
home, harms anybody, but specifically that harm is exacerbated when we are dealing with the 
displacement of migrants and refugees. For this discussion I rely on the work of Cara Nine 
(2017), who shows us how being displaced places an extra load on one’s cognitive functioning, 
while also putting strain on one’s relationships. This in turn impedes the process of starting to 
feel at home in a new place. 
This chapter serves as a transition from the conceptual and historical analyses of xenophobia 
in the first two chapters, to the question of how xenophobia is related to our identity in the final 
two chapters. Both those questions are deeply concerned with belonging and having a place in 
the world, and therefore this chapter is key to understanding why we have apprehensions about 
belonging and what the dangers of those apprehensions are. 
1. False homes and isolated individuals 
1.1 Place and belonging 
The notion of belonging is intimately connected to the notion of place. One can belong to a 
family, a group, a community but politically, belonging to a place matters: “We define 
ourselves at least partly on where we are from; we experience feelings of displacement that 
suggest how important must be the usually ignored signals testifying to emplacement” (Maier 
2008: 67). Where we are from is so fundamental to our sense of identity, that it is often one of 
the first things we tell new people we meet. We also tend to attach certain identities to people 
based on where they are from or make certain (often stereotyped) assumptions about them. We 
distinguish between ‘city people’ and ‘country people’. We make derogatory jokes about 
people from certain towns, and we attach characteristics to individuals based on their 
nationality. On official forms, we often not only have to fill out our current addresses or home 




taking out a loan, or voting in elections requires an official proof of address – confirmation on 
a paper that you have an address and, attached to that address, an identity. 
The strong link in our minds between belonging, place, and territory plays an important 
contributing role in people’s xenophobic beliefs, attitudes, and actions. For nationalists, and 
for xenophobes, the specific place or territory matters. In this sense, place “can license the 
xenophobic, the authoritarian, the military, and even the fascistic” (Maier 2008: 71). And 
emphasis on attachment and belonging is then a reemphasis on the Heimat, the small and local, 
a nostalgic longing for the past (ibid. 72). It translates into a longing for the good old days, 
before (for example) South Africa was ‘overrun’ by foreigners. Foreigners do not belong here, 
in South Africa, because they are not South African. Even ones born here do not belong, 
because they do not belong to the historical nation, or nations, indigenous to South Africa. But 
belonging is also metaphorical – the here in the statement can also refer to a group of people 
(like a club, a religious group, or a nation). This kind of belonging is not necessarily linked to 
territory or place. For example, Catholics all over the world may consider themselves part of a 
single community, and some may believe that some others are not ‘really Catholic’, i.e., that 
they do not really belong to that community, based on beliefs they may hold, or how moral 
their behaviour is, etc., and not due to their location. Both belonging in its metaphorical sense, 
and belonging linked to place, is relevant to this discussion, as both can be at play 
simultaneously. The nation, for example, is not only linked to a territory, but also to a narrative 
or a myth. Nations can exist in diasporas, or diasporic people can still ‘belong’ to the nation, 
even when they do not inhabit its territory, or when the nation does not have a territory. Even 
nomads attach special significance to specific places. 
We can think of the link between identity and place in more abstract terms. Jeff Malpas (1999: 
176) argues for the necessary connection between subjectivity and place – subjectivity is 
embedded in place. People can only exist as self-conscious subjects if they exist in a place; 
place is the precondition for subjectivity: 
Place is instead that within and with respect to which and with respect to which 
subjectivity is itself established – place is not founded on subjectivity, but is rather 
that on which subjectivity is founded. Thus one does not first have a subject that 




structure of subjectivity is given in and through the structure of place. (Malpas 
1999: 35) 
To put it more concretely: the place in which we find ourselves shapes our selves – place 
provides us with a background or a site within which social interactions and practices take 
place (ibid. 185). Indeed, this is indicated by our language – we speak of things ‘taking place’. 
Malpas uses ‘place’ in a broader sense than I have above. His understanding can include the 
spatiotemporal (i.e. a geographical place, or a place in space and time), but he considers it a 
too limited understanding of place. Place is not mere landscape, nor something we subjectively 
construct. Malpas is sceptical of claims that see place as merely social and political constructs, 
or constructs of our subjectivity. Rather, “[e]mbedded in the physical landscape is a landscape 
of personal and cultural history” (ibid. 1). There is more to ‘place’ than what is human (the 
social, the political, the historical). The world in its totality (including objects) is also presented 
to us through place (ibid. 15).  Place is “that wherein the sort of being that is characteristically 
human has its ground”, an “open and yet bounded realm within which the things of the world 
can appear and within which events can ‘take place’” (ibid. 33). This understanding of place is 
inspired by the Heideggerian Dasein (da-sein – ‘there/here-being’). So our subjectivities are 
formed by what is given to us in experience, our interactions with such objects and other 
subjects in space, and by what Malpas calls “Proust’s Principle”: the idea that our identities are 
derived from our inhabiting specific places, here understood in terms of location (ibid. 176). 
The dependence of identity on place comes from the general fact that people, as subjects, share 
the world/the place they inhabit with other objects and subjects, and the particular fact that our 
mental lives rely on actively engaging with our environments (ibid. 177). This also implies that 
our understanding of the world is dependent on place. Elsewhere, Malpas (2016: 381) writes 
of the “intimate belonging-together of place and thinking, of place and experience, of place 
and the very possibility of appearance, of presence, of being.” What we seek to understand is 
inspired by what we encounter and experience in the place we find ourselves, and our 
understanding of that place (or our place in the world) influences how we see and seek to 
understand what we encounter. 
There are those who argue that Malpas’s claim is too strong, or his argument too weak – that 
who we are (our identities, subjectivities, or sense of self) is not determined by place in the 
way he suggests: “in no non-trivial sense does being who and what one is require that one either 




2001: 791). It is not clear to me, however, that Malpas’s claim is as trivial as his critics make 
it seem. His emphasis on the opacity and obscurity of place, on its transcendental nature (1999; 
2016: 384) is not of direct concern to my argument. As indicated from the start, I am concerned 
here specifically with the more limited understanding of place – physical places, but also place 
as it relates to human history – as this directly relates to politics and political identities. For this 
reason, Malpas’s claim that place influences and indeed determines identity does not seem 
trivial, even if it is a bit of a truism. I do not think that place is the only determining factor in 
identity-formation – far from it – but that it plays a large role is undeniable. Where we grew 
up, which places we inhabited and continue to inhabit, provides us with a frame of reference. 
In a trivial sense, this means that I know certain things, having grown up in a rural town in the 
Kalahari, that friends who lived their whole lives in Johannesburg are less likely to know. Of 
course, this knowledge can be gained in other ways. However, the influence of place goes 
further than exposure to different things (the objects we encounter in experience).  
Crucially, a place also contains other people, people who act and react and interact in specific 
ways (in part determined by what their space asks of them). So different cultures developed in 
different places and, where those cultures spread through diasporas and migrations, some 
elements were retained, and some changed. Think, for example, of differences in dialect and 
accent. Such differences are not necessarily the product of geographical characteristics 
(mountains or oceans or deserts), but they are regional. It is here that the seemingly trivial 
claim becomes important. The places that we share, where we live and interact and form bonds 
and create culture, gain a special significance for us. We attach emotional meaning to place – 
we are loyal to our hometowns, our countries. We come to love places, not only for what they 
mean to us on an individual level but for what they mean to the group we form part of. In this 
sense, we politicise places. So to say that one’s identity is shaped by one’s place in the world 
is to also recognise that one’s politics is shaped by the political situation in which one finds 
oneself (whether in agreement or dissent or apathy).  
As we come to value the ways in which places shape our identities, we may feel strongly about 
protecting those places from change. In a sense, the xenophobic life-world I referred to in 
Chapter 1 is a place – a place constructed in such a way that it is ‘protected’ from outsiders. 
The term ‘life-world’ refers to our phenomenological and subjective experience of the places 
in which we lead our everyday lives, and when outsiders ‘intrude’ upon these places the shape 




sentiments – the fears that foreigners will bring irreversible change to the culture, architecture, 
and ‘feeling’ of a place or a life-world. 
The relationship between our phenomenological understanding and valuing of place and 
politics is central to Hannah Arendt’s work. In The Human Condition (1998), Arendt discusses 
the dual nature of place – place as something physical, but also place as the location where 
things in the world can appear. The Greek polis, she writes, “is not the city-state in its physical 
location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and 
its true space lies between people living together for this purpose” (ibid. 198). Arendt’s view 
is of the kind that Malpas is sceptical about – for her, “[the] space of appearance comes into 
being wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action […] Wherever people 
gather together, it is potentially there, but only potentially, not necessarily and not forever” 
(ibid. 199). Place, as it relates to politics, exists between public actors. I think it is possible to 
reconcile a limited understanding of Malpas’s conception of place with Arendt’s “space of 
appearance”. Malpas does not deny the cultural, historical, and political (i.e. human) dimension 
of place, he is just arguing that place is more than this – that these things take place within 
place. However, if Malpas’s claim that our identities are dependent on place has any depth, it 
is precisely because of the human dimension of place, because we come to value the ways in 
which we are shaped by our surroundings and the connection between us and specific places. 
Malpas’s view, while valuably recognising the necessity of being in a place to exist (or to have 
subjectivity; an important point I return to later in this chapter), can seem deterministic. We 
are shaped by the places we inhabit, but we are also shaped by a whole range of other things. 
Where it concerns politics, we cannot and, indeed, should not have such a deterministic view 
of the connection between place and subjectivity, precisely because humans tend to attach 
political meaning to place, as we saw in the nationalist movements of the past century. We are 
grounded in place, which to an extent limits what we are able to do and also what political 
challenges we face, but we also act and interact and appear in this place in response to the 
challenges set by the very place in we find ourselves. On one point Malpas and Arendt agrees: 
to exist in this world (whether to have subjectivity, or to appear before others who can confirm 
your existence), you need a place in which you can exist. 
1.2 Rootlessness and loneliness: the dangers of not belonging 
 If this deep connection between place and identity, subjectivity, or existence holds, it follows 




argue later, morally. I will discuss the harms of displacement in Section 2, as displacement 
relates more to the situation in which refugees, migrants, and those on the receiving end of 
xenophobia find themselves. However, xenophobic actions are not only an exploitation of 
displaced persons’ vulnerability. Xenophobia is also a reaction to the xenophobe’s own feelings 
of vulnerability and insecurity relating to their fears about their place in the world.  
As was argued in Chapter 1, xenophobia is deeply concerned with the question of belonging.  
Part of the explanation of xenophobia in South Africa relates to specific grievances that people 
have that are not addressed by government, for which foreigners are then scapegoated (see also 
Misago et al. 2009). However, such grievances trigger a deeper political insecurity: the fear of 
not belonging. This fear is ubiquitous in contemporary society, with rising levels of anxiety, 
belief in fear-based conspiracy theories (the ‘Great Replacement’, white genocide, etc.), and 
increased attacks on those considered other (anti-immigrant mass shootings in the USA, 
gender-based violence in South Africa). I recognise that the examples listed here are more 
complex, and that insecurity about one’s place in the world, or that of the group one belongs 
to, is not always the root cause behind such actions. However, the conditions of uncertainty 
and insecurity created by political instability, economic hardships (the recession after the 2008 
crash; another recession looming), and climate change (whether acknowledged or not) 
contributes to feelings of alienation, helplessness, frustration, and loneliness. Such feelings are 
the breeding grounds of populism and nationalism – -isms that are often accompanied by 
discrimination and violence against minorities or vulnerable groups.  
It is, I believe, what Arendt (1973: 459) calls our ‘political miseries’ – not disconnected from 
our social and economic ones – that trigger this fear of not belonging. But what are these 
political miseries? As stated above, our alienation, loneliness, and feelings of helplessness or 
powerlessness. The question is why so many people feel this way, and what they do about it. 
The answer to the latter we already know – people seek belonging in the nation, or in 
exclusionary communities, cementing their belonging on the non-belonging of others. The why 
is harder to answer, but Arendt locates the cause in capitalist modernity’s creation of 
superfluous things and superfluous people, and in the ways in which we are increasingly 
becoming isolated from one another. Modern society is characterised by “homelessness on an 
unprecedented scale, rootlessness to an unprecedented depth” (ibid. vii). People feel rootless, 
homeless, because of “their superfluity on an overcrowded earth” (ibid. 457). The dangers of 




change (also a product of human progress and capitalist expansion) threatening our very 
existence. More people are being displaced, or face situations in which they do not have 
adequate access to basic resources such as water or food, as physical places in which to exist 
become fewer and fewer.  
Superfluity also relates to the individual’s ability to appear and act in the world, and here it 
links to the discussion in the previous section. The superfluous person – the person without a 
use for modern society (like the homeless, or the unemployed) – is a person who finds 
themselves without “a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions 
effective” (ibid. 296). The very idea of superfluity suggests the threat of not-belonging or no 
longer existing. It is indeed the creation of superfluous people that allowed for the 
extermination of millions in the twentieth century (not only in Nazi concentration camps). It is 
this being without a place in which one is recognised, in which what one says and does matters, 
which creates a condition of homelessness and rootlessness. Arendt refers to the modern, 
atomized individual’s “situation of spiritual and social homelessness” (ibid. 352). The 
individualism of modern society, the boundless drive for acquisition and progress of capitalism, 
and the seeming limitlessness of it, also contributes to the sense of rootlessness. As a result, 
the rootless, homeless (literal and spiritual), superfluous masses seek a home in movements 
that, in their logic if not in name, are totalitarian: 
the masses are obsessed by a desire to escape from reality because in their essential 
homelessness they can no longer bear its accidental, incomprehensible aspects […] 
The revolt of the masses against “realism”, common sense […] was the result of 
their atomization, of their loss of social status along with which they lost the whole 
sector communal relationships in whose framework common sense makes sense. 
(ibid.) 
Instead of facing up to the incomprehensibility of reality, something that Arendt would later 
link to being at home in the world and to political judgment, the masses (or, increasingly in our 
time, the lonely individual) seeks a home in the “lying world of consistency” provided by 
totalitarian movements, “in which, through sheer imagination, uprooted masses can feel at 
home and are spared the never-ending shocks which real life and real experiences deal to 
human beings” (ibid. 353). We can interpret all exclusionary ideologies – fascisms, 




Xenophobia, then, is also an attempt to find a home – to insert roots by uprooting others, or to 
assert one’s belonging by excluding others.  
Not belonging as a citizen in one’s own country, in one’s home but not at home, can be seen 
as a form of internal exile. In Chapter 1 (1.1) we saw how South Africans’ own sense of the 
precariousness of their belonging contributes to xenophobia in their own context. Part of this 
is due to the aforementioned historical status of black South Africans as ‘foreign natives’ 
(Neocosmos 2010; see also Schierup 2016), a form of internal exile – of the land, but not 
belonging. This sense of insecurity surrounding belonging did not end after Apartheid; feelings 
of insecurity about their new position (as Nyamnjoh argued) created deep, existential 
apprehensions about belonging (Landau). Unable to deal with our insecurity, we seek sources 
of security in a kind of anti-African nationalism – the national chauvinism which leads to the 
scapegoating that Mbembe (2015) speaks of. We believe the narratives told by politicians and 
other leaders who want to retain their legitimacy and see in foreigners easy targets to shoulder 
their blame (this is our lying world of consistency). The poem with which I opened this study 
speaks of the frustrations that the superfluous people of South Africa feel, how it explodes their 
homes until, eventually, the fire is directed at the foreigner: “their paraffin-lit homes exploded, 
/ fuelled by their black-man fire / their black-man stress. / Homes overheating […] they shared 
their stories of disaster-eating / as they nurtured their anger about everything” (Shoro 2017: 25-
26). 
Our reasons for feeling that we do not belong where we are, for being uprooted, may differ, 
depending on one’s context and the history that shaped that context. Yet there is a relation 
between South Africans’ apprehensions about belonging, and those in other contexts. Earlier 
in this study I referred to the idea of ‘Great Replacement’, a common theme in right-wing 
conspiracy theories in the USA and in Europe. At face value it may seem like those who fear 
replacement think that they have a place, but on the contrary it is because they are precariously 
positioned, because they are uncertain of their place on a very deep level, that they fear being 
replaced. Camus (in Wildman 2017) sees white nationalism specifically as an expression of 
people being “very anxious about their destiny”, which implies fear about their continued 
existence. So even if the historical and current political realities that give rise to a fear of not 
belonging or being replaced differs radically across contexts, the experience of not belonging 
is similar. A South African who participates in xenophobic violence, or a white nationalist who 




feeling out of place. How race intersects with their xenophobic attitudes and actions also differ, 
but at the root of their xenophobia lies the same sense of insecurity about their place in the 
world and an attempt to secure that place through excluding those who are foreign.  
1.3 The nation as home 
A desire for home and belonging to something greater than oneself often takes on the form of 
nationalism. As a concept, nationalism can refer to one of two things: (i) the value members 
attach to their national identity, expressed in attitudes and actions, or (ii) the striving by 
members of a specific nation for self-determination. I am primarily interested in (i) – the 
question of national identity and how such an identity contributes to xenophobia. The 
usefulness of nationalism in self-determination attempts is widely recognised, as is nationalism 
as a liberating mechanism, for example in the liberation of African states from colonialism (see 
Fanon 2017). However, this kind of nationalism is also not free from the threat of becoming 
xenophobic, as we saw in the discussion in Chapter 1. 
To understand how xenophobia manifests in most contemporary contexts, we need to look at 
the false home of the nationalist. Hjerm (1998: 336) connects xenophobia specifically with our 
“national identity and national pride”, as we see in the relation between South African 
exceptionalism and xenophobia discussed in Chapter 1. For Hjerm (ibid. 337), national identity 
is understood in a similar sense to the kind of social identity that Tajfel (see Chapter 2) 
described: 
National identity could be seen as an awareness of affiliation with the nation that 
gives people a sense of who they are in relation to others or infuses them with a 
sense of purpose that makes them feel at home […] National identity is based in 
similarity to some people and difference (perceived or actual) from others. 
Importantly, members of nation who identify strongly with that nation can be more or less 
xenophobic, depending on how ‘others’ are understood, i.e. “the criteria on which one’s 
national identity is based or the type of national identity a person has” (ibid.). Hjerm 
distinguishes between a civic national identity and an ethnic national identity. Those with the 
former kind of national identity tend to be less xenophobic than those with the latter. How we 
understand nationhood can, therefore, have a profound impact on how we treat others. I return 
to this distinction later in the section. For now, the important point is that national identity 




home of the nationalist is therefore dependent on the differentiation between insiders and 
outsiders. Hence the possibility for xenophobia is present in the very logic of nationalism. 
I will not provide a history of nationalism. Such histories abound. It would perhaps be better 
to speak of nationalisms, to recognise the different forms nationalism can take. The nationalism 
of those fighting for liberation is vastly different from the nationalism of the Third Reich. I 
continue to use the singular form, however, as the kind of nationalism I am concerned with will 
become clear in my discussion. Arendt warned of people seeking belonging in places that offer 
a false home. A nation, I will argue, is potentially such a false home. Not because nations do 
not exist, but because they are not what they seem to nationalists. Benedict Anderson (2006: 
5) identifies three paradoxes of nationalism: 
i. The objective modernity of the nation from a historical perspective, versus the 
subjective antiquity of the nation from nationalist perspective 
ii. The universality of the concept ‘nation’ (in the sense that there are nations across 
the globe, and everyone belongs to one) versus the particularity of its manifestations  
iii. The political power of the idea of nations or nationhood, versus its relative 
philosophical poverty 
The latter two paradoxes will have to be set aside for lack of space. When I say that nations are 
not what they seem, I refer to the first paradox Anderson identifies. Nationalists see the nation 
as natural, sometimes god-given (think of the ‘chosen people’ narratives of the Afrikaner), and 
as having a long, or at least a noble, history. Even the idea of the post-Apartheid South African 
nation, recognised as ‘young’, views the territorial shape of the nation as defining, in spite of 
the fact that as a territory ‘South Africa’ is also relatively new. Such views are completely at 
odds with what we know about the history of nations: that they are largely the products of 
modernity and therefore, taking the whole of human history into account, relatively new 
inventions; that the borders delineating national territories are the products of conquests, 
exchanges, imperialisms, and deliberations and that there is therefore nothing inevitable in the 
connection between the member of the nation and the ‘homeland’; and that the members of the 
nation are themselves often the product of an equally complex history of intermarriages, 
migrations, and cultural exchange.  
We can easily understand why the alienated, lonely individual would prefer to believe that the 




a grand narrative and long history firmly grounds them in the world – if they have a past, they 
must belong. Remember also the search for consistency. National myths provide us with such 
consistency.  
Anderson (2006: 6) argues that nations are invented by us – that nations are imagined political 
communities. Nations are imagined in the sense that the members of the community called ‘the 
nation’ do not all know each other (as was the case with smaller communities, or theoretically 
possible at least). Nations are large collectivities of strangers imagine themselves to belong to 
the same group: “in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (ibid.). Nations 
come into being with the act of establishing, through the imagination, unity with people based 
on some shared characteristic. This can be a shared or similar culture. Very often, it is a shared 
territory. Nationalism, writes Anderson, invents nations. All imagined communities have two 
fundamental characteristics: they are inherently limited, and they are sovereign.  
Members of the imagined community see themselves as a fraternity, which “makes it possible 
[…] for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited 
imaginings” (ibid. 7). This is the cost of belonging to the nation, a price which many people 
will willingly pay for the sake of feeling that they belong. Notice here that nationalism inspires 
members to die for the nation, not to kill. Killing for the nation, when it takes place (and it 
takes place so often), is framed as an act of self-defence, protecting the nation from those who 
would harm it. This echoes what was argued in Chapter 2: that xenophobia is justified by the 
threat the foreigner seems to pose to the continued existence of the individual, community, or 
nation.  
In the previous section, we saw how internal exile and accompanying feelings of rootlessness 
lead people to seek a home in nationalism. This also holds for external exile, as the person 
exiled tries to deal with the exclusion, marginalisation, and frustrations of living in a new 
country. Due to this, a new phenomenon arose: long-distance nationalism (Anderson 2005: 
184).   This form of nationalism is one of the ironies of the globalised world – the formation of 
niches in a world where everything imaginable is theoretically at one’s fingertips. It also shows 
that nationalism is not necessarily directly connected to territory, even if it retains an indirect 
connection through longings for the homeland. This kind of nationalism could lead to exiles 




more depth is beyond my current scope.15 My main concern is with internal exiles and their 
xenophobic attitudes toward others who want to enter the ‘home’ they only precariously belong 
to. While focussing on diaspora identity, Anderson does emphasise that one can be ‘in exile’ 
while living in one’s own country as well. He refers to the new forms of exile created by 
industrialisation (Anderson 1994: 317) and its accompanying standardised education. Nation-
wide standardised education systems imposed a standardised vernacular, which was closely 
linked to employment possibilities. If you speak the standard vernacular, you could get a job. 
If not, employment was scarcer. This caused people to become self-conscious about their local 
dialects or linguistic practices, causing a sense of alienation or a kind of exile (exile from the 
new possibilities offered by industrialisation; an internal exile). This new form of exile spread, 
as global capital and industry grew. Nationalism is often a reaction against just this spread of 
global capital, against homogenisation, even as capitalism supports and often benefits from 
nationalism. We see this in the new nationalisms of today: the redrawing of borders, anti-elite 
populist rhetoric (because only the elite easily cross borders), the hunkering down in the face 
of diversity. 
While nationalism is therefore often a reaction against forced global homogenisation, it is of 
course itself a program of homogenisation. Nationalists narrowly define culture, values, 
language, etc. It is not only a reaction to the homogenisation brought by globalisation, but also 
to hybridity. Nationalists will demand that their language is the only official language, the only 
spoken language, until an outsider speaks that language (ibid. 316). That which is hybrid is 
impure and must be purified and cleansed. Because nationalism is a program of 
homogenisation, any outsider or foreigner represents a possible harm. Homogeneity is the 
opposite of human spontaneity, with its possibilities for new beginnings and change. For this 
reason nationalism is necessarily xenophobic, as it has to prevent miscegenation (literal and 
metaphorical) through contact with foreigners. For this reason, in Sundstrom’s (2015: 75) 
words, nationalism always shelters xenophobia. 
                                                 
15 That exiles or migrants hold such attitudes is undoubtedly true. We see this, for example, in Jonny Steinberger’s 
A Man of Good Hope (2015), an account of a Somalian refugee living in South Africa. As xenophobic attitudes 
are born out of stranger shock, cultural differences, and valuing one’s own group above others, it makes sense that 
immigrants or refugees may also hold such attitudes regarding their hosts, but the ostracising and institutional 
discrimination aspects of xenophobia are missing. Negative feelings and attitudes about the hosts can also be the 
result of their own experiences of xenophobic discrimination (e.g. thinking that South Africans are violent, 




The discussion thus far has shown us the dangers of not belonging, and how it contributes to 
people becoming xenophobic or participating in xenophobic projects (such as nationalism). 
The question is whether it is possible to belong without necessarily excluding others. Put 
differently, the question is whether one’s country can be one’s political home without opening 
the door to xenophobia. One answer to this question distinguishes between nationalism, as love 
of one’s nation, and patriotism, as love of one’s country. The homogenous nation is very often 
also ethnically and culturally homogenous, whereas a country need not be. Ethnically and 
culturally diverse people can all agree that they are members of the same country, and that they 
love that country (this is closer to our current reality than the idea of a nation). Instead of 
nationalism, we can have a kind of civic or constitutional patriotism where the love is not of 
the nation, or the people, or even the territory, but rather the love of your country’s constitution 
and the qualities and characteristics of its political system (see Habermas 1995, Kant 1996, 
Kleingeld 2012). This may provide us with a basis upon which political unity and solidarity 
can be built in diverse societies.  
However, whether this can work or not is debatable. The South African example seems to 
provide us with evidence to the contrary: a diverse nation, not united by culture or ethnicity, 
language or world-view, but seemingly united against outsiders and that nevertheless thinks of 
itself as a single nation (for the most part). Two things should be noted in response: firstly, the 
kind of patriotism suggested by Habermas and others requires a real respect and regard for the 
constitution, something that is not necessarily present in all South Africans. Indeed, if we took 
the constitution as seriously as we should, we would recognise that ‘South Africa belongs to 
all who live in it’. Secondly, as I already mentioned, political membership or citizenship in 
South Africa is still strongly connected to the idea of indigeneity, and consequently to territory. 
A kind of patriotism founded on respect for the constitution and a faith in the political system 
which it should engender can work to subvert this kind of territorial nationalism.  
Critics of constitutional patriotism have argued that commitment to constitutional ideals cannot 
unite people like a shared (national) identity would, and therefore does not provide us with an 
alternative form of loyalty from nationalism (see Canovan 2000). I am sceptical about the 
possibility of a patriotism that is without the threat of xenophobia, for xenophobia is not only 
strongly connected to ethnicity or race, but also to what the ingroup values and devalues. Even 
if constitutional patriotism can offer a strong sense of loyalty and unity, the danger of exclusion 




insiders, xenophobic prejudice can still be the result. An emphasis on the universal values 
contained in democratic constitutions – equality, respect for human dignity, etc. – is important, 
but only one in a set of strategies we should follow, and the strategies need not be political. 
Part of the strength of nationalism is that it relies on pre-political ties, such as birth and blood, 
which constitutional patriotism cannot provide (ibid. 416, 419).  The point is to address 
people’s sense of insecurity and apprehensions about belonging, and part of this is situating 
them in communities (this need not even be national) in which they can meaningfully 
participate. As we saw in Chapter 2, the origins of this is prepolitical. Another part is to reduce 
their sense of being threatened by others, something that the contact hypothesis suggests can 
only be achieved through positive interactions, a possibility I discuss further in Chapter 5.  
In Chapter 4, I consider how a narrative approach to identity may make our political identities 
less rigid and, because storytelling is also imaginative and affective, help us see others as fully 
human and not dissimilar from ourselves. Part of this would be to recognise not only shared 
hopes and dreams and goals (e.g. that refugees flee their countries because they also want their 
children to grow up in safe environments), but also to see other people’s struggles. I therefore 
turn, now, to a particular struggle facing foreigners but one that should not be wholly unfamiliar 
to the xenophobe, in light of the discussion above. In the next section, I will consider belonging 
from the perspective of the strangers in our midst, and show the special harm attached to 
displacement and how xenophobia contributes to a continuous sense of displacement or not 
having a true home, and the negative effects thereof on the displaced or homeless person. 
2. In a foreign place: displacement and a new home 
In the previous section I established the connection between belonging and place, and between 
place and subjectivity, identity, and existence. I used it to show how those who feel alienated 
from the world seek belonging in false homes, which can lead them to become xenophobic. 
These connections are also relevant to understanding the experiences of those who are at the 
receiving end of xenophobia – those who are considered foreign, or who have to leave their 
homes for a new home in a foreign land. Public discourse on immigration, emigration, refugees, 
asylum, and xenophobia (whether justifying or condemning) centre around ideas of place, 
placement, and displacement. The question is one of belonging to a place, but more specifically 
this place that is called home by some. ‘Home’ can be defined in three ways: (i) politically (in 
the sense of homeland, heimat, the nation, etc.) or in terms of community (a group-home); (ii) 




sense). While it is important to distinguish between these three different ‘kinds’ of home, it 
makes more sense to think of these categories as levels of home. To feel as if one belongs, one 
needs to be at home on all three levels. The stateless person, the foreigner in a strange land, 
often experiences a sense of homelessness and loss of home on all three levels. This loss of 
home amounts to a loss of freedom, especially when attempts to establish a new home, to enter 
into a new community, are prevented by the xenophobia of those already in the community or 
place. 
2.1 No place to be free 
Belonging somewhere is crucial to our existence as well as our freedom. We need a space or a 
place where our bodies can be situated, where we can rest them and nourish them and from 
which we can interact with others, situated in spaces or places around us. A truism from Jeremy 
Waldron (1991: 296): “Everything that is done has to be done somewhere. No one is free to 
perform an action unless there is somewhere he is free to perform it.” It may seem trivial, so 
simple is this truth, to emphasise that we cannot exist if we do not exist in a place. Yet the 
history of displacement is also one of disappearance, of extermination. We have seen, time and 
again, how easy it is for people who exist to suddenly not have a place in the world, and 
consequently for them to cease to exist. Strategies of denaturalisation and deportation, which 
imply displacement and loss of home, are often the first steps toward extermination. 
Immigrants are particularly vulnerable to this, especially those who are situated in the “murky 
domain between legality and illegality” (Benhabib 2006: 46) or “holes of oblivion” (Arendt 
1973: 459), such as undocumented immigrants or stateless people.16  
In the past seven years, South Africa has deported more than 400 000 foreign nationals. In 
March 2017 the government approved a White Paper on Internal Migration that includes the 
possibility of building detention centres for asylum seekers, something which is in breach of 
our Constitution and that our president has criticised other countries for doing (Heleta 2019). 
Those who support deportation can easily counter the argument that people have a right to a 
place to exist by agreeing that this is a need people have, but that this does not mean the place 
in which they exist has to be here. This is what lies behind the refrain “Go back to where you 
                                                 
16 For an important argument linking a place to exist to cosmopolitan right, see Kleingeld (2012), and of course 
Kant (1996). As this chapter is concerned with the link between home and belonging, and the harms of the loss or 





came from.” However, this point is disingenuous. Many people are here (wherever here may 
be) precisely because they cannot be ‘where they came from’ – because they were displaced 
from their homes by violence, famine, economic struggles, or natural disasters. And many 
people against whom this refrain is directed are from here – they were born in South Africa, or 
the United States, or wherever. There is, quite often, no other place, or no safe place to ‘go 
back’ to. This is something those shouting “go back to where you came from” should be aware 
of. To say this is not to say, ‘You have a right to exist, just somewhere else’. It rather says, 
‘You do not have a right to exist’ or, ‘I don’t care whether you exist or not.’ 
Arendt (1973) alerts us to the dangers of statelessness – how it creates superfluous people who 
so easily fall into the holes of oblivion, how not having a place in the world often leads to a 
complete removal from the world (extermination). Another group in danger of falling into the 
holes of oblivion, is the homeless (whether citizen or non-citizen). The plight of homeless 
persons perfectly illustrates the connection between place and freedom, while also showing the 
dangers of being displaced. Waldron (1991) connects this general insight to the specific 
relations between homelessness, freedom, and property rules. A key function of rules of 
ownership, especially those relating to land, “is to provide a basis for determining who is 
allowed to be where” (ibid. 296). With private property, only the owner(s) and those given 
permission by them would be allowed to be there. Where collective property is concerned, the 
rules are decided upon by the relevant group of people. Homeless people do not have access to 
private property, unless granted access by the owners. The only place for them to be is on 
common property – parks, sidewalks, etc: 
One way of describing the plight of a homeless individual might be to say that there 
is no place governed by a private property rule where he is allowed to be […] A 
technically more accurate description of his plight is that there is no place governed 
by a private property rule where he is allowed to be whenever he chooses, no place 
governed by a private property rule from which he may not at any time be excluded 
as a result of someone else’s say-so [...] the homeless person is utterly and at all 
times at the mercy of others. (Waldron 1991: 299) 
Even in places of common property, such as parks, homeless people are at the mercy of the 
authorities. Their ability to perform basic tasks, such as sleeping and washing, are inhibited. 
Of course, everyone is prevented from doing certain things in common spaces, but usually 




in one space, while acceptable in another. The limiting of our freedom to do as we choose in 
common spaces has unequal effects on those without a personal or private space: 
Someone who is allowed to be in a place is, in a fairly straightforward sense, free 
to be there. A person who is not allowed to be in a place is unfree to be there. 
However, the concept of freedom usually applies to actions rather than locations: 
one is free or unfree to do X or to do Y […] It follows, strikingly, that a person 
who is not free to be in any place is not free to do anything; such a person is 
comprehensively unfree. (Waldron 1991: 302) 
The state of being comprehensively unfree is not unique to the homeless but, I would argue, 
also plagues the condition in which many displaced people, migrants, and refugees find 
themselves.  Those who are denied entry are often kept in detention centres on the borders, on 
islands (e.g. Manus Island, Australia), or in third countries. Even those who do gain entry are 
prevented from expressing their freedom in any comprehensive sense. Those who entered 
illegally are precariously situated – if they are detected, they are vulnerable to abuse and 
deportation. Avoiding detection means avoiding certain actions, such as seeking protection 
from the police when you are the victim of a crime. It also makes it harder to find a safe and 
stable home, as the documents needed cannot be provided. Those who enter legally may seem 
to be in a stronger position, but the threat of violence (especially in South Africa) limits their 
freedom and their movements. In its most radical form, displacement leads to statelessness – a 
condition of not belonging anywhere and, consequently, of lacking the conditions for freedom. 
2.2 Statelessness 
As homelessness illustrates the connection between freedom and having a private home, 
statelessness illustrates the connection between freedom, existence, and having a political 
home. While displaced persons may be a perennial feature of human history, statelessness is a 
modern condition. Before the formation of sovereign nation-states, borders were more porous. 
Even while territories and empires and kingdoms existed, the distinctions between ‘here’ and 
‘there’, native and foreign, became blurred the further away one moved from the capital. There 
was also less stringent control of movement across borders (ironic, as we think of our time as 
the age of globalisation and cosmopolitanism). The displaced person in history is therefore not 
quite the same as the stateless person today. The distinction between ‘stateless person’ and 




The term “stateless” at least acknowledged the fact that these persons had lost the 
protection of their government and required international agreements for 
safeguarding their legal status. The postwar term “displaced persons” was invented 
during the war for the express purpose of liquidating statelessness once and for all 
by ignoring its existence. Nonrecognition of statelessness always means 
repatriation, i.e., deportation to a country of origin, which either refuses to 
recognize the prospective repatriate as a citizen, or, on the contrary, urgently wants 
him back for punishment. (Arendt 1973: 279). 
Displacement, whether internal or to a foreign country, is severely traumatic and places the 
displaced person at a disadvantage and often in a dangerous position. Displacement 
…breaks up families, cuts social and cultural ties, terminates dependable 
employment relationships, disrupts educational opportunities, denies access to such 
vital necessities as food, shelter and medicine, and exposes innocent persons to 
such acts of violence as attacks on camps, disappearances and rape (UN 
Commission on Human Rights 1998: 1). 
Yet statelessness is a more severe form of displacement, and a consequence of the whole earth 
being divided into sovereign territories. After WWI,  
Civil wars […] were followed by migrations of groups who, unlike their happier 
predecessors in the religious wars, were welcomed nowhere and could be 
assimilated nowhere. Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, 
once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of 
their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth. (Arendt 1973: 267, 
emphasis mine) 
Stateless people became “the most symptomatic group in contemporary politics” (Arendt 1973: 
277) – this remains true to this day, with the number of refugees, displaced, and stateless 
persons growing daily. As these numbers grow, host nations become increasingly antagonistic 
and xenophobic toward foreigners, regardless of their legal status. Now, as then, “the only 
practical substitute for a non-existent homeland was an internment camp” (Arendt 1973: 284). 
What is worrying about our current situation, is that we have a clear example of what this line 
of action and reasoning generally follows, and of its potential end in the extermination camps. 




who are already without a home – personal and political – are often refused any other shelter. 
Even where refugees and stateless persons are taken in, loud voices are calling for their 
expulsion. Despite advances in universal human rights, despite transnational and international 
agencies that exist to protect these rights, stateless people are still extremely vulnerable. The 
danger to the well-being and lives of stateless people is clear, as evidenced by the recent 
atrocities against the stateless Rohingya people in Myanmar. For this reason, the right of every 
individual to exist in a place should be guaranteed. However, this does not yet guarantee the 
individual’s freedom. The stateless have lost the protection of their state that comes from 
belonging. To guarantee their freedom and safety, to prevent them from falling through the 
cracks, some form of belonging should be guaranteed.  
2.3 No personal address 
Statelessness relates to the loss of one’s political home, yet this is always necessarily 
accompanied by the loss of one’s individual home. The value of the individual home is often 
underplayed, or even ignored, in political philosophy. For Cara Nine (2016: 43), a personal 
home is a necessity, for “[w]ithout a home, a person has no place to exercise many basic 
freedoms without first seeking permission”. Where ‘home’ is discussed in philosophy, it is 
mostly within the context of international displacement. Even where the focus is on more 
localised displacement (Moore 2015, Stilz 2013), political philosophy often misses out on the 
harms of local displacement: “our prevailing philosophical theories miss a section of people 
who may be disproportionately harmed by local displacement: the vulnerable, (poor, feeble, 
oppressed), who are subject to moves, sometimes multiple moves, within the same community” 
(Nine 2017: 256). We will come to see that displacement, in any form, is harmful. We tend to 
focus on the big displacement in the lives of foreigners – from their home country to the host 
country – but they are also vulnerable to constant internal displacements. 
In emphasising the importance of a personal home for freedom and justice, Nine echoes 
Waldron’s (1991: 302) earlier statement that “a person who is not free to be in any place is not 
free to do anything; such a person is comprehensively unfree.” For Arendt, having a private 
home is a precondition for participation in the political sphere. Indeed, the first step toward 
rendering people stateless, was to take their homes away, “and this meant the loss of the entire 
social texture into which they were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct 




can retire, recharge. Where one can be oneself, protected and safe. The loss of home is the loss 
of that protection, but also the loss of a place in which one is free to be oneself. 
Of course, a home does not offer perfect protection. We can lose our homes, be attacked within 
our homes, or the home can be the site of conflict and abuse. For this reason, feminist theory 
is often sceptical of the notion of ‘home’, as a site of domestication and as a private, as opposed 
to a public, space. Even ‘safe’ homes can be criticised: “It was recognized that these safe and 
secure homes were in fact founded on repressions and exclusions, on defences and on the 
policing of borders” (Weir 2008: 5). Thus, even in a ‘safe’ home one can feel not at home upon 
realising the exclusions and oppressions that make your safety possible. These criticisms (see, 
for example, Honig 1994) are warranted. For many women and children (also men, however 
not as often), their homes are the arenas in which their families or partners sexually, physically, 
and/or emotionally abuse them. Moreover, traditional gender roles saw, and still sees, the 
domestic sphere as the woman’s ‘place’. For centuries, women have been kept in the bedrooms 
and kitchens, sometimes with force, and out of the ‘public’ sphere. In homes where women 
had more freedom, this freedom is often due to the domestic labour being taken over by 
domestic workers, nannies, etc. – people (mostly women) who are generally from vulnerable 
and historically oppressed groups. In South Africa, this role is increasingly being fulfilled by 
women from other African countries, documented and undocumented (see Nyamnjoh 2006, 
Chapters 3 and 5 for discussion). Furthermore, the means employed to keep the home safe can 
be problematic – think of racial targeting and stereotyping by police forces and in 
neighbourhood watch groups.  
While broadly agreeing with the criticisms and recognising the necessity of criticising the 
traditional notion of ‘home’, I would argue that the notion of home is salvageable. Despite the 
countless examples of homes that are abusive, there are examples of homes that are not – homes 
that are supportive and in which inhabitants can flourish. And while private property 
necessarily excludes some while including others, one can think of justifiable reasons to 
exclude strangers. It is not clear that wanting privacy during intimate moments – sleeping, 
having sex, or taking a bath – would lead to unfair exclusion. The debate on the justifications 
of private property is beyond the scope of this study, but I think it would be useful to draw a 
distinction between privacy, and a space in which one can have it, and private property (the 
latter is not a prerequisite for the former). Privacy requires that we have some control over who 




study, but it stops well short of Downton Abbey. Privacy also does not mean the ‘private 
sphere’, but rather “the autonomy and control a person has to allow or not allow access to her 
person, information about her, and the things that are meaningfully associated with her person” 
(Young 1997: 162). 
Iris Marion Young (1997) offers a feminist perspective of home, which recognises the 
historical oppression of women while identifying positive aspects of home that she argues we 
should reclaim. Instead of viewing home as solely a space of oppression, Young (1997: 161) 
argues that the notion of home can become a regulative ideal with which we can criticise 
society, based on the values of safety, individuation, privacy, and preservation. Instead of 
completely rejecting home, we should strive to extend the positive values of home to everyone 
who does not have a (positive) home (ibid. 159). Reducing home to a space of oppression and 
insecurity, while not offering an ideal of home, does not bring us very far. The ‘outside’ world 
is no less violent to women. Young’s point is that without an ideal of home, we cannot criticise 
non-ideal homes – we measure our judgments of homes and society against this ideal.  The 
importance of having a home are perhaps best illustrated by asking what it would be like to be 
homeless (as Waldron did), or to lose one’s home by being displaced.  
2.4 The harms of displacement 
Cara Nine (2017) argues for the importance of home or attachment to a specific place, and the 
harm suffered with the loss of home or even just the change of home:  
Place attachment can provide an anchor in life and offer important benefits when 
we remain in those places to which we are attached. When these bonds are broken, 
the disruption generally brings about the fragmentation of routines, of 
relationships, and of expectations, and it upsets a sense of continuity that is 
ordinarily taken for granted. (ibid. 240)  
Even when voluntarily moving to a new home, one can feel a sense of displacement and 
experience high levels of stress. For Nine (ibid.  241), the potential harm in moving to a new 
house lies in the burden in places on us cognitively, as she sees our homes as extensions of our 
minds. When she speaks of home, she refers generally to a permanent dwelling or structure; 
however, “[a] person need not have a fixed structure in order to form substantial cognitive 
attachment with certain places”, and her argument therefore does not rely on the assumption of 




work on displacement focus on larger places (e.g. one’s country), and not on smaller spaces 
like individual homes. Looking at small-scale displacement is important, because smaller-scale 
places like our homes or offices help us to function in specific ways, contributing especially to 
our cognitive functioning. Who we are – “our dispositions, choices, values, and beliefs: (ibid. 
242) – relies on our cognitive functions. Here once again the link between our identities and 
specific places is emphasised. Nine (ibid.) focusses specifically on these cognitive functions: 
“(1) the ability to form memories, attitudes, beliefs, and emotional attachments; (2) the ability 
to evaluate, reflect, and revise values, attitudes, and beliefs; (3) the ability to perform actions 
consistent with one’s commitments”, functions that she sees as crucial for our ability to be 
rational agents. 
Moving home, voluntarily or not, is a major and often traumatic life event that can have a 
profound impact on our lives. Most importantly, being displaced negatively impacts one’s 
cognitive functioning, which in turn has several knock-on effects on one’s life. To make her 
argument, Nine draws on the philosophy of mind, specifically the extended mind hypothesis 
according to which “mental functions are not confined inside the head” (Nine 2017: 243). Our 
homes and the objects within our homes (i.e. objects external to our minds and selves) enable 
us to perform our cognitive functions. We organise the objects in our home for optimal 
functioning by lightening our cognitive load. An example would be photo albums, whether 
physical or digital, which store our memories externally, outsourcing our cognitive function to 
an environment we have control over. External objects therefore become part of our cognitive 
processes, providing that they can be reliably invoked, that they are as trustworthy as memory, 
and they contain easily accessible information (ibid. 244). 
Pen and paper, notebooks, and computers serve as examples. Yet Nine argues that one can also 
conceive of a space in this way – spaces and places as “complex objects of the extended mind” 
(ibid.). We construct our spaces in such a way that they support cognitive functioning, or even 
perform functions for us so that we don’t have to. Homes are not the only examples of this – 
institutions and office spaces also function in this way. Nine refers to this as niche construction, 
a term borrowed from biology, which describes how “organisms modify their own 
environments in such a way that the changes become a necessary part of the explanation of the 
nature of the organism or population, and its adaptive success” (ibid.). The example given is 




When we set up our homes, we are busy with niche constructions. Cognitive functions are 
outsourced to objects and the ways in which those objects are organised in our homes. In 
making a home, we “[endow] things with living meaning, arranging them in space in order to 
facilitate the life activities of those to whom they belong, and preserving them, along with their 
meaning” (Young 1997: 151). It is in a home, organised in a specific way, where we as children 
first learn about following rules, and principles such as fairness which determine house rules: 
“The home can play a role in the development of a person’s formative memories, beliefs, and 
values through the home’s extended cognitive functions” (Nine 2017: 246).  
What happens when we move or are displaced, is that the structures we put in place to increase 
our cognitive functioning, and the rules we set up to govern our interactions and actions, are 
disrupted. We separated from cognitive supports and required to use our energy to set up new 
ones. Vulnerable people, such as people living in poverty, are disproportionally harmed by 
displacement.17 Where a non-vulnerable person experiences some harm during a move this is 
generally only temporary. Vulnerable people often move more often, making it harder for them 
to continuously create new niches and outsourced functions – their homes are less likely to be 
trustworthy spaces where they experience household security. Nine (ibid. 253-255) defines 
household security as: 
i. Having reliable and extended access to the home and, when there is interference (e.g. 
theft), with recourse to the protection of the law  
ii. Having control over the contents of one’s home, including the management and use 
thereof  
iii. Believing that the conditions of access and control exist 
iv. Being free from domination from outsiders regarding the management of one’s home 
Taking these into account, we can see how foreigners, especially undocumented migrants, may 
feel insecure in their homes. People who own their homes have more security, but people living 
in poverty are often at the mercy of their landlords, with financial insecurity making the 
                                                 
17 “Vulnerability is the diminished capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural 
or man-made hazard. This diminished capacity is most often associated with poverty, but it can also arise when 
people are isolated, insecure, and defenceless in the face of risk, shock, or stress” (Nine 2017: 13). This definition 
indicates that immigrants, refugees, and stateless persons are especially vulnerable – very often living in relative 
poverty, isolated from the communities because they are new and strange and ‘don’t belong’, and with very little 




situation more volatile. Immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants, generally also rent 
instead of owning property. Undocumented immigrants’ situation is even more insecure, as 
they cannot go to the police in case of theft or break-in, for fear of their undocumented status 
being found out and them being reported and deported. As a group, they are especially 
vulnerable to being victims of crime. Vulnerable groups’ ability to control what goes on in their 
own homes can also be limited in several ways: (i) they may have to share their space with 
other families, as rent can be expensive. This may lead to conflict and instability, as each family 
organises a home in a different way. (ii) Landlords may include strict conditions about what 
tenants may or may not do, which also inhibits their ability to control and create their own 
niches. Lack of privacy and the increased risk of crime contributes to powerlessness and lack 
of control.  
Nine (ibid. 254) states that the “perception of home security may be as important as home 
security itself”. If a person does not believe that their home is secure, they are less likely to 
invest time and effort in niche creation, to the detriment of their cognitive functioning. As for 
the question of domination: vulnerable people, due to renting or due to sharing with other 
families, often have to live according to another’s rules. We can be dominated in the homes we 
rent or live in, in direct or indirect ways: 
Domination can sabotage a home through legal measures, such as forbidding the 
display of religious symbols […] or controlling the features of built dwellings to 
suit only the dominant culture. Under domination, inhabitants may not feel that 
their home structures authentically reflect their desires and beliefs, and it would be 
difficult for them to rely on these structures as cognitive supports. People who are 
politically oppressed or otherwise socially vulnerable may be more susceptible to 
this kind of domination (ibid. 255). 
Living without a home means living without the niches or cognitive crutches those with homes 
have. The homeless or displaced person must expend more energy – cognitive, physical, 
emotional – to perform the most basic of human tasks: seeking shelter, food, sleeping, 
ablutions. A person with a home, but without household security, is in a slightly better position 
than the homeless, yet because of the loss of their cognitive crutches they have to do more to 
achieve the same as a person with niches in place. This can leave very little energy or time for 





Being displaced is also harmful because it can potentially be isolating. Earlier in this chapter I 
discussed the dangers of rootlessness and isolations on the part of the xenophobe. However, 
this discussion also applies to the foreigner or displaced person who has to find a new home. 
On the part of the xenophobe, anti-foreigner sentiments and actions may be a reaction against 
his or her own sense of alienation and isolation. Xenophobic discrimination, in turn, isolates 
and alienates the foreigner through civic ostracism and by making them feel insecure in the 
outside world. Loneliness is already a condition found among those who try to make a home 
in a new community, city, or country. It is  
closely connected with uprootedness and superfluousness […] To be uprooted 
means to have no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to be 
superfluous means no to belong to the world at all. Uprootedness can be the 
preliminary condition for superfluousness, just as isolation can (but must not) be 
the preliminary condition for loneliness. (Arendt 1973: 475). 
In a way, feeling lonely after moving to a new city or neighbourhood is to be expected. It takes 
a while to adjust and to meet new people and build new relationships. Usually, people are 
eventually able to settle into new communities through their work, school, or church. While 
there are cultural differences between different cities in a country there are enough similarities 
for people who grew up in the one, to easily make friends in the other. There is some shared 
history – similar experiences at school, living through the same political and historical events, 
growing up watching the same television shows, etc. – that would enable one to make 
connections. Even under these circumstances, forming new relationships can be hard, but it is 
nowhere near as hard as settling into a community in a new country. Not only is there a bigger 
‘gap’ between people due to national and cultural differences, but immigrants no longer have 
their support networks close at hand. Distance and financial constraints make it harder to go 
back home to visit (if this is possible at all – it is difficult for undocumented immigrants and 
not possible for refugees). Technology makes life easier for immigrants – instant 
communication is possible and accessible (here once again refugees are at a disadvantage: 
conditions in their home countries can be such that it is not easy to get in touch with people, 
e.g. during a war). But social media and online communication cannot be substitutes for human 
contact. Immigrants report feeling that they must start from scratch in the new country, 
accompanied by a sense of loss, not only material, but also in terms of their life achievements 




These factors will negatively impact one’s ability to work productively; one’s relationships 
with others (both inside and outside the home) will suffer, and one will find it harder to 
complete basic tasks than before the displacement. This is a problem for any person who moves 
to a new house, but it provides an extra problem for the politically displaced, who not only 
have to build new homes and new cognitive coping mechanisms, but who have to try to fit into 
the larger, political community (whether a local community or a nation or a state). If one thinks 
of what is expected of immigrants (whatever their legal status), the scale of the problem 
becomes clear. In popular discourse and in the kinds of visas one can apply for (e.g. scarce 
skills), there is a strong narrative of: immigrants are welcome if they are useful. This not only 
from those who are against immigration (and therefore dub all immigrants as lazy and a net 
drain on citizens’ resources), but also from those in favour of immigration. One is almost 
guaranteed to see an “Einstein was an immigrant” poster at any pro-immigrant event or march. 
Immigrants are expected to prove their worth. However, if their cognitive (and emotional) 
functioning is negatively affected by the displacement, their ability to ‘prove their worth’ is 
affected.  
Having ‘worth’ or being ‘useful’ is often used, by some immigrants and people who are pro-
immigration, as a justification of immigrants’ presence in a country, or an argument for ‘letting 
them in’. The danger of this argument, however, is that it instrumentalises humans; only those 
who have worth (i.e. can contribute in some meaningful way) to society, are worthy of being 
homed, of having a place in which to exist. In her discussion on antisemitism in Europe, Arendt 
(1973) discusses the role that the idea of the ‘exceptional Jew’ or genius played in the 
assimilation of the European Jewry: 
Assimilation, in the sense of acceptance by non-Jewish society, was granted them 
only as long as they were clearly distinguished exceptions from the Jewish masses 
even though they still shared the same restricted and humiliating political 
conditions […] exceptional Jews, knew quite well that it was this ambiguity – that 
they were Jews and yet presumably not like Jews – which opened the doors of 
society to them. (ibid. 56) 
Strangers become palatable when they show signs of genius, of being exceptional, yet even 
then their acceptance is only conditional. Even as the privileges of the exceptional Jews waned, 
as antisemitism gained political strength and influence, the idea of the ‘special’ Jew, the Jew 




to stay alive than an ordinary one” (Arendt 2006: 132). For the more liberal eighteenth century 
Europeans, the acceptance of the exceptional Jew served as proof that “all men are human” and 
a “demonstration of the dignity of man” (Arendt 1973: 57). It was the fact that despite and 
while still being Jews, they could be ‘like Europeans’, that granted them social acceptance. 
The consequences of not being a genius, of not being a ‘good’ or ‘first-rate’ Jew ranged from 
ostracism and discrimination (as a best-case scenario) to, of course, extermination in the camps. 
But this function of being a ‘genius’ or ‘exceptional’ did not, and does not, only apply to Jews 
in Europe during that time. Arendt (ibid.  287) discusses the genius in relation to statelessness. 
Stateless people lack a home (especially in the political, or group-home sense), and are 
therefore often “without the right to residence and without the right to work” (ibid. 286) 
wherever they may find themselves. Statelessness, like homelessness, is a condition of 
invisibility – it was with reference to the stateless Jews during WWII that Arendt coined the 
term “holes of oblivion”. Those who are already unseen can disappear without anyone 
realising. Nine perhaps does not have such extremes in mind when she warns of the cognitive 
harm of displacement, yet we should not underestimate the negative effect of reduced cognitive 
functioning, caused by stress and trauma, can have on a person’s ability to function and act in 
the world. 
Displacement is therefore harmful because it disconnects us from our various networks – 
social, familial, professional, but also from the network of cognitive aids we set up in our homes 
and offices through niche creation. All of these contribute to feelings of insecurity, loneliness, 
reduced cognitive functioning, fatigue, stress, and even trauma. Foreigners are especially 
vulnerable in this regard, as they find it harder to establish new networks and, given their 
political vulnerability, to find a sense of security inside and outside the home. The ordinary 
feelings and harms that come with displacement are exacerbated by a political climate in which 
foreigners are hated, feared, blamed, and harmed. A world in which there is no room for 
xenophobia must therefore be a world in which there is room for everyone on every level: in 
public and in private, in local communities and in the country at large.  
Conclusion 
In earlier chapters, I identified xenophobia as a response to apprehensions about belonging. 
The aim of Chapter 3 was to show the relation between belonging and home, and xenophobia 




from the perspective of the xenophobe (i.e. apprehension of belonging as a cause of 
xenophobia) and the other belonging from the perspective of the victim of xenophobic 
discrimination (i.e. the dangers of displacement and not finding a home). I argue that a sense 
of belonging and specifically having and specifically having a place where one belongs is 
crucial for human existence and freedom.   
In Section 1, I argued that xenophobia is a response to a feeling of rootlessness, not belonging, 
and isolation on the part of the xenophobe. I discussed the idea of ‘place’ and how the place 
we are from – i.e. our home – has a profound impact on our sense of self and self-identity. I 
consider the dangers of not belonging, or feeling as if one belongs, with reference to Arendt’s 
writing on rootlessness, showing how those who feel out of place seek belonging in nationalist 
and other exclusionary movements – one’s own belonging at the cost of someone else’s. 
Nationalism, I argued, provides the lonely individual with a false home. The nation is an 
imagined community (Anderson), imagined because we feel ourselves to be related in a deep, 
important sense to people we do not know but who is part of this ‘home’. Nationalism is also 
a project of homogenisation, and for this reason it is always accompanied by xenophobia – by 
a fear of those who are other or different. Foreigners threaten the fragile belonging the 
nationalist or xenophobe feels, and for this they are hated. 
Section 2 considered what belonging, or rather the lack thereof, means for the foreigner. Here 
my focus was specifically on the harms of not having a secure home or a place in which one 
can freely exist. These harms are the result of xenophobia but are important to take note of for 
they provide an imperative for the fight against xenophobia. I argued that having a place in the 
world is intimately connected with our ability to exist freely, and that being without a place is 
therefore a condition of comprehensive unfreedom. We see this in the ways in which homeless 
individuals’ freedoms are curtailed, but I showed how the situation of the homeless is 
analogous to that of the foreigner, for the latter is also vulnerable to external forces preventing 
them from accessing places where they can exist freely. I then linked this discussion to Arendt’s 
work on statelessness, the most radical form of homelessness or place-lessness and showed 
how the precarious position of the stateless makes erasure and extermination possible. This is 
not only relevant to discussions on genocide or ethnic cleansing, but it also pertains to 
xenophobic violence, as the xenophobe can act with impunity precisely because the foreigner 




In the final two subsections, I narrowed my focus to the question of having a personal home, 
and showed how having a home protects one, but more importantly how being displaced from 
one’s home is deeply harmful. Having a home is important for it provides us with a place in 
which we can exercise our autonomy, and as Nine argued it also serves as an extension of our 
cognitive functions through niche creation. We organise our homes in specific ways to make 
living and functioning easier, and to ease our cognitive load. The displaced person, in losing 
their homes, loses this. If they are unable to find a new home, they have to put in more energy, 
cognitive and emotional, to perform basic functions. I showed how this places an unfair burden 
on foreigners, especially as their belonging in a new country is often conditional upon them 
being able to prove their worth and show that they can contribute to their communities.  
One can see why, especially in conditions of scarcity or marginality, xenophobia can arise out 
of the fear of being displaced or replaced. Being hospitable may be difficult when conditions 
are cramped and there’s not much to share. For many xenophobes, the solution would be to 
‘send them back to where they came from’. They may not belong here, but they do belong 
somewhere. However, xenophobic attitudes can be more extreme, where the question is not 
one of belonging in a specific place, but one of belonging in the world at all. In this chapter, 
we have seen what the dangers of not belonging are – either seeking belonging in false homes 
or having one’s very existence threatened. Our sense of belonging determines how we see the 
world and act in it, and it also determines how others see us. Belonging is therefore a 
fundamental part of our identities. In Chapter 4 I therefore turn to the question of identity and 
defend a narrative approach to identity. According to this approach, our identities are the 
products of the stories we tell about ourselves, and of the ways in which we attempt to make 
sense of the world and give meaning to our experiences. Part of this is attaching specific 
meanings to the places we find ourselves in, to our homes, to the groups we belong to, and to 







Chapter 4: Narrative Identity 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 3, I argued that a sense of belonging is crucial for human flourishing and, 
conversely, that being or feeling displaced contributes to feelings of alienation, which fuel the 
xenophobe’s hatred on the one hand, while enhancing the precarity of the potential victims of 
xenophobia. How we think about place and home in general and the specific places we inhabit 
has a deep impact on our identities, both individually and collectively. Very often, in response 
to a question about our lives, we start by saying where we come from. Place matters in identity 
formation, as well as in identity recognition. One’s place of origin, or where one’s home is 
situated, often serves as shorthand for identity when encountering strangers. The connection 
between self and place, identity and home, is reinforced with narratives of place. We come to 
know people from different parts of the world in part through stories we hear about those parts 
(leaving aside, for the moment, the issue of whether those stories are truly representative of 
their lives), and we tell our own biographical narratives with reference to the places where we 
grew up, the places we visited that had a profound impact on us, and the places where we live. 
Different places can of course mean different things to different people. Xenophobia is, in one 
sense, believing that people from one’s own place (nation or country) are better than people 
from other places – that South Africans are better than Congolese, for example. Accompanying 
this belief is a set of assumptions we have about other places and people who come from there. 
In using place as a shorthand for identity, we tend to stereotype, relying on biases and 
prejudices and half-remembered facts. Our connection with places changes over time, lessening 
or strengthening the place’s impact on our sense of self-identity. Just as our sense of belonging, 
and our situatedness, can change, so can our identities linked to place, remaining fluid and open 
to interpretation (and, consequently, misunderstanding): 
Any place, named or unnamed, has multiple meanings and associations attached to 
it, and, potentially, multiple identities, for example, because of the activities 
associated with it, its social history and the personal experience of a particular 
[person]. (Taylor 2010: 10) 
Our assumptions, beliefs, prejudices, and stereotypes about other places and other people are 




a broader narrative of self, a narrative that illuminates and shapes our personal and collective 
identities. The importance of narratives in fashioning individual and collective lives has long 
been a distinct research focus in philosophy. Such narratives can comprise stories (e.g. in 
novels or biographies), but also artworks, images, public discourse, propaganda, political 
speeches and codified law. Storytelling is seen as something inherently human, a way in which 
we make sense of the world, give meaning, and understand our lives, selves, and also others. 
Mark Rowlands (2008: 2), on considering what it means to be human (as a species), writes: 
“our uniqueness lies simply in the fact that we tell these stories [distinguishing us from other 
animals] – and, what’s more, we can actually get ourselves to believe them. If I wanted a one-
sentence definition of human beings, this would do: humans are the animals that believe the 
stories they tell about themselves.” Connelly and Clandinin (1990: 2) understand human beings 
as “storytelling organisms who, individually and socially, live storied lives”, and stories are 
therefore the tools by which we interpret and characterise our experiences and phenomena in 
the world. 
In this chapter I shift my focus from understanding and explaining xenophobia, to asking how 
our identities and the exclusionary narratives upon which we build our identities contribute to 
creating and upholding the xenophobic life-world. In the discussion on prejudice in Chapter 2, 
we saw how prejudice is the result of the process of identity formation (individual identities) 
and socialisation (i.e. individuals finding belonging in groups). Above, I have shown how our 
identities are influenced by the places we live in and the people we encounter, including the 
groups we belong to. This chapter will show how such identities are created through a process 
of narration, and how the meaning we attach to belonging to specific identity groupings is also 
the product of our narratives. This offers us hope, for while our narratives are often 
exclusionary, the sharing of narratives and stories can also create connections between people. 
This chapter will be divided into two sections. In the first, I distinguish between ‘narrative’ and 
‘story’, arguing that narratives are the stories we tell with the intention of distilling themes, 
giving meaning, and illuminating consequences. Narratives are therefore the tools with which 
we organise our experiences and our lives (Section 1.1). Section 1.2 briefly considers other 
prominent approaches to identity – the psychological, the biological – and I argue that the 
narrative approach better explains how identities take shape and, on a meta-level, allows us to 
see that theories of identity are themselves identity-forming narratives. I then argue for a 




constitution view. Ultimately, I argue that our identity-forming narratives, on a very basic level, 
are our answers to the question, ‘Who are you?’. In Section 1.3, I look at the connection 
between our understanding of identity and the question of personhood. I show how an 
understanding of personhood can be exclusionary, with reference to traditional Western and 
traditional African conceptions of personhood. I argue that both personhood and narrative 
identities are fundamentally communal and, therefore, have political implications. The final 
subsection therefore deals specifically with political narratives. Such narratives include any 
narrative that appear in public forums, but also those that shape our understanding of our 
group’s identity, and that influence our interactions with others. I show how our identities are 
shaped not only by our own narrative constructions, but also by the kinds of political narratives 
we accept and incorporate into our sense of self. There is a constant interplay between our 
individual and group-identities, and the latter are products of both our individual and shared 
narratives. 
In Section 2 I turn to the criticisms of the narrative theory of identity. This is necessary to test 
the validity of my theory, but more importantly the criticisms highlight the challenges facing 
not only the theory, but also my broader project of countering xenophobia by rethinking our 
identities and retelling the narratives that shape them. Section 2.1 focusses specifically on 
Strawson’s (2004, 2015) critique that narrative identity theories make unfounded claims to 
universality, and that many people do not think of their lives or their identities in terms of 
narrative. Strawson’s critique engages with Schechtman’s theory, therefore I offer a response 
to him here. Ultimately, I argue that his critique hits the mark when directed at strong narrative 
views, but that he is wrong in his belief that identities cannot be narrative in a weaker sense. I 
argue that, on a very basic level, everyone narrates their identity when asked ‘Who are you?’, 
and indeed that Strawson does this himself. This weak sense of narrative identity is sufficient 
for my purposes.  
I also consider the limited potential of storytelling in bringing about societal change in Section 
2.2, and the problem of false narratives in Section 2.3, criticisms to which I respond more fully 
in Chapter 5. Both these criticisms affirm the role that narratives play in our understanding, but 
they also show us how narratives can fail to achieve the ends I suggest they can – that of helping 
us create a less xenophobic world. That this is necessary was shown by my discussions of the 




the narrative view, but alert us to the limitations of this view and task us with the project of 
meeting and overcoming those limitations. This is the aim of Chapter 5. 
1. Stories, narratives, and identities 
1.1 Defining ‘narrative’ 
In our everyday language, we tend to speak of ‘stories’ and ‘storytelling’ to refer to accounts 
we give of events. In academic literature, the word ‘narrative’ is preferred, although it is often 
used interchangeably with ‘story’ (as I do below). If there is a distinction to be drawn, it is a 
very fine one. Stories and narratives share similar structures, and if there is a difference it lies 
in the significance we attach to the content. Both attempt to make sense of complex situations 
by stringing together events, not only in order to say what happened, but also how significant 
it is (Barwell 2009: 49). Yet sometimes we use the word ‘story’ to refer to a simple retelling of 
daily events with no other purpose than to inform, with no special significance or underlying 
meaning being communicated. However, the way in which I use ‘story’ and ‘narrative’ in this 
study refers to more than a simple listing of chronological events. I take narrative to refer to 
stories constructed in such a way that they attempt to make sense of human actions, 
experiences, and events. Narratives are told through a wide variety of mediums – oral 
storytelling, writing, film and photography, journalism – and permeate all levels of life. 
Generally, narratives are taken to be intentional: the storyteller crafting a narrative, a person 
reflecting on their past and making sense of if through narrative. As we will come to see, 
however, our participation in meta-narratives through the stories we tell are not necessarily 
intentional or even conscious. This specifically relates to the narrative aspect of our identities 
and the political narratives. A person may, for example, exclaim that ‘a foreigner took my job!’ 
without being aware that such a claim is part of broader anti-foreigner narratives, with 
implications that go further than their specific context. 
Narrative in the context of this study should also be understood as a tool with which we make 
sense of our past and create a framework for the future. Narratives can do this precisely because 
they do not simply relay events but connect events and experiences with the specific intention 
of finding meaning. Stephanie Taylor (2010: 36) defines narrative as “a construction of 
sequence or consequence [which] therefore encompasses temporal references (including, 
minimally, ‘then’, ‘after that’ and so on) and the logic of cause-and-effect relationships (‘so’, 




is the consequence of Y), but also as indicating importance or significance. Narratives do not 
only tell us what happened, but also why, and why this is important.  
Because narratives direct our attention to what is supposed to have significance, a narrative 
approach to identity is an attempt to interpret, understand, and give meaning to our lives. We 
do this by identifying themes in our life-story through identifying similarities, patterns, and 
recurrences. In doing this, we come to understand ourselves as specific kinds of people – we 
may look at all our past failures, and conclude that we are fundamentally lazy, or unlucky, or 
victimised. Narratives are also, according to Taylor (2010: 36) social, “because the talk in 
which they appear draws on commonly held, already existing discursive resources […] out of 
which we construct what we say and also, because talk is a form of social action”. Our 
individual narratives fit into, draw from, and interact with the narratives of those around us – 
individuals and institutions. 
Jerome Bruner (1990) distinguishes between several conceptualisations of narrative. Firstly, 
he refers to narratives as constituents of culture. As people tell stories and narratives, these 
narratives accumulate, giving rise to a tradition, history, and culture. This accumulation of 
narratives happens not only on a large scale (i.e. peoples, or cultural groupings), but also within 
family units, companies, or smaller communities. Cultures use narratives normatively, to 
indicate what is acceptable and what is abnormal in that culture – Bruner calls such narratives 
canonical. Institutional narratives of the kind I will discuss later fall under this category, as do 
many of our political narratives. Secondly, Bruner understands narrative as local, contingent, 
and in the moment. Such narratives are intended to “find an intentional state that mitigates or 
at least makes comprehensible a deviation from a canonical cultural pattern” (ibid. 49-50). 
Where canonical narratives are normative, localised narratives are informative, explanatory, 
and justificatory when there is a deviation from the canonical narrative. Thirdly, Bruner also 
understands narrative as a means by which we can negotiate, interpret and reinterpret, norms. 
‘Narrative’ in this final understanding refers to actual talking, or telling, relying on “lexical and 
grammatical usages that highlight subjective states, attenuating circumstances, alternative 
possibilities” (ibid. 59).  To my mind, there seems to be a link between these latter two 
conceptualisations, if we understand narrative as a tool with which we can bring about societal 
change (more on this in Chapter 5). Through negotiating and reinterpreting norms, we can tell 




justified when the canonical narrative is, for example, exclusionary (e.g. explicitly xenophobic 
laws). 
Finally, as hinted at above, narratives are to be understood as tools with which we organise our 
personal experiences and lives. Each person tells multiple narratives, as they interpret their life 
and experience in a multitude of ways. These narratives Bruner calls ‘self-accountings’, told 
by individuals, but constrained by the greater narratives of culture and family culture (meaning 
that individuals can’t just make things up). Such self-accountings have the function of situating 
us in a broader community, or web of others: “The ultimate function of autobiography is self-
location […] Through it, we identify with a family, a community, and indirectly with the 
broader culture” (Bruner & Weisser 1991: 133). 
Such narrative self-accountings constitute our personal or individual identities, an idea 
developed in the narrative theory of identity. Note here the communal aspect of narratives. 
Narratives need a narrator, as well as an audience. This will become important later on in this 
chapter. Yet we do not share all our self-accountings with the world. We also try to make sense 
of our lives, experiences, expectations, and actions through introspection (or by having a debate 
with an imagined other in front of the mirror!). Even when we do not share our introspective 
narratives with other people, such narratives have a narrator and an audience. We can think of 
our consciences in this sense – audiences to our narratives or judgments about our lives, and in 
turn judges of such narratives’ validity. Speaking of ‘conscience’, however, raises further 
questions we cannot consider here. Instead, I propose we think of our internal narratives as 
(ideally) having audiences in two senses. From personal experience (and I know of other people 
who share this experience), my ‘self-accountings’ often take the form of conversations with 
imagined others, usually the person I feel accountable to (e.g. if I wronged a friend in some 
way and wonder how I will rectify the situation). In a sense, we make others present in our 
minds, and we anticipate how they will respond or judge us. Of course, they may respond 
differently in real life, but that is not the point. The point is that even in our internal self-
accounting narratives we imagine an audience, and the ‘presence’ of that audience influences 
what we narrate. In Chapter 5 I consider Hannah Arendt’s theory of judgment and its relation 





Arendt (1973) provides us with another way to think of our introspective thoughts having an 
audience. At the end of The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt makes a crucial distinction 
between the lonely man and the solitary man. Loneliness is dangerous, but solitude is crucial, 
for only in solitude can we truly think. Loneliness is a condition we can feel while we are 
among people, but it is a condition that isolates us from those around us, making it impossible 
to establish contact. Solitude, on the other hand, refers to being alone in the sense of being by 
oneself, and it is a place in which a person “can be together with himself” and where people 
have the capacity of “talking to themselves” (ibid. 476). It is here where Arendt brings in the 
‘audience’ to our private thoughts: 
I am “by myself,” together with myself, and therefore two-in-one, whereas in 
loneliness I am actually one, deserted by all others. All thinking, strictly speaking, 
is done in solitude and is a dialogue between me and myself; but this dialogue of 
the two-in-one does not lose contact with the world of my fellow-men because they 
are represented in the self with whom I lead the dialogue of thought. (ibid.) 
Of course, the lonely person also has this dialogue with him- or herself. Solitude is crucial for 
us to come to understand ourselves, but the ‘solitary man’ that Arendt contrasts with the ‘lonely 
man’ never remains by himself – eventually, the solitary person joins others again: “The 
problem of solitude is that this two-in-one needs the others in order to become one again: one 
unchangeable individual whose identity can never be mistaken for that of any other” (ibid.). 
Our narrative self-accountings can only become identities when confirmed by others: “For the 
confirmation of my identity I depend entirely upon other people” (ibid.). We trust our thoughts, 
our inner dialogues, when our conclusions are confirmed by other people. The lonely man 
cannot find this confirmation, and therefore also loses trust in his inner dialogue – even one’s 
own self becomes unreliable. When Arendt wrote about loneliness and solitude, she had not 
yet developed her theory of judgment, nor had she recognised the link between thoughtlessness 
and evil (or what she calls the ‘banality of evil’).  
What we should take from this: narratives, no matter what shape they take or where (if!) they 
are told, are of necessity social and, because this implies interactions between people, 
narratives pertain to the political. The narratives we construct and tell are also intimately 
connected to who we think we are, as individuals and groups. Narratives therefore shape our 
identities, as we will see in the next section, and by doing so they also situate us in place and 




impact on how we think about belonging and who belongs, and consequently on who we 
include and exclude. In Chapter 2 we saw how identity formation, both on an individual level 
and through being socialised into a group, contributes to prejudice and outgroup discrimination. 
Prejudicial beliefs and stereotypes are shared through the narratives we share about ourselves 
and others. How we think about identity formation and about our particular identities therefore 
has a determining impact on how xenophobic we are. 
1.2 ‘Who are you?’: identities as narratives 
To understand how group and individual identities enable xenophobia through the kinds of 
narratives they are based on and distribute, we must first ask what it means to see identity as 
narrative. In what follows, I will briefly consider the question of identity, and argue that the 
narrative approach to identity best captures how identities are formed and how our identities 
impact our interactions. Because the question of identity is mostly framed in terms of individual 
identity, I will focus on the individual first and then extrapolate to group identities.  
Simply put, the question of our identities asks how we can meaningfully claim an identity over 
time. To say that I have an identity over time is to say that I am the same person over time. 
How can I meaningfully speak of myself (or my Self) as a child, and myself as an adult, as 
being the same self? Are those two people the same person – do they share an identity? Most 
people would, without giving it a second thought, answer in the affirmative. We think of 
ourselves as existing over time, as being the same person even as we change. The cells in our 
bodies may be replaced, our personalities may alter, we may even come to understand ourselves 
in a radically different way, but for the most part we feel some connection to our childhood 
selves (not always – we will return to this below). We generally have some sense of who we 
are, as individuals – some sense of identity. It is our sense of our own identity that links past 
selves to present and future selves. Our understanding of the process of identity formation 
explains the nature of the link between past, present, and future selves. 
Identity is also about ownership. To say, ‘This is my identity’, is to say that I claim ownership 
over the specific contents of that identity – the personality traits, memories, prejudices, 
opinions, belief systems, interests, hopes, and passions. How we organise those contents, what 
we give priority to, differs from person to person. For some, their sense of personal identity 
may be shaped primarily by their vocation, while for others it is what they do outside of the 




brought up in, while others do not. The same goes for national identity. For you, the most 
important aspect of your identity may be that you are South African, while for me it is that I 
am a reader, or a dog-lover. Because we build our identities from these blocks – interests, 
memories, attachments to larger groups – our identities can also change over time, as our 
positions in life and understanding of life changes. Hence the problem of identity: does it make 
sense to speak of sameness, if what we call our ‘identities’ can change? If we change? And 
how does reidentification work – identifying both my younger and older self, as the same 
person? 
There are various theories that attempt to answer this question – the psychological view of 
personal identity, the biological, and anticriterialism, to name a few (Olson 2003). An extensive 
discussion of these theories is beyond the scope of this study. Briefly: 
The psychological view: Also called the psychological-continuity view (see Parfit 1971). An 
identity persists because mental features are inherited from a past self, and the future self will 
inherit the same features. Mental features are things like memories, beliefs, and rational 
thought. The importance given to memory in this view limits it, as we so easily forget things. 
I may remember an important event from my childhood now but forget it in a few years’ time. 
Present and past me will share an identity, but future me will not share an identity with past me 
because the memory is not shared. The view therefore does not guarantee continuity. The view 
also assumes a distinction between the psychological and the biological (i.e. I would still be 
me, if my memories and mental processes are somehow uploaded to a computer or another 
body). It is unclear that this distinction exists, as debates in the philosophy of mind show. 
The biological view: quite simply, the past, present, and future self is the same (identical) 
because it has the same biological body. The problem with this view is related to the ones 
identified in the previous view: (a) can we so easily distinguish between mind and body? And 
assuming that we can, (b) imagine if one’s mind is uploaded to a computer, and the body 
remains behind. According to this view, the body would remain the same, or retain the identity. 
The body would be the person. Intuitively, this seems unconvincing. We do not think of bodies 
as being the whole of the person (otherwise we would think differently about death). 
Anticriterialism: Unlike the previous two views, anticriterialism does not offer necessary and 
sufficient conditions for identity. Inherited mental features and biological continuity can be 




however, how we can meaningfully speak of identity, or answer the question of identity, 
without some kind of criteria.  
The most prevalent contemporary explanation for personal identity, which also dominates 
popular understandings of identity, is the theory of narrative identity. This theory offers a more 
convincing answer to the question of identity over time, or the problem of reidentification, than 
the other theories. The reasons are as follows:  
i. Our understanding of our own identity is taken from the building blocks of identity – 
the things that we choose to represent us, or that we take ownership of. How we 
understand identity formation (i.e. which theory explaining identity we find 
convincing) will necessarily shape how we perceive our own identities. The theories 
themselves then become building blocks to identity (one has the identity of someone 
who takes a biological view of identity, just as one may have a Christian identity 
because one believes in the Gospels, or a geeky identity because one is passionate about 
video games). 
ii. The same holds, of course, for people who understand identity narratively (this 
understanding itself is part of the content of their identity). However, narrative identity 
works on a different level as well. It does not matter which theory of personal identity 
one ascribes to. When asked about your identity (i.e. when asked ‘Who are you?), you 
will answer by telling a story about your life or your ‘self’. Similarly, when asked how 
you understand identity, whatever you answer will be answered narratively. 
(Philosophical arguments are also narratives, in the sense that they seek to explain or 
account for existence and things we encounter in the world.) One’s theoretical 
understanding of identity becomes a narrative thread in the greater narrative of one’s 
life. In fact, some theorists rely on the narrative view to supplement the psychological 
view, in an attempt to make up for the latter’s shortcomings (see, for example, Slors 
1998, 2001). 
A narrative understanding of identity also provides us with a framework within which we can 
make sense of collective identities. Many of the building blocks of our personal identities are 
linked to collective identities – nationality, membership to a choir or orchestra, cultural and 
religious groups, one’s gender or sexual orientation. Our identities are not only determined by 




design or not). How much importance we attach to those exclusions and inclusions is up to us. 
Amartya Sen (2006: 23) warns of the danger of constructing our whole identity based on a 
singular affiliation, especially singular affiliation to culture, nation, or religion. Instead, we 
should (and, in fact, generally do) have multifaceted identities, because we belong to many 
different groups. The problem Sen identifies with identity, is that we often reduce individual 
identities to a single marker of identity that encompasses and is supposed to define the 
individual. Very often, these identities are imposed. We do not get to choose which nation or 
cultural group we are born into, and our parents or caretakers decide in which religion to raise 
us in (or not). When we choose to accept such an identity as our defining identity, Sen (2006: 
9) argues, it may lead to exclusionary practices and violence. Our given identities should be 
questioned, and we should be exposed to different systems of identification through exposure 
to other people with different identities.  
In Chapter 2 I suggested that, despite our tendency to hunker down when confronted by 
strangers, positive contact can have the opposite effect. Exposure to other people, cultures, and 
identities can lower prejudice by learning more about the outgroup, generating affective ties, 
and by encouraging us to reappraise the ingroup (see Pettigrew 1998: 70-72). Our 
understanding of our own identity is often formed in part by our understanding that we belong 
to this group instead of that group, with the accompanying assumptions about superiority and 
inferiority. In Chapter 1, I referred to the need for a stranger in order to define the self. Learning 
about and interacting with other groups will therefore also teach us something about ourselves, 
and more than just that we may have been wrong in our beliefs and assumptions. We may 
come to understand ourselves, as individuals and as groups, in a new way: 
Optimal intergroup contact provides insight about ingroups as well as outgroups. 
Ingroup norms and customs turn out not to be the only ways to manage the social 
world. This new perspective can reshape your view of your ingroup and lead to a 
less provincial view of outgroups in general (“deprovincialization”). (Pettigrew 
1998: 72) 
The affective ties that can result from positive contact can also help us to value other aspects 
of our identity more, by connecting with someone from a different culture or religion on the 
basis of a shared hobby or interests. This creates new possibilities for connection and loyalty 
that are not based on the kind of prepolitical factors that contribute to xenophobic nationalism 




a meaningful sense of belonging. For Sen, such ties and alternative identity-groups provide a 
powerful antidote to violent and exclusionary identities. We come to know others and are able 
to establish such affective ties not only through exposure, but through learning more about each 
other through the stories we tell about ourselves. 
A person may, of course, still decide to identify themselves in relation to their race, nationality, 
religion, etc., despite being exposed to difference. And these identifications need not 
necessarily be violent and/or xenophobic (there are, for example, many ways to be Christian, 
or Muslim, or Jewish). Whether our chosen identity is exclusionary and violent is determined 
by how we think about identity, in general, and what the content of our specific identity is. If 
we think of identity as something that is naturally given (as nationalists do), or as all-
encompassing, then in all likelihood our identities will be exclusionary and close us off to 
others with different identities (e.g. those not belonging to the nation). Regarding the content 
of identity: a religious person, for example, adheres to a specific doctrine, which determines 
how they understand their religion and how they act on the basis of that. Different 
interpretations of a single religion may be exclusionary and violent (e.g. the religious right in 
America) or less so (e.g. those who take the Christian doctrine of love and forgiveness 
seriously). Communities may be more or less hospitable, have permeable or solid borders. 
Whatever the case may be, it seems that our identities are largely shaped by our thinking on 
identity or, to put it simply, by the narrative of identity we find convincing. The antidote to 
identities that tend to encourage exclusionary and even violent practices, would be to start 
telling a different narrative of such identities – to offer an alternative view of a specific identity, 
to which the person who identifies may not have been previously exposed. This is not a perfect 
solution – some will still choose exclusion and violence. I return to the limits of narrative and 
narrative identity below, but for now I will simply say: perfection is an unreachable goal. 
To understand what is meant by ‘narrative identity’, three questions should be answered: “(1) 
What counts as a life narrative? (2) What counts as having a narrative? and (3) What are the 
practical implications of having (or failing to have) a narrative?” (Schechtman 2007: 159). The 
answers given to these questions by different theories of narrative identity lie on a spectrum: 
weak, middle-range, and strong narrative views. In answer to the first question, weak narrative 
views define a ‘life narrative’ as “a sequential listing of the event in one’s history” (Schechtman 
2007: 159). Police reports, meeting minutes, or telling one’s partner what your plans for the 




– they do not only list events, but also explain the relations between the events. Such narratives 
look at causes and effects, consequences, reasons, meaning. Strong narrative views expect life-
stories to be like “an account of a life that approximates as much as possible a story created by 
a gifted author and edited by a talented editor” (Schechtman 2007: 160). Such narratives have 
a unifying theme and direction. 
In answer to the second question, weak views hold that you have a narrative if that narrative 
impacts your experiences in some way, whether consciously or not. The middle view sees life-
narratives as conscious, and something that the person can explicitly narrate when asked. For 
those holding the strong view, “in order to have a narrative in the relevant sense a person must 
actively and consciously undertake to understand and live her life in narrative form” 
(Schechtman 2007: 160). As for the practical implications, weak views hold that one can only 
function if one has a narrative (as understood above); the middle view requires a narrative for 
interaction to be possible (engaging in complex activities, especially with others). One cannot 
have higher order capacities, such as reasoning or autonomy, without a life-narrative. 
Interaction requires that we account for ourselves in some way to others – that we are able to 
answer questions about ourselves when asked. Finally, strong views hold that one’s life can 
only be meaningful if one has a life-narrative (Schechtman 2007: 160). 
In my view, the strongest views ask too much. If a requirement for identity, or indeed 
personhood, is that we actively construct our lives as narratives and ‘live narratively’, most 
people on earth would fall short of having an identity, or a meaningful life. This is clearly not 
desirable from a moral perspective (more on this later), nor realistic. Most of our time is taken 
up by mundane tasks and repetitive actions and interactions. It is, I suppose, possible for an 
individual to approach laundry narratively, but it is also improbable that many people will do 
so. The strong views seem to apply more to Disney heroines and characters in musicals than to 
the average person. The weaker theses may do too little and end up providing us with mere 
trivialities about people’s everyday lives. However, as we will see below, Schechtman later 
adapted her middle-range view to make room for a weaker narrative view. This weaker view 
is only one aspect of her ultimate theory, but for reasons I will discuss later in the chapter it is 
sufficient for our understanding of the functioning of narratives in a political or group-identity 
context. However, regarding individual narratives the mid-range views seem the most sensible, 




better than the alternatives. Because Schechtman elucidates this view clearly, and the main 
criticisms engage with her view, I will focus on her theory of narrative identity. 
Schechtman (1996, 2012) develops what she calls the narrative self-constitution view, 
according to which “we constitute ourselves as persons by forming a narrative self-conception 
according to which we experience and organize our lives” (Schechtman 2012: 162). She sees 
this process as automatic and a result of our socialisation. As we grow up, we come to see 
ourselves as continuing individuals within society. Our actions and experiences are interpreted 
as instances that form part of a larger and ongoing life-story, in which the present is influenced 
and shaped by both the past and future. Our identities are constituted by our life-stories, by the 
recognition that the past, present, and future, belongs to the same person. Charles Taylor (1989) 
emphasises the importance of this link between past, present, and future in identity – we can 
only know who we are, if we know where we come from and we come to know this through 
narrative: “I understand my present action in the form of an “and then”” (ibid. 47). This ‘and 
then’ can be understood as both past- and future orientated, i.e. ‘I did this and then ended up 
here’ and ‘…and then I will…’. These ‘and thens’ link past, present, and future me and provide 
continuity for my identity.  
With ‘narrative’, Schechtman means more than a chronological telling of events (which would 
be enough for the weaker views), but she does not understand identity-constituting narratives 
as requiring any kind of explicit unifying theme, quest, arc, or take the shape of any literary 
genre. One’s narrative cannot be merely sub-personal (i.e. going on in the background), but it 
need not be as active and conscious a project as the strong view requires. The middle view 
requires that we tell stories, but we need not think of them as stories, narratives, or consciously 
construct them in a specific way. This we do, every day, in response to questions from those 
around us. 
Schechtman (2012: 163) places two constraints on this development of a narrative identity: the 
reality constraint and the articulation constraint. The reality constraint “requires that a 
person’s narrative conform to what we are generally accepted to know about the basic character 
of reality and about the nature of persons” (Schechtman 2012: 163). This would include such 
things as how old a person can realistically say they are (i.e. if a person claims to be a thousand 
years old, we would become suspicious), as well as physical constraints (a person cannot be at 




identity-forming beliefs that would do not conform to the reality constraints, such as people 
who believe that they were abducted by aliens, or that they are gods. While such beliefs may 
greatly inform those individuals’ self-experience and sense of identity, we can regard them as 
unreliable narrators or, even, delusional. One of the potential dangers of the narrative view is 
that it may seem to prioritise the first-person perspective over facts (Msimang 2016; DeGrazia 
2005: 85). Both of Schechtman’s constraints are put in place to prevent this from happening. 
DeGrazia (ibid.) suggests something similar: “the self-narratives that qualify as identity-
constituting are those that are realistic or within reason, given what we know about the person 
in question, about persons generally, and about the way the world works.” There can be wrong 
answers to the question ‘Who are you?’, even if the person answering believes those answers 
(DeGrazia refers to a woman who believes that she is a snake.) 
This constraint applies to narratives other than the personal as well. Regarding history-writing, 
which she likens to storytelling, Arendt (1968: 238) writes: “Even if we admit that every 
generation has the right to write its own history, we admit no more than that it has the right to 
arrange the facts according to its own perspective; we don’t admit to the right to touch the 
factual matter itself”. Arendt is here referring to brute facts, or indisputable facts (she uses the 
example of Germany invading Belgium, stating that no one can say that Belgium invaded 
Germany). Leaving aside the question of more ambiguous ‘facts’, or the interpretation and 
arranging of facts, what concerns Arendt specifically are the ways in which totalitarian 
movements and propaganda construct new facts, and how lies so easily become political ‘facts.’ 
We see this in the kinds of narratives used to justify xenophobic discrimination, narratives that 
can easily be corrected with reference to empirical facts and statistics (e.g. how many 
foreigners are actually present in the country, or how many ‘take jobs’ from citizens). The 
narrative we construct should correspond to reality, but Arendt also suggests that how we 
construct/arrange our narratives has an impact on our world. How we choose to tell our 
histories, and how we choose to judge the past, not only impacts how we experience the present, 
but it is also normative for the future – remember Taylor’s ‘and then’ (Section 1.2). For Arendt, 
our judgments and stories about the past show us what our world should look like, and who 
should be part of it. Where our narratives are based on factual inaccuracies, or evasions of facts 
due to what we choose to include and exclude, as is the case with many xenophobic narratives, 




Schechtman’s second constraint, the articulation constraint, “requires that a person be able to 
articulate her narrative locally when appropriate, or at least to recognize the legitimacy of 
certain questions” (Schechtman 2012: 163). One should be able to answer questions such as 
‘How did you get here?’ or ‘What job do you do, and how did that become your job?’ or ‘Why 
did you do that?’, or at the very least understand why such questions would be asked:  
The point is that one should not simply be at a loss, or fail to understand the sense 
of such questions. The requirement here is thus not that one must have a perfectly 
worked-out and explicit account of why everything in her life is as it is, but rather 
that she must recognize a certain kind of explanatory obligation, and be able to 
meet it for the most part. (ibid.) 
In my view, this ties in with the shared nature of narratives, discussed in the previous section. 
Schechtman’s two constraints have to be met for a narrative identity to be ‘successfully’ 
constituted. Part of this would be the affirmation of that identity from others, or the testing of 
my identity narrative against the judgments of others. Hilde Lindemann (2014: ix) says that 
understanding someone requires recognition of their expressions of personality, and a response 
to that. Our understandings of others and ourselves “consist of a web of stories depicting our 
most important acts, experiences, characteristics, roles, relationships, and commitments” – 
these things make up the “narrative tissue” of our identities (ibid.). Understanding one another 
is important, as it guides our action (how we are supposed to treat each other). To reach such 
understanding, we must participate in the exchange of stories, often through the kinds of 
questions that Schechtman mentions. This is common practice whenever you meet someone 
new – indeed, we are often taken aback when people do not ask questions of us, or answer our 
questions curtly, whether they fail to understand why you would be interested, or whether they 
are secretive or very private. 
Here the reality constraint and the articulation constraint converge, and once more tie in with 
Arendt’s point about measuring one’s judgments, or for our purposes narratives, against those 
of others. Writing on how Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment can be applied politically, 
Arendt highlights Kant’s notion of publicity – making one’s thoughts public and opening them 
up for scrutiny by others. For Kant, at least as Arendt (1982: 18) interprets him, only evil 
thoughts are kept secret. This is not to say that people who cannot answer questions about their 




such questions or who are baffled by them. Part of testing one’s narrative against reality 
requires articulating it, sharing it with others, and allowing their judgment.  
Schechtman’s two constraints highlight the most important aspects of narrative theories of 
identity. The idea that we are fundamentally beings who tell stories is widely accepted and, for 
the most part, considered uncontroversial. The popularity of the narrative theory, both inside 
and outside academic thought (perhaps especially outside), points towards its intuitiveness – 
people truly feel that this describes their experience. What is most interesting to me are the 
political implications of this understanding of identity, which I will discuss in more depth 
below, and how Schechtman’s two constraints already hint at that, in that these constraints 
require of us to put our self-narratives ‘out there’. If I had to explain narrative identity to 
someone in thirty seconds, I would answer (in line with Schechtman’s second constraint) that 
one’s identity is the answer one gives to the basic question, ‘Who are you?’, and that that 
answer always takes the form of a story. That story becomes political when we ask ‘Who are 
you?’ and, based on the answer, decide whether you belong or not. 
1.3 Narrative Identity and Personhood 
Lindemann (2014) connects our identities and our understandings thereof to the process of 
“initiating human beings into personhood”, with personhood defined in terms of four elements: 
“(1) a human being has sufficient mental activity to constitute a personality, (2) aspects of this 
personality are expressed bodily, (3) other persons recognise it as the expression of a 
personality, and (4) they respond to what they see” (ibid. ix). Identity and personhood are not 
interchangeable concepts, but they are very closely connected, in the sense that we tend to think 
of persons (however defined) as having identities (i.e. individual characters and personalities). 
Where the line between person and non-person blurs, for example with very intelligent animals 
or pets, we also find that our thinking on identity changes. In other words, people who tend to 
think of their pets as non-human persons tend to do so because they think of their pets as 
individuals with unique identities and personalities.  
Personhood is a difficult concept to get a grip on, but generally the question of personhood (i.e. 
of who/what qualifies as ‘a person’) is concerned with who/what can be said to be a moral 
being, or a being worthy of moral consideration. It is therefore often closely linked to the 
distinction between species, with humans regarded as having personhood and animals not. For 




amounts to dehumanising people, a strategy used in all forms of discrimination, often with 
violent and life-threatening results (genocide, extermination).   
Early understandings of personhood saw the person as a being who has rights (Roman), and 
later a being who has moral value (Stoics, early Christians). While modern (and specifically 
Western) conceptions of personhood incorporate these ideas, the crucial characteristic for a 
person is “the capacity for certain complex forms of consciousness, such as rationality or self-
awareness over time” (DeGrazia 2005: 3, emphasis in the original). The “self-awareness over 
time” suggests that personhood is also concerned with the question of identity over time. I will 
here consider Schechtman’s initial views on personhood as it developed in her narrative self-
constitution view. Schechtman’s narrative view is a development of the psychological view of 
identity (as said above, the narrative view was developed to avoid the shortcomings of the 
psychological view, and the two need not exclude each other). Four features of personhood can 
be found in most iterations of the psychological view: 
[M]oral responsibility (a person is rightly held responsible for only her own 
actions), prudential concern (there is a particular kind of concern that we have only 
for our own future states), compensation (justice demands that the person who 
makes a sacrifice and the person receiving compensation be the same person), and 
survival (there is a basic interest a person has in her own survival). (Schechtman 
2012: 164) 
The psychological view makes an important distinction between ‘human beings’ and ‘persons’. 
The difference lies in the persistence conditions of a person, as opposed to a human being. A 
person is a psychological entity, and the persistence of a person is defined in terms of the 
continuation of the consciousness of that person. This idea comes from John Locke, who 
originally developed the psychological view. Locke (1975: 335) understands ‘personhood’ to 
refer to a “thinking and intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself 
as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.” Here we see the connection 
between personhood and identity, for although personhood relies on certain capacities a being 
has (being a thinking thing), it also has a temporal dimension – the being must think of itself 
as a self, and the same self over time. In other words, a person is a being that has identity over 
time. For Locke, present me and past me are the same person, because of a shared 
consciousness. Our sense of moral responsibility, our concerns for our future – all of these 




That the biological view cannot account for these features of personhood is evident, but it is 
not clear that the psychological views can. According to Schechtman, while psychological 
accounts claim these four features, the theories do not in fact reach these requirements. For this 
reason, we need a narrative view. 
The first issue with Locke’s view is that it is unclear what exactly is meant by a continuation 
of consciousness. How does a consciousness continue, even when there are interruptions (like 
sleep)? Locke’s answer is memory – it is our memories that enable us to unite our past selves 
with our present selves; through memory, we claim different episodes of our past as our own. 
This is not quite satisfactory – memory is famously fickle. More often than not, we remember 
things incorrectly, if at all. Our memory of a specific event may change, depending of what 
happened after. If the continuation of consciousness relies on memory, but memories are 
untrustworthy, how can we be certain of the identity of said consciousness (i.e. how can we 
know the consciousness belongs to the same person, or my consciousness now is the same as 
what I had before my afternoon nap)? One option would be to develop Locke’s view, to say 
that the continuation relies not only on memory, but on other psychological faculties as well. 
Another could be to look at the content of consciousness – where there is similarity of content, 
identity could be established. Pre-nap me and post-nap me are the same person, because both 
felt consciously guilty of not yet finishing their PhD. 
For Schechtman, similarity of content is not good enough: 
It is not because I am like someone who took an action or worked some number of 
hours that I am responsible for that action or entitled to compensation; it is because 
the experiencing subject suffering the consequences (or enjoying the rewards) is 
the same subject who took relevant action. It is not because someone in the future 
will be like me that I care in a particular way about her experiences, but because I 
expect to experience them myself. And survival is not guaranteed by someone quite 
like me having experience in the future; I must have experience. (Schechtman 2012: 
166) 
Schechtman’s point is not that there cannot be a continuation of consciousness, but rather that 
the links provided by Locke and others between different “portions of life”, or different 
instances of what we want to think of as the same consciousness, is not nearly strong enough. 




believes that we need a stronger reading of Locke’s view – it is not simply memory that 
provides the link between past and present, but rather our appropriation of our past 
experiences. Not merely remembering, but “being affected by” past experiences: “There must 
not only be cognitive but affective and practical relations to an action or experience remote in 
time if it is to be appropriated. In other words, it must be woven into one’s narrative” (ibid.). 
This then also answers Schechtman’s question of the implications of the narrative view. 
Narratives provide us with the link needed to show unity of consciousness over time, which in 
turn is necessary for being a person, understood as having moral agency, prudential reasoning, 
and engaging in relations of compensation. 
This was Schechtman’s early view of personhood, which although critical of Locke is still in 
line with the general Western view on personhood. There are two broad approaches to a 
conception of personhood, which also has implications for how we think about identity. 
Personhood can either be ascribed individually, based on inherent characteristics the individual 
being has (often rationality). This is the position often taken in the Western philosophical 
tradition, notably defended by Kant ([1798] 2010) and Locke. In contrast to this conception of 
personhood stands the idea of personhood as relational or communal, common in the 
philosophical traditions from Africa (for example Menkiti 1984). A being is a person if 
recognised as such by those in the community it finds itself in. Menkiti (ibid. 171) writes that, 
in contrast to Western views, the traditional African view of personhood sees a person as 
“defined by the environing community” and that individuals can only come to know themselves 
through their communities (ibid. 172). The distinction as given here between these two broad 
understandings of personhood is, of course, an over-simplified distinction. The ‘later’ 
Schechtman (2014) proposes a conception of personhood that is more akin to the relational and 
communitarian conceptions found in African philosophies, whereas someone like Kwame 
Gyekye (1997) is critical of radically communitarian conceptions of personhood, as found in 
Menkiti’s work. These debates, while important and interesting, are beyond my current scope.  
The important thing to realise is that our understanding of personhood is intimately linked with 
our identity, and also that how we understand personhood has a very real impact on who we 
treat as beings worthy of moral consideration.  
The more communitarian views of personhood are often offered as an alternative to the kind 
of view that developed from Locke and Kant. Understanding personhood as a collection of 




dangers. What about babies and young children, or people suffering from dementia? Such 
individuals can easily be classified as non-persons in this view, which could lead others to 
believe that they can be treated differently. Having personhood in this sense has, for example, 
never been truly gender neutral, with rationality strongly linked to the masculine and 
irrationality/emotions linked to the feminine. This has had real-world consequences for women, 
who were excluded from citizenship through most of Western history, as our idea of 
personhood (or the rational subject) “defines the idea of citizenship” (Coetzee 2019: 5). In a 
similar way, colonialism excluded the colonised from citizenship: “the colonised serves as the 
imminent and material other for the emergence of the rational and transcendent subjectivity 
that the colonizer lays claim to and on which his status as citizen is then based” (ibid. 6). The 
problem is that this approach to personhood runs the risk of being essentialist and, 
consequently, creating vulnerability for whole groups of people who do not share this 
‘essence’. It also denies the so-called embodied existence of persons – the ways in which 
environments, places, and others shape our individual existences. This shortcoming is 
especially clear if one thinks of personhood and identity as being closely tied together.  
It is not clear, however, that the alternative view necessarily avoids such problems, at least not 
in the radical form Menkiti provides.18 The traditional African understanding of personhood, 
as described by Menkiti, also excludes certain human beings from the category of ‘persons’. 
According to Menkiti, the traditional African conception has three requirements that need to 
be met in order for a human being to qualify as a person (non-human animals cannot be 
persons). Firstly, human beings (or “organisms”) become persons through “a process of social 
and ritual transformation” (Menkiti 1984: 172). Secondly, as this process takes time, a human 
can only be a person once they have reached a certain level of maturity, specifically in terms 
of one’s moral functions (i.e. moral and rational thinking). One must also be able to meet the 
obligations that relate to one’s station (ibid. 176). The first requirement hints at the social or 
communal nature of personhood in this understanding, yet both requirements still resonate with 
aspects of the Western conceptions of personhood. The real difference comes in with the 
importance given to community. This radical difference comes to the fore in Menkiti’s third 
requirement: “rudimentary psychological characteristics” (ibid. 172) are not enough to ascribe 
                                                 
18 Note that Menkiti is not necessarily arguing for this specific understanding of personhood, but rather discussing 
the traditional African understanding of personhood (or what he sees as the traditional view). Menkiti is used as 
an example here as there are parallels between his view and that of Schechtman, although she does ascribe 




personhood. The human being must apply their moral capabilities in service of the community 
by participating in its activities, and following its moral and social rules: “Without 
incorporation into this or that community individuals are considered to be mere danglers to 
whom the description “person” does not fully apply” (ibid.).  
The traditional view excludes children from personhood, but adults can also be excluded if the 
latter requirement is not met. The distinction between non-persons and persons is “not just a 
distinction of language but a distinction laden with ontological significance” (ibid. 174). Given 
the psychological dimensions of personhood, which see persons not only as moral beings but 
as beings deserving of moral treatment, this sharp distinction can have dangerous 
consequences. The fact that the individual’s personhood is wholly dependent on the community 
and on whether the rules of the community are followed poses another problem, one which 
faces all theories that privilege the community over the individual: the problem of internal 
minorities. If an aspect of one’s personal identity, personality, or being goes against the norms 
of the community you find yourself in, this can lead to ostracism and even forms of oppression. 
Historically, this has led to the persecution of minority groups. To relate this back to 
xenophobia: if ascription of personhood depends on one’s following the moral and cultural 
mores of the community, culturally alien members will not be persons unless they are fully 
assimilated (i.e. give up their own cultural identities). 
The communitarian view need not be as radical. Kwame Gyekye (1997), for example, criticises 
Menkiti’s and similar interpretation of traditional African personhood, as such conceptions do 
not allow for individual freedoms: 
 In the light of the autonomous (or near-autonomous) character of its activities, the 
communitarian self cannot be held as a cramped or shackled self, responding 
robotically to the ways and demands of the communal structure. That structure is 
never to be conceived as reducing a person to intellectual or rational inactivity, 
servility, and docility. Even though the communitarian self is not detached from its 
communal features and the individual is fully embedded or implicated in the life of 
her community, the self nevertheless, by virtue of […] its “mental features” can 
from time to time take a distanced view of its communal values and practices and 




The value of the more communitarian view is that it indicates the importance that other people 
play in our identity formation, as well as alerting us to the dangers of a loss of community (i.e. 
the dangers of ostracism or exclusion). Even the more individualist views cannot deny that we 
are embedded in communities and that, especially politically speaking, this has a profound 
impact on our lives and our sense of self. As Schechtman’s understanding of personhood and 
identity developed, she moved more towards the kind of communitarian views found in African 
philosophical traditions; Beck and Oyowe (2018) have argued that her theory resonates with 
such views, especially Menkiti’s (although Schechtman applies personhood more broadly).  
Schechtman (2014: 110) defines personhood as living a “person life”, which she connects to 
having a personal identity: “Persons are individuated by individuating personal lives; and the 
duration of a single person is determined by the duration of a single person life” (ibid). To live 
a person life does not require the kind of developed psychological capacities found in, for 
example, Locke. A person life, briefly put, is the kind of life lived by a human being who is 
embedded in a culture: “Our paradigmatic examples of persons are typical enculturated 
humans” (ibid. 111) whose person lives start with “social dependence” and “relatively basic 
cognitive capacities and activities” (ibid. 112). As the person matures, they become “sentient, 
reflectively self-consciousness, a self-narrator in the sense described by the Narrative Self-
Constitution View, and a rational and moral agent” (ibid.). This psychological development is 
only one aspect of personhood. The other aspect or requirement is “an array of complex and 
sophisticated interactions with other persons that involve, among other elements, adherence to 
moral, cultural, or personal norms” (ibid.). Such lives also contain relationships with other 
people, such as friendships and community ties. These characteristics of a person life are not 
necessary for a person life – one can lose one (e.g. one’s psychological characteristics due to 
dementia) and still remain a person. Schechtman’s view has its own failings, notably that she 
identifies person-specific practices on the basis of which we supposedly identify others as 
persons, such as interacting in interpersonal ways. Yet, as Beck and Oyowe (2018: 195) point 
out, we interact with non-human animals in such ways (and they interact with us), but 
Schechtman would not extend personhood to animals. 
Where does this leave us? The philosophical project of distinguishing humans from animals, 
of finding essential or shared characteristics, of defining personhood (in whichever way), has 
opened the door for exclusions, oppressions, and terrible violence. Yet trying to understand 




not think we should abandon, despite the negative consequences of our answers to these 
questions. The consequences have, after all, not been exclusively negative. It is unlikely that 
we will ever arrive at an essential characteristic of personhood and identity that does not 
exclude some, just as it is unlikely that any conception of personhood can ever be truly neutral. 
However, we do not have to come up with a final answer here. These theories and conceptions 
are helpful tools by which we can interpret and understand our lives and selves, if we see them 
not as ‘the final word’ but as narratives that we tell about ourselves as a species. Remember 
Mark Rowland’s earlier remark, that humans tell all these stories about how or why we are 
different from animals, but that it is the storytelling itself that reveals us to ourselves. Because 
narratives are open-ended, because iterations of the same story can illuminate new things, 
understanding our theories of identity and personhood in this light prevents us from seeing 
them as final answers, but rather as processes or explorations. The benefit of this is that, where 
theories lead to violence and subjugation, there is room for alterations and reinterpretations that 
could have the opposite effect. The important thing to take away from the discussion above is 
that our identities and personhood are not separate from other people, but that they are shaped 
through action and interaction, through accounting and publicising our narratives. And this has 
political consequences. 
1.4 Political narratives 
Where narratives concern our political lives, they also become political. A “political narrative” 
can be defined as any narrative that appears in a political forum, such as a speech in parliament, 
party meetings, or political protests (Shenhav 2006: 247). Propagandistic speeches by 
politicians are a clear example of this, as politicians tend to give political significance to world 
events in a way that would further their own ends. Narratives emerging from public institutions, 
such as laws, judiciaries, or educational institutions, also have a political nature. Political 
narratives can also be defined by looking at the contents or conclusions of the narratives. If 
political themes, such as justice, power relations, or belonging, are present, the narrative is 
political (ibid.). The aim of all political narratives is to shape our political world in a specific 
way – that is, either to justify or condemn the laws, norms, institutions and practices that 
regulate how we live together in society. 
Individual or private narratives, while not emerging from public institutions or political 
campaigns, can also be and often are political, albeit not deliberately so. Our identities are not 




are deeply impacted by our place in the public or political realm (a distinction – private versus 
political – we can question).  Stephanie Taylor (2010: 3) writes: 
Identity is about the interface between what might variously be characterized as the 
macro and the micro, the exterior and interior, the peopled social world and the 
individual person within it, as well as other people’s views of ‘who I am’ and how 
I see myself. 
Our individual sense of self, and our self-esteem, are influenced by how others view us, and by 
what public and political institutions tell us about ourselves. Nationalists are not only 
nationalists outside the home; white supremacists do not stop believing in their supremacy once 
they come home in the afternoon. On the contrary, violence in the home is often a precursor 
for violence in public. One can think of mass shooters/domestic terrorists in the USA, many of 
whom had complaints of domestic violence on their records. We saw, in the previous chapter, 
the role the notion of home plays in politics. Our ideas on race, gender, sexuality, etc., – all 
politically relevant – inform our understanding and treatment of others (and ourselves). A story 
told in the comfort of one’s own home, the ‘private’ sphere, can have political undertones and 
political implications.  
This is not to say that all narratives are political, but to indicate that narratives we may think of 
as non-political can contain political elements. It is important to keep this in mind – to 
remember that the home, just as much as the taxi rank, school, or parliament, can be the 
birthplace of xenophobic attitudes. However, when speaking of ‘political narratives’ in this 
study, I refer mainly to stories told, laws written, or statements made to a public audience. 
Xenophobic attitudes in the home are dangerous because they can leave the home, and once 
xenophobic attitudes enter the outside world, they contribute to the construction of a 
xenophobic life-world. 
We should also distinguish between our identities and individuals, and political identities. The 
latter refers to group-identities. There is, obviously, interplay between these two kinds of 
identity – one’s personal identity will in some ways be shaped by the group(s) one belongs to, 
and the identity and culture of such group(s). Maureen Whitebrook (2014: 4) argues that even 
individual narrative identities contain aspects relevant to the political: “The construction of 
narrative identity is a collective act, involving tellers and listeners.” Indeed, the very idea of 




…inasmuch as identity means something like ‘what the self shows the world’ or 
‘what of the self is shown to the world’, together with ‘what of the self is recognized 
by the world’, the construction of identity – narrating identity – entails placing 
oneself in the public sphere, and thus a capacity for taking on a political role. The 
political aspect of identity rests on an understanding of the self as social, ‘situated’, 
and narratives of identity as embedded in other stories, including the wider stories 
of social and cultural settings. (ibid.) 
This is reminiscent of Arendt’s understanding of human beings as fundamentally political and 
acting beings (Chapter 3). Being seen and recognised by others, and having one’s identity 
affirmed, is necessary. The kind of civic ostracism that results from xenophobia (Chapter 1) is 
morally harmful in part because it prevents this from happening – because such ostracism 
prevents targeted individuals and groups from “meaningful possibilities of…identity, and 
relationship formation” and of a sense of “the cultural legitimacy of historically non-normative 
identities and cultural practices” (Kim & Sundstrom 2014: 24-25). 
Political narratives, in the context of group identity, can be the myths and history of the nation, 
the laws and interpretation of laws pertaining to membership, and the directives from leaders 
that tell us how someone belonging to this group should act and be. South African 
exceptionalism, discussed in Chapter 1, is an example of this kind of group-identity forming 
political narrative that clearly contributes to people being xenophobic.  
Before I turn to the question of the kinds of narratives that contribute to xenophobia, and the 
possible directions counternarratives can take to make our identities and accompanying 
thoughts on becoming less xenophobic, it is first necessary to consider the possible criticisms 
against the narrative view of identity, and the idea that such narratives can contribute to the 
creation of an anti-xenophobic or non-xenophobic world. One of these criticisms  (Strawson 
2004) rejects the narrative view, and it is important to consider for two reasons: (i) Strawson’s 
critique shows us how even the narrative view, if strongly formulated, can lead to unjustified 
exclusions where people do not think of their identities in terms of coherent narratives, and (ii) 
my theory is only valid if it can stand up to these criticisms. Ultimately, I argue that it does, 
but that we should take Strawson’s warning of the dangers of too strong a view seriously. 
However, weaker views are sufficient for my purpose, as individuals and groups need not be 




prejudices about foreigners, or in their justifications of xenophobia, for such narratives to be 
harmful. 
The last two points of criticism are concerned with the limits of the narrative view, but do not 
seek to discount the view. Granted that our understanding of ourselves, others, and the world 
around us is shaped by the narratives we tell about those things, two questions remain: firstly, 
can stories really be catalysts for societal change? And secondly, how do we deal with the 
problem of false narratives? Both questions should be answered if, as I suggest in this chapter, 
the problem of xenophobia can be addressed by rethinking and retelling our identity-forming 
narratives. These latter two points of criticism therefore provide the direction for the last 
chapter in this study, where I will consider how narratives can bring about institutional change, 
what kinds of false narratives contribute to xenophobia and how we can counter them, and how 
approaches like narrative play can contribute to relationship formation.  
2. Criticisms of the narrative theory of identity 
2.1 Strawson’s critique 
Support for and belief in the idea of identity as narrative is widespread. In recent years, the 
‘power’ of storytelling has been lauded in academic research and popular culture. The latter 
may in part be attributed to novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s 2009 TEDtalk, ‘The dangers 
of a single story’, which has been viewed 4.5 million times on TED’s YouTube channel. The 
link between storytelling, or narrative, and identity has been around for much longer in 
academic disciplines, and it is possibly the most popular view of identity at this stage. Yet there 
are some who are deeply critical of this view, such as Galen Strawson (2004, 2015).  
Strawson argues that the view that identity is, or even should be, narrative, is flawed and not 
universally applicable. He identifies two broad theses on narrative identity found in literature 
on the topic: (1) the psychological Narrativity thesis, and (2) the ethical Narrativity thesis 
(Strawson 2004: 428).19 The psychological Narrativity thesis is descriptive and empirical, 
claiming (broadly) that it is in our nature to see our lives and understand ourselves as part of a 
narrative. The ethical Narrativity thesis is, as the name suggests, normative: we should 
understand our lives and selves in this way – it is the only way to live well and to attain full 
                                                 
19 Strawson capitalises ‘Narrative’ to denote a psychological property/outlook, as opposed to a narrative (which 




personhood. Strong narratives view would fall under this category. Strawson disagrees with 
both theses. 
To make his argument, he draws several distinctions: 
i. The experience of oneself as “a human being taken as a whole” versus one’s experience 
of the self as an inner mental entity (ibid. 429) 
ii. Diachronic and Episodic self-experience 
iii. Narrative and non-Narrative selves 
First, regarding one’s experience of oneself: on the one hand, I understand myself to be the 
same person who was born to my parents, who had specific experiences and achievements in 
the past. I understand my present self to be the same as the past self, in the sense that I am the 
same human, “taken as a whole”. Others also consider me to be the same. This experience of 
oneself should be familiar, unless one has no memories.20 This seems obvious. One’s self-
experience is something entirely different. You may be fully aware that present-you is the same 
human as past-you, without ‘internally’ thinking of or recognising past-you as being the same 
self as present-you. This seems less clear to me. How I think of myself has changed, in some 
ways radically, from the ways in which I thought of myself as a young child. While I can 
recognise the memories as belonging to me, or as being memories of my life, I may feel 
distanced from the self in those memories. This seems to be what Strawson means with self-
experience. Yet, taking myself as an example (as Strawson takes himself as an example), it is 
not clear that these two selves, along with the future-self, is as disconnected as Strawson 
implies. I may not be exactly the same person I was at age six, yet there is enough overlap in 
what I remember of my inner life for that self to be recognisably me. And I imagine that even 
if there had been more radical internal changes in my self-conception, leading to my past self 
seeming like a stranger, I would not necessarily no longer think of that self as myself.  However, 
Strawson would simply point out that we have different kinds of self-experiences, as he sets 
out in his distinction between Diachronic and Episodic self-experience. 
                                                 
20 In which case, others may still see you as the same person (e.g. in the case of an old person with Alzheimer’s). 
Strawson does not really go into others’ view of our identities – it is not relevant to his argument, which focuses 
on individual identity and the self’s understanding of itself. However, it is relevant to my discussion of group- and 




Strawson is not interested in our holistic understanding of ourselves as humans, but in our inner 
experience of selfhood. This experience can take one of two forms, Diachronic (which he 
would argue fits my self-experience) and Episodic (which is how he experiences selfhood). 
‘Diachronic’ refers to a concern with the way something evolves over time, whereas ‘Episodic’ 
refers to the experience of things in intervals or as separate events (ibid. 430). Diachronics are 
more likely than Episodics to experience life in Narrative terms although the connection is not 
necessary – Strawson argues that one can be Diachronic and non-Narrative. A single individual 
may also change position in the “Episodic/Diachronic/Narrative/non-Narrative state-space”, 
depending on what they are doing, concerned with, their age, or their state of health (ibid. 431).  
The distinction between Diachronics and Episodics not only describes different kinds of self-
experience. Where one lies will also have a significant effect on one’s ethical and emotional 
life/positions. Strawson’s two forms of life-experience point toward deep psychological 
differences between people, which may easily lead the one group to believe that their 
experiences are better/more authentic/more in touch with the human condition than the other’s. 
It becomes a new form of discrimination – the questioning of another’s sense of self, and 
legitimacy of their experience, because of the difference. And, as with all distinctions and 
differences that bring about feelings of superiority and accusations of inferiority, there is a real 
danger here. If the dominant view is that the self is experienced Narratively, and furthermore 
that it should be experienced Narratively, those who do not feel their self-experience fits this 
model may feel alienated from the possibility of accessing a good life. Strawson is, to my mind, 
correct in criticising strong Narrative views that claim that sentient creatures become persons 
only when they live narratively, or consciously construct and tell stories of their lives. Strawson 
does not see himself as fitting this description, and therefore he would not qualify as a person. 
Nor would, presumably, people living with dementia or Alzheimer’s, or people who are for 
whatever reason unable to narrate their lives. I already indicated that this is a position I cannot 
support, precisely because of the profound impact of a narrow understanding of ‘personhood’ 
on how we treat and mistreat others. 
It is important to note that the Episodic person does not live from arbitrary moment to arbitrary 
moment, forgetful of the past and careless about the future. The way in which they connect to 
their past- and future-selves just differs. For the Diachronic, that self is essentially the same. 
For the Episodic, that self is recognisable, but not the same. Yet this does not mean that the 




in so far as it helped to shape the way one is in the present” (ibid. 432). Episodics know that 
they have a past. They have factual knowledge of this past and have memories ‘from the inside’. 
Yet, for Strawson, even recognising these memories as somehow his own does not yet mean 
that he makes a narrative connection between that self and this self, nor that he has a special 
interest in his past or future self (ibid. 433). 
But it is not only a matter of not being interested in one’s past or future: 
…it seems clear to me, when I am experiencing or apprehending myself as a self, 
that the remoter past or future in question is not my past or future, although it is 
certainly the past or future of GS the human being […] I have no significant sense 
that I – the I now considering this question – was there in the further past. And it 
seems clear to me that this is not a failure of feeling. It is, rather, a registration of a 
fact about what I am – about what the thing that is currently considering this 
problem is. (ibid.) 
If this is how Strawson experiences life and himself, I cannot argue otherwise. He is making 
no claims to universal experience, precisely the opposite. That people experience their selves 
in these differing ways is very probable.  
While Diachronics tend to be Narrative, and Episodics tend to be non-Narrative, this is not 
necessarily so: “one can be Diachronic, naturally experiencing oneself(*) as something existing 
in the past and future without any particular sense of one’s life as constituting a narrative” (ibid. 
439). An Episodic, as has been mentioned, has memories of the past and may connect them to 
the present to tell a story and an Episodic can also think of themselves as having a specific kind 
of personality (i.e. their sense of who they are is not entirely fragmented). To understand 
Strawson’s distinction between Narrative and non-Narrative, it is therefore not enough to look 
at his previous distinction. We must also consider his definition of ‘narrative’: 
I take the term to attribute – at the very least – a certain sort of developmental and 
hence temporal unity or coherence to the things to which it is standardly applied – 
lives, parts of lives, pieces of writing. So it doesn’t apply to random or radically 
unconnected sequences of events […] or to purely picaresque or randomly ‘cut-up’ 




Strawson recognises that this definition is not enough – that the link between developmental 
unity and a narrative life is still unclear. We may look at the life of an animal and see 
developmental unity, we may even narrate the life of that animal (e.g. one’s pet dog), without 
that life being a narrative or of the dog having a narrative identity (in a self-experienced way). 
Therefore, says Strawson, those who defend the Narrative theses require that a life be lived 
Narratively, in order for it to be a narrative: “One could put this roughly by saying that lower-
case or ‘objective’ narrativity requires upper-case or ‘subjective’ Narrativity” (ibid. 440). 
‘Subjective’ Narrativity is more than understanding one’s life as a unity – it requires a 
construction or form-finding tendency. It is not merely giving a sequential account of one’s 
life, but actively construing one’s life. Finding form in one’s life, which may seem filled with 
arbitrary events, is an act of pattern-seeking. An example would be people looking for ‘signs’ 
or omens, either to explain something that happened, or to determine a future course of action 
or predict the future. A second distinctive tendency of Narrativity is story-telling in the sense 
of taking facts and placing them in a connected account. This may also include a revision of 
the facts to satisfy our pride or to suite our needs, or due to our cognitive biases. I return to this 
problem in Section 2.3. 
Strawson does not argue against Narrativity or narrative as a whole. He accepts that there are 
people who experience, and want to experience, life in this way. He is, however, arguing 
against the two aforementioned theses: that everyone experiences life in this way (the 
psychological thesis) and that everyone should experience life in this way (the ethical thesis). 
The first, for him, is factually incorrect, whereas the second is harmful to those who do not, 
indeed cannot (if our way of experiencing self depends on our genes) live a Narrative life 
without being untrue to themselves. The Narrative life holds a further danger for him: 
It’s well known that telling and retelling one’s past leads to changes, smoothings, 
enhancements, shifts away from the facts, and recent research has shown that this 
is not just a human psychological foible. It turns out to be an inevitable 
consequence of the mechanics of the neurophysiological process of laying down 
memories that every studied conscious recall of past events brings an alteration. 
The implication is plain: the more you recall, retell, narrate yourself, the further 
you risk moving away from accurate self-understanding, from the truth of your 




This may be true, yet for me it does not deal a death blow to the notion of narrativity or narrative 
identity. Of course we would, in telling stories about ourselves, remember some things 
incorrectly. We forget important things and focus on the trivial; we get dates, names, 
participants wrong; our view of things is coloured, even skewed, by our own insecurities, 
doubts, pride. And as time passes, as we become more familiar with a story, that story may 
change. Perhaps it changes in response to others’ responding to it (where they laugh, what 
seems to shock them). Strawson says that narratives need not be revisionist, yet here it seems 
that they are. Does this make our narratives less authentic? Perhaps. Does it take us further 
away from our ‘true’ selves? That is more questionable. We can and do speak of people lying 
to themselves, of people being delusional, in perfectly sensible ways. But it is not clear to me 
that “accurate self-understanding” is in any way possible. It may be an ideal we strive toward, 
but I think narratives can bring us closer to, as well as prevent us from reaching, self-
understanding. This depends on the narrative and how it is told. Moreover, we do not live in 
isolation (ideally). We have friends and family and people we share our lives with, who hear 
our stories and act as fact-checkers and sounding boards. Self-understanding does not come 
purely from internal ‘work’ we do ourselves. 
My main issue with Strawson’s argument, however, is the fact that he is making it, and how he 
does this. I do not disagree with him on the point that people have different kinds of self-
experience, or that people may be more or less ‘Narrative’. It is the claim of people being 
entirely non-Narrative which I doubt. Strawson’s argument stands against strong narrative 
views, but not against weak narrative views. It seems to me that Strawson is denying that he, 
and other people like him, construct any kind of narrative regarding the self or its identity. Yet 
here he is, in an academic paper, in a blog post, in a book chapter, telling us about himself. Not 
a simple relay of facts about his life, but a coherent analysis of his self-experience, from which 
he draws certain conclusions and insights about his identity. And this is not only his present 
self – these thoughts and arguments are made over a decade. Of course, present-Strawson 
knows about past-Strawson, and it may be possible that both could have the same thoughts and 
self-experience and irritation with the dominant view, yet not be the same selves. Perhaps 
because he uses himself as an example, his argument reads like a kind of narrative. 
My difference with Strawson could simply be explained by a difference in understanding of 
what ‘narrative’ entails – a conceptual difference. I find little fault with Strawson’s definitions 




in the context of identity, I mean the answer to the question ‘Who are you?’. How you answer 
that question – coherently, fragmented, vaguely, in detail, interpretive dance – does not really 
matter. The fact is, most people can answer that question, and therefore have a sense of self or 
identity (those who cannot – babies or people living with dementia, for example – do not have 
an idea of their individual identity yet or have forgotten it; this need not mean that they are no 
longer ‘persons’). The ‘you’ can be an individual, a group, a nation, and the answer will give 
me a sense of his/her/their/its identity and self-image. The question can also be framed in an 
almost infinite number of ways: Are you a person who loves reading? Do you play rugby? 
Does the idea of narrative identity make sense to you? Are you the kind of person who would 
go bungee jumping? Each answer giving the questioner, and perhaps yourself, insight into your 
identity.  
Strawson expects this criticism, that he is also Narrative, even if unconsciously or 
subconsciously so. His responds, simply: “I think it’s just not so, and I take it that the 
disagreement is not just terminological” (ibid. 448). It seems that, even under the above 
understanding of narrative definition, I would not be able to convince Strawson otherwise. I 
acknowledge that, under the strong conceptions of the Narrativity theses he refers to, he is non-
Narrative; Episodics are mostly non-Narrative. My definition is weaker – it makes no claims 
to personhood, to a life lived Narratively, or even to coherence. It simply says: when confronted 
with the question of our identity, we answer by telling some kind of story. And this, for me, 
Strawson seems to do. To say that one experiences one’s self in one way and not another, to 
give examples of such experience, even to just say how one experiences oneself right now in 
the present moment, is to tell a narrative about one’s identity. Perhaps I should say, in 
Strawson’s spirit, “I think it is just so.” 
Schechtman (2012) responds to Strawson’s criticism of the narrative view, which includes a 
criticism of her work, by developing and clarifying her narrative self-constitution view. One 
possible response to Strawson she considers is to simply say that he misunderstands ‘narrative’ 
(which is my feeling). How Strawson describes his experiences – that he experiences some 
special relation with other parts of the human Strawson’s life, and that they constitute a life as 
a whole, even if they seem like different selves – seem similar to her view. Another possible 
response would be to focus on the duration of the narrative, instead of the strength of the 
narrative. Strawson’s distinction between human being and self, like the psychological view’s 




view fails because he assumes that the duration of a narrative should be equal to the duration 
of a human life, yet Schechtman shows why this is not necessary: 
Since the narrative self-constitution is devised as a means of expressing the 
intuitions behind the psychological approach to identity, however it does not and 
should not insist that the duration of an identity-constituting self-narrative must be 
the same as the duration of a human life. Persons, after all, are distinguished form 
human beings on this view […] The fact that Strawson does not view his entire 
human life as a narrative thus does not serve as an objection to the narrative view 
if each self* is constituted by a narrative internal to it. (ibid. 168) 
Both responses seem legitimate to Schechtman, yet she is aware of the possible contradiction. 
The first sees the narrative life as more or less corresponding to the human life, as different 
‘episodes’ are recognised as belonging to the same whole, even when there is not a deep 
connection to all the different selves or phases. The second view sees the narrative life, or rather 
lives, as necessarily having shorter duration than one’s human life, but it requires a strong 
identification with the different narrative selves. This tension points toward two different 
questions of identity answered with two slightly different narrative theories, where Schechtman 
had previously only seen the need for a single theory. Strawson’s criticisms had revealed this 
tension to her. When asking questions of personal identity we should, argues Schechtman, 
distinguish between ‘persons’ and ‘selves’. When we speak of persons, we are mixing two 
different (but not unrelated) things: a notion of the self like that proposed by Strawson (a self-
experiencing ‘I’), and a more practical understanding of personhood connected to social 
contexts: 
[A] person is conceived as the bearer of certain complex social capacities that carry 
important practical implications. A person is a moral agent who can be held 
responsible for her actions, a reasoning creature who can be held to be irrational 
when she acts against her interests, and a creature capable of a range of complex 
relationships with other persons. (ibid. 169)  
Whereas Schechtman’s earlier view saw the self and the person as co-extensive (and both 
correspond to the length of our individual lives), she now holds that they need not be. This is 
not to say that they are unconnected – for a complete understanding of one’s identity, both need 




narrative accounts of persons, “and the question of how strong a narrative is required or how 
long it must endure will depend, at least to some extent, on which is receiving emphasis” (ibid.). 
The latter account is weaker than the former. Personhood enables us to interact with others in 
specific ways (as quoted above), and this simply requires of us to recognise ourselves as 
continuing beings whose past actions have implications for our present rights and 
responsibilities, and that this past and present has an impact on our future (ibid. 170). However, 
one need not associate very strongly with it, or see the past self as somehow fundamental to 
the present. Our personhood is also closely connected to our bodies, as personhood is what 
enables us to interact with others, and others tend to recognise or reidentify us by recognising 
our bodies. This narrative account is relatively weak, in terms of the kind of association it 
expects between persons and their narratives. This is also primarily the account that I am 
interested in, the reasons for which I will give below.  
The narrative account of selves is a stronger account, and it differs from the previous account 
in its temporality. The duration of the self need not correspond to the duration of the person, 
body, or human. This aspect of Schechtman’s new theory corresponds to her earlier self-
constitution view, barring the realisation of the temporal difference, and therefore I won’t go 
into more depth.  
Strawson’s view of himself therefore fits the weaker narrative account of persons. This view 
does not expect the kind of sweeping, constructed narrative Strawson criticises, but it is also 
more than a trivial sequence of events. It is simply “an explanatory account of how actions and 
events lead to other actions and events, how we come to be in the position we are in and where 
that position is likely to lead us” (ibid. 171). This echoes my response to Strawson – that in 
writing about how he is not narrative, he is providing us with precisely this kind of account. 
And this weak narrative account is sufficient for my purposes in this study for two reasons. 
Firstly, as Schechtman (ibid. 172) points out, we need to be able to tell this kind of story about 
our lives for us to participate in “distinctive activities and interactions” with other people. 
Having a narrative in this weak sense (which I think of as being able to answer the question 
‘Who are you?’) is necessary for social and political interaction.  
And this brings me to my second reason: we are concerned here not only with personal 
narratives, but also and primarily the political narratives that shape our political identities. This 




also includes our group identities such as our national identity. And this kind of identity is not 
simply personal identity on a grand scale. As Derek Parfit (1971: 3) points out, we ask questions 
about personal identity that we do not ask about national identity, or our criteria for the latter 
is different from that of the former. We do not worry about ‘identity over time’ concerning our 
group identities, as we do concerning our personal identities. While personal identities engage 
with group identities, and it is therefore necessary to have some understanding of how they 
function, solving the conflict between those who argue for and against a narrative conception 
of the self is not necessary to make the weaker, and descriptive rather than normative, point 
that we do tell stories about ourselves, individually and collectively, and these stories shape 
how we and others see ourselves, as well as determine the shape of our interactions 
(interpersonal and intergroup).  
The power of the narrative theory of identity lies precisely in its flexibility, which allows for it 
to account for both personal and group identities. This is due to the open-ended nature of 
narratives. Schechtman may speak of narrative self-constitution, but this ‘constitution’ is never 
finished (not even at our death, as our loved ones continue to remember us and contribute to 
the narratives of our lives). To think of identity as narrative is to see identity-formation as “an 
ongoing process of narrative self-interpretation that brings coherence and psychological 
intelligibility to the fragmentary nature of lived experience” (MacKenzie & Poltera 2010: 32). 
Whitebrook (2014: 5) writes that understanding identity as constructed by narratives does not 
ensure the kind of unity Strawson thinks narrative theories are aiming at: 
[N]arrative may exhibit a lack of pattern, an absence of closure. Such instability 
may appear politically threatening, or even dangerous; but attention to narrative 
also shows how instability – disorder – can be a characteristic of coherent stories. 
The narrative process itself – narrative telling – is significant here. Narrative 
understood by way of process – form, narrative structure, style and techniques – 
suggests that coherence is in the telling. Uncertainty, fragmentation and disunity 
can be contained in the narrative by way of content and form, what is told and the 
telling of it. (ibid. 5-6) 
Narratives allow us to order the chaos around us without it becoming a totalitarian project of 
absolute order and control – narratives expect spontaneous action on the part of its ‘characters’, 
it delights in unexpected twists and surprises. Politically, thinking of identities as narratives 




(which see identities as natural or predetermined in some way). The nature of narratives or 
storytelling also allows for emotional connection, for us to see the other as similar to ourselves, 
or to imaginatively share in their struggles and joys and so establish commonalities, upon which 
relationships can be built. 
2.2 The limits of story-telling 
Storytelling is not a panacea, and it is crucial that we realise this even as we celebrate the ways 
in which it can bring about change. The problem with storytelling is that it generally happens 
on an individual level – two strangers, perhaps, sitting opposite one another and sharing their 
life stories. This is not nothing, but it will not bring about world peace. Stories can be more 
widely shared – through film, television, the media, literature – yet even as we binge watch the 
same shows on Netflix, this experience remains largely individual. Listening to another 
person’s story is a step in the right direction, but it is also just that: the first step. The power of 
storytelling – to connect us to others on an emotional level – is also its limitation. For while 
xenophobia and other forms of discrimination are fuelled by emotions, they are kept in place 
by institutions. Hearing a refugee’s story may bring about a change of heart in me, but if I do 
not act on that change of heart in the public sphere, nothing will change. 
This limitation is something that popular South African writer and storyteller Sisonke Msimang 
chose to address when she was asked to do a TEDTalk in 2016, which she titled ‘If a story 
moves you, act on it’. This talk is significant, as it is a response to Adichie’s viral talk referred 
to earlier. Where Adichie lauded the power of storytelling and exposed the ‘dangers of a single 
story’, which reinvigorated the idea that storytelling is the best tool with which to fight 
discrimination, Msimang, while appreciative of Adichie, wants to draw our attention to the 
limitations of storytelling. It is also significant as Msimang herself does recognise the potential 
power of stories. She is the head of Storytelling and Training at the Perth-based Centre for 
Stories, an organisation that uses storytelling “to inspire social cohesion and improve 
understanding of diverse communities” by cultivating stories “that inspire thought, spark 
empathy and challenge intolerance”, with a specific focus on the stories of marginalised people 
– “refugees, migrants, people of colour, sexual minorities, the elderly, and people with 
disabilities” (Centre for Stories n.d.).  
Msimang (2016) provides us with four reasons to be sceptical of stories’ ability to make the 




stories to form emotional connections, to help us empathise, which is also its limitation in this 
sense. In a world that prescribes stories like a doctor would prescribe medicine, we may feel 
that either telling a story, or especially listening to a story, is enough. That is all we have to do 
– we have to create opportunities and spaces in which those whose stories generally go untold, 
can tell their stories. And those in privileged positions should sit and listen and be moved 
emotionally. Listening to inspiring stories give us a sense of solidarity, a “feel-good factor” 
that may make us feel like we did the work in the story (we climbed Everest to raise money for 
charity, or we opened our homes to refugees). Except, of course, we did not: “You haven’t 
done anything. Listening is an important but insufficient step towards social action.” The sense 
of solidarity, the connection, remains trivial and unsustainable unless it spurs us into action. 
This is not to say that listening cannot be hard and listening to stories that make us 
uncomfortable are challenging. It is just not enough. 
Msimang’s second point has serious implications for the claim that stories can counteract bias 
(a claim which she does endorse). The capacity of stories to bring about change is limited by 
the fact that we tend to prefer stories with likeable characters, and we ignore or dismiss stories 
about or from people we do not like. Where a person holds a very strong xenophobic (or racist, 
or sexist, etc.) biases, it is considerably more difficult to get them to listen to the story, or to 
have them make the kinds of emotional associations necessary to make storytelling a success. 
We see this perhaps most clearly in responses to survivors of rape and sexual assault who share 
their stories.  
Msimang’s point raises a further question: if strong biases or prejudices prevent us from being 
able to really hear certain stories, how do we fight the bias or prejudice? To say that we will 
do so by telling stories is circular. It is unclear that it is possible at all without institutionalising 
intolerance of discriminatory attitudes (e.g. by incentivising tolerant attitudes and punishing 
intolerant ones). Here we link with Msimang’s third point: that stories remain personal, while 
we should be focussing on ‘the bigger picture’. The celebration of storytelling has also led to 
us starting to value what we feel, in response to stories, more than what we know (facts). This 
means that, even where stories reach us emotionally, we tend not to connect the content of a 
specific story to larger, societal causes: “we applaud someone when they tell us about their 
feelings of shame, but we don’t necessarily link that to oppression. We nod understandingly 
when someone says they felt small, but we don’t link that to discrimination” (ibid.). At this 




of hers. There is a disconnect, a distance between storyteller and listener, which remains even 
when we establish a link of solidarity and empathy. Our emotional reaction to a story can lead 
us to forgetting that this distance is there, that even as I have a kind of fellow-feeling, I do not 
fully know what the storyteller experiences or feels. Thus I can relate to her because I know 
what shame feels like, but because the causes of our shame may differ, I assume that I see the 
full picture when I don’t.  
Msimang’s point is that because stories individualise people, we forget how those individuals 
fit into society. The positive side of this individualisation is that individualising strangers/others 
can help work against stereotypes, which relies on generalities (‘All X people are Y’). The 
negative side is that we tend to remove these individual stories from the contexts in which they 
take place – we see stories of suffering as having individual causes, instead of societal. So a 
xenophobic attack is committed by a person with hatred in his heart; evil deeds are done by 
evil people. We too easily see such people as aberrations, and not as people enabled by a society 
to do what they do, indeed as products of their societies. So we may celebrate or condemn 
individuals through stories, without ever bringing about structural or societal change.   
For Msimang, storytelling and listening should be intellectual work (the listener should be 
critical, ask questions), and should be followed by action in the world. She says, “it is justice 
that makes the world a better place, not stories” (ibid.). We see storytelling as so fundamental 
to human existence that we almost see it as “so natural an activity that it requires no attention 
to technique” (Whitebrook 2014: 4). To see narratives and stories as intellectual work is to pay 
attention to the kinds of stories, how we tell them, and what they require of us in terms of 
actions. What stories can do, if we take them seriously and think critically about their 
implications (i.e. ask what the story says about society) is alert us to instances of injustice that 
we may not have been aware of, or provide us with the necessary emotions (e.g. anger in 
reaction to a story about a person’s experience of injustice) that will compel us to act to 
establish a more just society. Msimang’s goal is not to dismiss storytelling, but rather to put it 
in its place: a starting point. From there, those listening to the story have to do something. To 
relate this back to xenophobia: the stories we tell and the stories we listen to have to translate, 
somehow, into societal and institutional change that would ensure the protection of foreigners. 
In Chapter 5, I develop this idea, specifically to the institutions of citizenship and borders and 




2.3 False Narratives 
A final criticism that poses a real problem to narrative identity has to do with false narratives. 
What is to stop someone from narratively constructing an identity for themselves, an identity 
that they project into the world, that is completely false? Conmen and spies do this regularly, 
even if they assume each identity only for brief periods of time. They do not believe in those 
identities, but we can imagine someone telling a false narrative about themselves and believing 
it (we all have blind spots). Narratives also necessarily leave some things out – we cannot tell 
our life-stories in excruciating detail, due to time constraints and the fickleness of memory. 
This can also potentially be a problem – a person can tell a tragic story about their parents being 
murdered, leaving them orphaned, and leave out the fact that they murdered their parents. This 
omission is significant, as knowing that part of the story will greatly change one’s judgment of 
their character. False narratives are especially dangerous in the political sphere, where 
politicians often use lies for their own political gains or to achieve their own ends. Many of the 
kinds of narratives told about immigrants have little or no correspondence to reality, yet people 
readily believe them. Through such narratives, and immigrant identity is constructed by the 
local population (often through the media, or by politicians). I will discuss such narratives in 
more depth in Chapter 5. The consequences of such false narratives we see around us: 
widespread xenophobic violence and discrimination, even the death of individuals presumed 
to be foreign.  
There is a distinction here between narratives that are deliberately false, i.e. that intend to lie, 
and narratives that are unconsciously so, as where a person is delusional or where they have 
incorrect information. However, the effects of both kinds of false narrative are the same, in the 
sense that both, for example, lead to xenophobic attitudes. Speaking of false narratives assumes 
some kind of ‘true’ narrative, the truth of which can be difficult to establish (especially given 
the subjective nature of personal narratives). When I speak of false narratives, I specifically 
refer to narratives that contradict that which can be known or independently established, or that 
contradicts what we already know about the world and human life. So we have reason to be 
sceptical of a person claiming to be the reincarnation of Napoleon, and we can outright reject 
the identities of people claiming to be us (i.e. if someone is impersonating you or stole your 
identity). We can also distinguish between understanding why someone may think that they 
are, in fact, a dog, and agreeing to or confirming that identity (thinking of them as if they were 




political facts, and as I already mention in such cases we are concerned with brute facts – who 
invaded who, who enslaved who. Where such facts are disputed, as for example we see with 
holocaust deniers, we should measure the narratives against historical evidence and, for the 
most part, this will be sufficient in establishing the truth (whether those telling the narratives 
will believe the facts is another problem). Of course, even historical narratives (i.e. things we 
take to be historically true) should be judged especially when new evidence comes to light.  
A possible solution then to the problem of false narratives, specifically pertaining to individual 
identities, would be third-person storytelling – i.e. the people around you counter your false 
narrative, with their memories of the event or of you. Schechtman’s two constraints on 
narrative provide a partial solution here. Narratives and identities arising from them should be 
judged against reality, or what we know thereof, and against the person’s own ability to 
sensibly and coherently answer questions about their identity. This is also what Bruner means 
when he says that narrative is constrained by community and family. What we are able to 
believably say about ourselves is determined, in part, by what others know about us. For 
example, if I decide to change my appearance in such a way that I convince other people that I 
am of a different race (as Rachel Dolezal did), my parents can provide evidence that this is not 
the case, by telling their narratives about me growing up, showing photographs, etc. Third-
person accounts can therefore prevent this problem in some instances but not in all. If I am 
convinced of the ‘facts’ of my life, I may simply refuse to believe third-person accounts. Or I 
may be isolated from people who knew me growing up. For example, I may move to the other 
side of the world, where it will not be easy for new acquaintances to ‘fact check’ my identity 
(although it is much easier than before). Finally, those around me have no clearer view of things 
as they ‘really’ are – they are just as prone to blind spots, prejudice, cognitive bias, and false 
memories as I am. Once again, the potential power of stories is limited by our biases and 
prejudices. 
This brings us to a further problem: often, the issue is precisely the fact that the third-person 
narratives about me, or the group I belong to, are false (and not my own narrative). For people 
also form their own judgements of me, even when taking into account my own self-conception 
I shared with them. So I may think of myself as hardworking and successful, but the person 
listening to my stories of success think of me as narcistic and arrogant. Lindemann (2014: 82) 




the second- and third-person stories that enter my identity can misrepresent me, but 
I will nevertheless be treated according to that misrepresentation […] Sometimes 
these inaccurate portrayals are benign […] but other times they are not. If the 
master narratives depicting my social kind portray me as lazy, dirty, slutty, and 
stupid, people with enough social power to benefit from seeing me that way are apt 
to treat me that way. In fact, the narratives purport to justify treating me that way. 
Additionally, my own consciousness may be infiltrated by those narratives, and 
then I will treat myself that way.  
Countering such misrepresentative narratives is possible – “identity can be rehabilitated by 
counterstories that represent the person in a more accurate and respectworthy light” (ibid.) – 
but it will only work if those who benefit from the current misrepresentational narrative take 
up this new counternarrative. The question is, how to we get people to believe or ‘take up’ 
counternarratives in this way? Or, where people base their narratives on false facts, how do we 
get them to believe the facts? Part of the issue here is that people are attached to specific 
narratives to a variety of reasons, and such attachments are very strong where there are 
emotions involved (such as fear, or love of one’s country) or when it is a question of being in 
power, and the counternarrative questions that power.  
Another issue is our inherent cognitive biases, which are often strengthened by our emotional 
attachment to our narratives or our power. Our beliefs about the world and our prejudices, 
whether conscious or not, in a sense shape what we are able to see. We are biased in all kinds 
of ways, but for this discussion one form of cognitive bias is especially relevant: confirmation 
bias. In short, confirmation bias involves only recognising or believing facts that align with our 
already held beliefs. I may believe that women are more intelligent than men and would take 
an actual intelligent woman as proof of that ‘fact’, while ignoring any evidence for intelligence 
in men. Thomas Gilovich (1991: 84) looks at the strange beliefs people hold (e.g. that 
homeopathic medicine works). He says that, when confronted with a new fact, we ask ourselves 
one of two questions. If the fact is in line with our world-view, we ask ‘Can I believe it?’, 
whereas if the fact conflicts with our world-view we ask, ‘Must I believe it?’. To put it 
differently, if we really want to believe something to be true, we want to know whether we 
have any reason for believing it to be true. We will consider the evidence and grab onto the 
first piece of evidence we find in support of the thing we want to believe. Anyone who has 




person looking in your direction is taken as evidence that they feel the same. Whether this piece 
of evidence, this ‘fact’, is good or not, whether it is a scientific fact or pseudo-science, or 
absolute nonsense, does not matter. We take it as proof that we are correct, and as a justification 
of our belief. 
On the other hand, when we do not want to believe something, we lament “Must I believe 
this?”. This is a crucial distinction. Can is open, ready to be convinced, must is closed, and 
precludes any possibility of belief. Both are equally problematic, as both express a bias, but the 
distinction explains why people seem to pick and choose the evidence they find convincing. If 
you ask, ‘Must I?’, you are already subconsciously answering ‘no’. Instead of looking for 
evidence to support our implicitly held belief, we look for evidence to disprove the undesirable 
belief and, once again, we grab onto the first piece of evidence which will help us disprove it. 
Say, for example, that you believe the narrative that immigrants are illegal and criminal. You 
may know immigrants who lead perfectly lawful lives, but you will disregard them (or make 
an exception, ‘they are like us, not really like other immigrants’). However, the moment you 
open the newspaper and see a headline about an immigrant who got caught for doing something 
illegal, you will rejoice because your belief has been justified. We look for reasons, often just 
a single reason, to doubt claims that do not align with our world-views.  
So far, the only suggestion has been to provide the correct facts, yet we have to accept that 
people will not necessarily be convinced by facts. This is not to say that fact-checking, or telling 
accurate narratives, are unimportant. It is, as I have repeatedly said, crucial that our narratives 
correspond to reality as far as possible. Deliberately false narratives are used for propagandistic 
purposes, and such lies should be exposed. But this is only the first step. We see, every day, 
how people who are confronted by facts refuse to believe them (climate change denialists and 
anti-vaxxers spring to mind). In the next chapter, I will offer strategies of dealing with false 
narratives that misrepresent, and the cognitive biases that prevent us from accepting facts. The 
existence of false narratives, while problematic, does not negate the idea of narrative identity. 
On the contrary, it confirms that our identities and even our actions are shaped by the kinds of 
narratives we choose to tell and choose to listen to.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I provided an overview of the narrative theory of identity. Throughout human 




In this sense, stories also shape our world and our identities. This is the basic idea behind 
narrative theories of identity: that we construct our identities by telling stories about ourselves 
and about others. Stories situate us in the world and in relation to others, and for this reason 
they can also be used as tools with which we include and exclude. Our identities and 
specifically our group identities, therefore, can also be exclusionary or be more inclusive. 
In the first section of this chapter was divided into four subsections. In the first, I defined 
‘narrative’ and ‘story’. Although I argued that the two can be used interchangeably without 
much confusion, I understood narratives to refer to broad themes in our stories that we call 
upon to interpret and give meaning to our world and through which we want to relay 
information about the world. Stories are more episodic, whereas narratives are open-ended – 
they do not necessarily have an end. Importantly, narratives and stories are normative, in the 
sense that we communicate our norms and values and ideals through them. The second 
subsection showed how narratives can be identity-forming, and how a narrative approach to 
identity better explains how our identities are formed and understood than other theories of 
identity. Here I specifically discussed Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view, according 
to which we shape our experiences and organise our lives in terms of a story we tell ourselves 
about our selves. We bind our past, present, and futures into a narrative, whether consciously 
or not. I argued that our sense of self, or our identities, are basically our answers to the question 
‘Who are you?’, and that this question is always answered by a life-story. The narrative view, 
I showed, also has implications for our political narratives, as it is closely linked to our 
conception of personhood and as narratives are necessarily relational – there is a listener and 
an audience. Narratives are shared, and in so doing we also create group or political identities. 
The narratives that we then tell about ourselves as groups are political narratives, and these 
include everything from myths about the nation, written and oral histories, to laws and political 
speeches. Political narratives are normative in that they delineate who we, as a people, are, and 
also how we should act. By implication, our political narratives also determine who we exclude 
and who we include. Therefore such narratives can be xenophobic. 
 The second section of this chapter looked at the criticisms of the narrative theory of identity. 
One prominent criticism, as formulated by Strawson, received the most attention. Strawson’s 
argument against narrative identity was discussed at length, and I offered my response. The 
criticism holds that not all people live narratively or think of their lives in terms of a narrative, 




their past and present selves as the same self. Moreover, the normative aspect of narrative 
identity is harmful, as by implication it means that only lives lived narratively have value. 
While agreeing with Strawson that strong narrative views are harmful in this sense, I argued 
that a weaker narrative view is not, and that his response to the narrative view and explanation 
his own self-experience in fact constitutes a narrative.  
The further two criticisms are not against narrative theory as such, but rather indicate its limits 
or challenges it has to meet. I gave an overview of these two points but will show how these 
challenges can be met in the next chapter. In brief: storytelling is limited in its ability to bring 
about societal change unless it leads to action (Msimang), and the narrative theory of identity 
also allows for false narratives to shape our ideas about ourselves and especially about others. 
Politically speaking, such false narratives can be extremely harmful. I argued that we can find 
a solution to the problem of false narratives in Arendt’s and Schechtman’s work. For both, 
narratives (or history-writing, in Arendt’s case) have to be measured against known facts about 
the world. Many of the false narratives that we tell about others, especially about foreigners, 
can be shown to be false. This I do in the next chapter.  
To understand our identities as narratives is to think of identities as a process, not as 
predetermined or given. Who we are is told and can be retold, our stories interwoven with those 
of others. Thinking of identities – both individual and as groups – as narratives allows for 
interpretation and reinterpretation of the stories of our past, providing us with the means of 
making our identities less exclusionary. Narratives, in their nature, are also open to change and 
twists and turns. Narrating as an activity can allow for spontaneity and be open to what is new, 
which can serve as an antidote to dogmatic and fundamentalist identities and the prejudices 
and exclusions they give rise to. I turn to this possibility in the next chapter. The challenges 
identified by the last two points of criticism provide the framework for Chapter 5, as I have to 
show how telling new or different narratives can have a positive effect on society, which as we 
will see requires change on an institutional level. The problem of false narratives is a serious 
one, as xenophobic narratives are often based on false facts, and half-truths that are often 
deliberately obscured. In the next chapter I will therefore identify the kinds of narratives we 
tell about foreigners and suggest directions that counternarratives can take and strategies for 





Chapter 5: New Narratives 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 4, I identified several limitations to the narrative theory of identity and the ability 
of narratives to bring about societal change, and specifically for our purposes to make society 
less xenophobic. This chapter will respond to two of the challenges identified in more depth: 
the question of countering false narratives, and of the relation between listening to narratives 
and being inspired to act. As was emphasised, we have to realise that the telling and retelling 
of narratives is only the first step, but a very crucial step, towards constructing an alternative 
to the xenophobic life-world. The benefit of recognising our political narratives as narratives 
is that it draws our attention to the constructed nature of narratives. Some narratives can reveal 
truths while others can gloss over truths, or even convey falsehoods. Storytelling is a process 
of picking and choosing from experience, from memory, or from the available material, and 
that there is a deliberateness to how we choose what is included, and what is left out in a story. 
Understanding our identities in this way helps guard against rigidity and the idea that identity 
is something given to us, or something we are born into. Rigid identities are not only dangerous 
for those not of the identity, but ultimately unsustainable even for those who adopt the identity.  
A narrative approach to identity, on the other hand, sees identity as something created, brought 
into being, an identity that is still on its way, which progresses as one’s story progresses. 
Sharing our narratives, accounting for ourselves through stories, also allow us to connect in 
one of the most basic human ways, a connection that can take place across all the borders we 
erect between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘me’ and ‘you’ – national borders, age gaps, religious or cultural 
differences. Connections across such separations are crucial in a world in which people are 
feeling increasingly isolated and, as we saw in Chapter 4, seek belonging through exclusion of 
others. In such situations, a deep commitment to the community one belongs often leads to 
xenophobia, as one wants to protect the community at all costs. Missing are the kinds of 
connections which seek to establish commonality and relationship across group divisions, 
connections which undermine the rigidity of exclusionary communities. But such connections 
are dependent upon the kind of narrative that is told – a narrative that is open, that seeks 
connection, and not a narrative used as a tool in service of exclusion. That the latter kinds of 
narratives exist and do unmeasurable harm is something which those who have faith in the 





The first section in this chapter will therefore look at the kinds of narratives that support 
xenophobia, with a focus specifically on the South African context. These narratives, however, 
are not unique to South Africa – across the world we find examples of anti-immigrant 
sentiments and even xenophobic violence being justified because ‘they take our jobs’ or ‘they 
threaten our culture’ or ‘they are criminals’. As I argued in the previous chapter, the first step 
to take to counter such narratives is to measure them against evidence, which I will do here. 
False narratives are told by those in power to scapegoat vulnerable groups and avoid 
accountability, and therefore we have to make them accountable, and hold ourselves 
accountable, by first determining how much truth and untruth such narratives contain. I identify 
three common themes in anti-foreigner narratives that express our xenophobic attitudes and 
also seek to justify discrimination and violence. These are (i) foreigners are harmful to the 
economy; (ii) foreigners do not belong here; and (iii) foreigners pose a threat to us. Within 
these themes, I discuss several beliefs and prejudices which are contained in these broad 
narratives and indicate how we can criticise them. Narratives corresponding to the first theme 
– such as foreigners taking jobs or sponging on the welfare system – can countered with facts 
and with establishing more material security, yet such narratives also touch on the second 
theme of belonging. The counternarratives I suggest in Section 2 will therefore address 
primarily the question of belonging, as I argued in the chapters preceding that this question lies 
at the heart of people’s xenophobic prejudices and attitudes. 
In Section 2.1, I address the criticism discussed in Chapter 4 regarding the limited power of 
storytelling by considering the potential of narratives to bring about institutional change. I 
argue that institutions already contain narratives, either by being narratives themselves (e.g. 
constitutions) or by having an institutional identity informed by narratives. Such institutional 
narratives shape our lives and possibilities of action in various ways and change on this level 
will have far-reaching effects on the shape of our political world and our interactions with 
others. I then turn to the question of how institutional narratives can be changed and conclude 
that the responsibility lies with exemplary individuals within the institutions, and pressure 
groups that hold institutions to account.  
In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, I consider institutional change in the realm of citizenship and borders 




narratives about belonging, an anti-xenophobic project will have profound implications for our 
conception of citizenship, territory, and borders. Drawing on the work of Joseph Carens (1987, 
2000) I argue for a counternarrative to the dominant ones that link citizenship to indigeneity, 
and that sees the nation as a family. Such a narrative emphasises connection along other lines 
than nationality or origin, while also undermining the essentialist idea behind the connection 
between citizenship and indigeneity. I then consider the territorialism that accompanies 
nationalism and xenophobia, and argue for narrative about borders that understands borders 
not as predetermined, natural, or permanent, but as products of specific histories, arbitrary, and 
open to change. Problematising borders in this way can help sever the link between belonging 
and territory and open the door for alternative narratives of belonging. In Section 2.3 I then 
consider how the language that we use in our narratives, especially the generalised statements 
we make about ourselves and others, contribute to prejudice and essentialist thinking. I suggest 
ways in which we can change this, with reference to Sarah-Jane Leslie’s (2017) work on 
generics. Leslie shows us how essentialist thinking is a product of generalisation, as a cognitive 
tool, which under most circumstances is harmless and correctly applied but, when applied to 
the social and political world, leads to essentialising groups. Because Leslie provides us with 
the kind of language that works against essentialist thinking, her work is relevant to the 
question of telling new kinds of narratives.  
Section 3 investigates the relationship between narrative or storytelling, judgment, and the 
imagination. The aim here is to show how narratives and narrative thinking can be incorporated 
into our political judgments and our institutions. The section provides a framework for 
judgment which individuals can rely on in their daily life, but also in their attempts to bring 
about institutional change as suggested in Section 2.1. I discuss Martha Nussbaum’s (1995) 
literary imagination and Hannah Arendt’s (1982) theory of political judgment. Both Arendt 
and Nussbaum argue for a form of judgment that is imaginative, in the sense of making others 
present in one’s mind or taking on the experiences of those affected by one’s judgments. This 
allows for judgments, in both a legal and political sense, which take the fullness of human life 
into account, serving as an antidote to dehumanising and instrumentalising ways of dealing 
with political questions.  
Finally, Section 4 provides us with one particular context in which the kind of judgment 
suggested above, and the anti-xenophobic narratives suggested in earlier sections, can be 




only sector where change should be implemented, but as narratives are also normative with 
regards to the future (as argued in Chapter 4), we should look to the future, our children, for 
change. I argue that we should understand our curriculum as narrative and teach it in a way 
which situates the facts in the world children live in and gives meaning to those facts. I also 
show how the narrative approach to teaching is more effective than other methods in relaying 
information. 
The final part of this section provides us with a novel tool that institutions and individuals can 
use to share anti-xenophobic and inclusive narratives, strengthen the imagination, and promote 
cooperation and connection between strangers.21 This tool is given to us by our evolutionary 
heritage: play. I refer to studies on animals that show how play diffuses xenophobic tension, 
and studies on children that indicate that play, whether structured or unstructured, narrative or 
not, is not only the most effective way of transmitting education but also teaches children social 
cooperation. Play therefore provides us with an answer to the problem of people not believing 
facts, as it packages facts in a different way. Play, we will see, is also a narrative form. Finally, 
I consider the potential of games – sports, board games, and especially video games – to 
contribute to an anti-xenophobic project. I argue that games not only foster positive 
relationships because people share in the fun, but also that they promote effective 
communication and cooperation, and that their immersive nature makes them exemplary 
vehicles for sharing both philosophical ideas and positive narratives. This chapter therefore 
shows us how we can apply the theory of narrative identity to the problem of xenophobia, with 
the aim of providing solutions to said problem. If xenophobia is a response to apprehensions 
of belonging, as I argued throughout this study, a solution to xenophobia needs to be found 
rethinking our identities, our place in the world, and in promoting trust and collaboration. 
1. Xenophobic Narratives in South Africa 
Our discussion thus far has shown us how narratives, whether individual or group-based, shape 
our identities and our perspective of ourselves and others. What we believe about ourselves, 
others, and the world, will inevitably shape our actions and interactions, and our narratives 
show what we believe and what prejudices we hold. If narratives have this world-shaping and 
world-creating potential, it follows that narratives can contribute and indeed form the 
“xenophobic life-world” discussed in Chapter 1. There, we saw that xenophobic violence is not 
                                                 




sudden and random, but the consequence of a life-world in which xenophobia is tolerated, 
accepted, and even encouraged. A life-world in which the majority of people and institutions 
already hold xenophobic beliefs and prejudices, expressed in xenophobic narratives. The 
increase of xenophobic violence in post-Apartheid South Africa has gone hand in hand with “a 
heightened language of hysteria and demeaning ‘Othering’ of African immigrants” (Desai 
2008: 51) not only in social settings, but also in the press, in parliament, and especially state 
institutions such as the Department of Home Affairs and the South African Police Service.  
So to understand xenophobia, and xenophobia in South Africa in particular, we need to look 
further than humankind’s instinctive fear of the unfamiliar and natural longing for belonging. 
We need to look at the actual things that people believe about foreigners, the reasons they give 
to justify xenophobic violence and attitudes, and how those beliefs are expressed in the 
narratives they tell about themselves and others. This will, ultimately, help us work toward a 
solution – towards telling different kinds of narratives. I focus on South Africa specifically, 
because it is where I am writing from and because it is a country characterised by xenophobic 
violence. Many of the narratives I will consider are in fact global – the same anti-immigrant or 
anti-refugee claims are made in the United States, in Europe, in Australia. This discussion, 
while local, therefore has broader significance. The narratives, or narrative threads, that I 
identify are sourced from a range of empirical research done on xenophobia in South Africa. I 
will look at peer-reviewed studies, but similar narratives can also be found in the media. 
Newspaper articles and opinion pieces may have limited perspectives or be particular (e.g. 
interviewing only one victim/perpetrator), but they do give an indication of what people think 
and tell ‘on the streets.’ Furthermore, the media (including social media) is one of the main 
mediums through which xenophobic narratives are spread. In a 2007 study of xenophobia in 
Southern Africa, Crush and Pendleton (2007: 70) found that people got most of their 
information (or, more often, misinformation) about migrants from media sources. The number 
one source then was television, followed by radio, personal interaction, and then newspapers. 
Despite ‘personal interaction’ being listed third, their study found that citizens have very little 
personal contact with non-citizens (ibid. 80), and another study found that “the vast majority 
of South Africans form their attitudes in a vacuum, relying mainly on hearsay and media and 
other representations” (SAMP 2008: 4, my emphasis) This means that the different forms of 
media are the strongest contributors to citizens’ ‘knowledge’ of foreigners. The situation today 




There are two broad kinds of xenophobic narratives: those we tell about foreigners (e.g. ‘they 
steal our women’) and those we tell about ourselves, which have exclusionary effects (e.g. 
South African exceptionalism). The latter need not be explicitly xenophobic, or even concerned 
with others, for it to have xenophobic undertones or implications (i.e. I can believe that this 
land is my land because I was born here, as were my parents and their parents and their parents’ 
parents, without ever consciously thinking that those who weren’t born here, don’t belong here. 
Yet the implication is clear.) I will focus on the explicitly xenophobic narratives we tell, i.e. 
the reasons we give to justify our hatred toward foreigners. The narratives we tell about 
foreigners seem to fall under three broad themes: (i) that foreigners are harmful to the economy; 
(ii) that foreigners do not belong here; and (iii) that foreigners pose a threat to our lives. These 
have been alluded to before, with points (ii) and (iii) discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. My 
discussion here will focus on the more concrete aspects of these themes. In Chapter 4, I held 
that narratives are the responses we give to questions about identity – ours and others’ – and 
through which we arrange facts and give meaning to facts and experiences. Narratives are also 
the medium which we use to express our beliefs and prejudices, with the aim of sharing them 
with others. Below we will see how facts are interpreted, arranged, erased, denied, all in service 
of anti-foreigner prejudices and beliefs, and how these are spread in the form of narratives, and 
in turn accepted and believed in by those who hear these narratives. 
1.1 Foreigners are harmful to the economy 
In their comparative study, Crush and Pendleton (2007: 72) found that South Africans are 
especially averse to allowing entrance or membership to the nation to foreigners, with 
“economic harm” being the major deterrent, whereas neighbouring SADC countries fear 
overpopulation the most. Foreigners, so the story goes, are harmful to the economy because 
they (i) take ‘our’ jobs and undercut wages; (ii) put a strain on the welfare system, especially 
on healthcare and education; and (iii) are arriving in ever increasing numbers, taking up space 
and using up resources – this is often referred to as the ‘wave’ of 
immigrants/refugees/foreigners. Water metaphors are common in anti-immigrant or anti-
foreigner narratives – tsunamis, waves, foreigners streaming across the borders, institutions 
drowning in paperwork and needy foreigners. 
The effect of socio-economic factors on people’s attitudes toward foreigners has been widely 




how secure people feel in their own homes or positions, and how likely they are to see 
foreigners as a burden: 
Perceptions of relative national and personal economic circumstances have been 
shown to have a strong correlation with attitudes towards outsiders. When 
perceptions are negative, scapegoats are required and often the visible and invisible 
foreigners “amongst us” take the blame. (ibid. 76) 
However, this is only part of the story. Crush and Pendleton (ibid. 80) found that the 
economically stronger SADC countries – South Africa, Namibia, Botswana – are far more 
negative about the presence of foreigners than the economically weaker Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, and Swaziland. The difference between these two groups is that the latter are 
(generally) migrant-sending, while the former are (generally) migrant-receiving. It is therefore 
not simply a matter of the have-nots looking for someone to blame (although that is sometimes 
the case), but also the age-old story of the have’s not wanting to share what they have. It is not 
only the poor or disenfranchised who are xenophobic – “the poor and the rich, the employed 
and the unemployed, the male and the female, the black and the white, the conservative and 
the radical, all express remarkably similar attitudes” (ibid.). Of course, there are different levels 
of economic security (or the perception thereof) among different individuals within a country. 
The economic inequality in South Africa no doubt contributes to xenophobic attitudes – the 
poor measure themselves against the rich, and may see others in their class as competition, or 
as preventing them from gaining economic security. The rich may be fearful of losing what 
they have or may want to become richer by exploiting foreign workers. In either scenario, 
internal problems (inequality) are blamed on outsiders. Scapegoating, as we saw in Chapter 1, 
happens because it is easier to find a scapegoat, than to address the actual causes of problems. 
What should be clear here is that, despite the claim that foreigners harm the economy, it is not 
their actual or potential harm that matters or determines citizens’ attitudes towards them, it is 
the citizens’ perception of their own economic security (or lack thereof). This is not to say that 
migrants do not have an impact on countries’ economies, but rather that the facts surrounding 
that impact are not what shape people’s attitudes or give rise to the idea that they are harmful. 
‘They take our jobs’ 
Perhaps the most frequent accusation levelled at migrants across the globe is that ‘they take 




against labour laws. For employers hoping to increase their profit, undocumented (and hence 
unprotected) migrants are ideal employees. They can pay them less than the minimum wage, 
without benefits, contracts, or the promise of permanent employment. There can be no doubt 
that this is something that happens. However, there seems once again to be a dissonance 
between how regularly this is actually the case, and citizens’ perception of how regularly this 
happens. Despite this ‘fact’ being widely believed, the 2007 study found that 
Over 60% of respondents in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique 
have never heard of anyone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner […] 
Even fewer people know from their own experience of someone being denied a job 
because it went to a foreigner […] Almost 90% of respondents in all six countries 
have no personal experience of being denied a job because it went to a foreigner. 
(ibid.: 72) 
It is likely that this may occur more often in unskilled jobs (such as farm labourer or domestic 
worker) than skilled, which means that those who are most vulnerable (the unskilled and 
unemployed) may have reason to feel cheated. However, the issue is once again more complex 
than a foreigner coming in and ‘taking’ a job. One has to wonder at a system that allows that 
kind of exploitation by (i) not protecting all people from exploitation from employers, 
regardless of citizenship, and (ii) making it possible that an exploitative wage is even desirable. 
As with the broader ‘economic harm’, it seems that in the labour market foreigners become the 
scapegoats for a deeply unequal system. 
Another fact should be considered, when comparing the unemployment levels of migrants 
versus citizens. Research has shown that many migrants are employed because they create 
opportunities for themselves, especially in informal economies. Migrants become street 
vendors, selling wares bought or crafted, or spaza shop owners in informal settlements. In such 
instances, they do not take jobs from citizens, but sometimes create jobs for citizens (see 
Nyamnjoh 2006: 73-74). Ironically, another charged levelled against job-stealing foreigners is 
that they are also lazy. This is perhaps more common in, for example, the USA than in South 
Africa. Crush and Pendleton (2007: 72) found that “people from outside are not seen as 
particularly more or less hard-working than citizens.” The laziness of immigrants is common 
refrain in right-wing or Republican discourse in the USA. The question is, how can the same 
group of people be lazy and sponges on society, and steal jobs? One certainly cannot accuse 




The narrative that foreigners are ‘taking our jobs’ is not harmless. It not only joins other anti-
foreigner sentiments in creating and upholding a xenophobic life-world, but it has in the past 
served as a justification of violence: 
In September 1998, three migrants to South Africa were savaged by a mob on a 
train: one, a Mozambican, was thrown out while the other two, both Senegalese 
citizens, were electrocuted as they climbed the roof trying to escape the crowd. 
This violence was visited by members of a crowd who were returning from a rally 
[…] who had gathered to protest under the banner of an organisation called 
‘Unemployed Masses of South Africa’ (Pretoria News, 4 September 1998, in Desai 
2008: 51) 
The anger and frustration of the rally-goers was taken out on the three men (whether they, as 
individuals, ‘stole’ jobs or not). One can imagine the reasoning of the crowd: They are 
foreigners, and therefore part of the group that causes the crisis of unemployment in South 
Africa. For that reason, they can and indeed should be harmed.  
Part of the reason why unemployment or job scarcity are blamed on foreigners is that people 
believe that there are more foreigners in the country than there actually are. The water/wave 
metaphors I alluded to earlier express this – it is never a trickle, but a wave. The country is 
‘drowning in foreigners’. However, studies show that we generally overestimate the number of 
foreigners in the country, with Crush and Pendleton (2007: 68) showing that South Africans 
believe between 25-35% of the people in the country are foreigners. Establishing this number 
is difficult, given how many foreigners are undocumented, but even if we take this into account 
the numbers are overestimated. A Stats SA report from 2012 (following the 2011 census) 
indicated that there were around 2.2 million foreign-born individuals in South Africa (Stats SA 
2012), while estimates in the media at the time said around 5 million, with the assumption that 
most of those are undocumented (Wilkinson 2015). In all likelihood the number increased since 
2011, but the difference between the estimates of Stats SA and the estimates of the media is 
telling. Of course, xenophobic people may consider people born in South Africa, but of foreign 
descent (e.g. Indian), as ‘foreign’, so accurate statistics about foreign born individuals will not 
convince on this score. This raises the question of who truly belongs, which we discussed in 
Chapter 3, and the link between belonging, citizenship, and indigeneity discussed in Chapter 




 ‘They sponge on our welfare system’ 
Foreigners are also accused of putting a strain on the welfare system. In 2007, 8.6% of South 
Africans believe that foreigners should be kept out because they cause shortages on housing, 
food, and services (Crush & Pendleton 2007: 72). Given the rise in xenophobia since then, one 
can safely assume that this number, if changed, will only be higher. On Crush and Pendleton’s 
‘Stereotyping Scale’, they listed several activities – positive and negative – and asked 
respondents to what extent they think migrants in their home country are involved with these 
activities. The activities are (on the negative side) taking jobs, committing crimes, sending 
earnings out of the country, using the welfare services, bringing diseases, and (on the positive 
side) creating jobs and bringing scarce or necessary skills to the country. The mean scores of 
the negative activities far outstrip those of the positive activities. For example, “create jobs” 
got 3/10, whereas “using welfare” got 7/10 (with ‘0’ meaning no migrants do this, and ‘10’ 
meaning all of them do this). The fact that using welfare is perceived negatively is already 
telling – the healthcare, education, and other welfare systems are seen as ‘ours’. This 
possessiveness over healthcare resources no doubt springs from resource insecurity – the most 
economically vulnerable citizens have no choice but to rely on the state for healthcare, and the 
state is not providing as it should. There is a shortage of doctors and other medical staff, a 
shortage of medicine and treatment options. Moreover, the healthcare system is vulnerable to 
municipal and provincial mismanagement and government corruption.  
Many immigrants who come to South Africa also rely on the public healthcare system, as they 
rely on public education (another sector that is understaffed, under resourced, and 
underfunded). Given the scarcity, citizens’ feeling that they are in competition with foreigners 
is understandable. Yet once again this feeling is based on the incorrect assumption that the 
scarcity is the fault of the foreigners, instead of mismanagement and corruption (once again, 
the socio-economic or material aspect of the problem). The feeling is also based on a political 
assumption: that the resources belong, first and foremost, to citizens. In a way this makes sense, 
if one considers that citizens pay taxes which in turn is used to fund public institutions, but 
many citizens in South Africa who make use of the public healthcare system are not tax-payers. 
So this is not a case of ‘I paid for it, they’re getting it’. Citizens assume that the state has to 
provide for them in a way it does not have to provide for immigrants. While states do have 
responsibilities toward citizens that they do not have toward non-citizens, this does not apply 




to healthcare and education are universal human rights and are guaranteed by the South African 
constitution for everyone who lives within the state’s borders, regardless of citizenship. 
Moreover, many immigrants have been naturalised, given residency, or asylum. A naturalised 
citizen, at the very least, has just as much right to state resources as other citizens. Yet, as we 
saw in Chapter 1, the legal status of foreigners, or even the foreign status of individuals, does 
not matter. One simply needs to be perceived as a foreigner, for other citizens to assume that 
you are illegal and have no right to state resources. 
Tangentially related to this issue is the question of the relationship between immigrants and the 
state, and how that affects their ability to access healthcare and education: 
African immigrants had already learnt to live on the margins of the system, finding 
ways to get their children to school, finding jobs and shelters to live in. At the same 
time many had to learn to live at a distance from the repressive arm of the state. 
(Desai 2008: 50). 
The above quotation hints at another way in which xenophobia threatens the quality of life of 
immigrants in South Africa. The reality is that going to the hospital or sending their children 
to school may place immigrants in an awkward (at the least) or even dangerous position, 
especially if they are undocumented. A simple, necessary thing like going to the doctor can 
alert the authorities to a person’s presence of South Africa, which can have dire consequences. 
For this same reason, undocumented migrants are more vulnerable than citizens when they are 
victims of crime. Crimes against them may go unreported, because they do not want the 
authorities to identify them (and because migrants often suffer at the hands of the police force, 
where xenophobic attitudes are rife). This means that migrants do not only have to think of 
direct threats to their safety and lives, as when they are attacked by citizens who are angry at 
them for ‘stealing’ jobs and resources, but their lives are also threatened in a more indirect way 
because accessing healthcare, education, and justice is a big risk to take. If we understand 
xenophobia as a system of exclusion (the ‘civic ostracism’ of the ‘xenophobic life-world’ – see 
Chapter 1), then this is another form of exclusion. Migrants are not only excluded from social 
settings, or from political decision-making. They are often even excluded from the things one 
needs to live a basically decent human life.22 This exclusion is not separate from the xenophobic 
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narratives in question – healthcare workers, teachers, police officers are, after all, also citizens 
who may hold xenophobic attitudes based on such narratives. Where the belief exist that 
migrants do not have the right to ‘our’ healthcare and ‘our’ education, individuals and the 
institutions they belong to will try to prevent them from benefitting from such public 
institutions.  
To counter this belief and its expressions in narratives, we would need accurate and clear 
information on the state of our healthcare system (or education, or justice, etc.). Not only how 
many migrants make use of public healthcare – a number that is likely to be overestimated – 
but also the reasons why the healthcare system is in crisis. That this crisis is due to things other 
than ‘foreigners taking over’, is clear. This, however, would require a level of honesty and 
accountability on the part of public servants and political leaders that we are unaccustomed to. 
I have no suggestions for how we can make politicians more honest. Strategies like encouraging 
whistleblowing (and protecting whistle-blowers), institutions like the Public Protector (if it is 
functioning as it should, which is also not a given), an independent judiciary, non-governmental 
agencies that serve as watchdogs, as well as civil protest are ways in which politicians and 
public servants can be held more accountable, and truths uncovered. 
But, as I suggested, the problem goes deeper. What needs to change are people’s beliefs about 
who has the right to what. The strategies listed above will only work if there are people that 
make them work, and people who have the will and conviction to do so. The narrative in 
question here rests on the assumption or belief that foreigners do not have the same right to 
care and protection and support because they are not from here and do not belong here. What 
is needed is a narrative that questions this notion of belonging (as discussed in Chapter 3), but 
also one that problematises the link between ‘belonging’ and ‘ownership’. We need to imagine 
a form of belonging that is not possessive, but that recognises that one can belong alongside 
others. This will surely be easier if material circumstances were different – if there were more 
resources to go around. Scarcity creates insecurity, which encourages competition.  
                                                 
most part, due to the inequalities in our society and resource scarcity. The causes for the lack of access are therefore 
different. Migrants’ access is impeded by xenophobic attitudes (e.g. nurses refusing to treat them) and the threat 
of being deported, whereas citizens are impeded by poor or ineffective service delivery, general scarcity, and other 
factors external to them (i.e., they are not shown away because of who they are, and they do not fear being detected 
and deported). Under certain unique circumstances, citizens may be similarly impeded. Think of, for example, 
sex-workers who are the victims of crimes or women who are abused by their partners who may feel that they 
cannot go to the police for protection because the police will not protect them, may even threaten and abuse them 




Yet it is not inconceivable that, even in times of scarcity, people can act differently. Evidence 
of this is found in the field of disaster studies. The almost Hobbesian idea that under conditions 
of scarcity, people will resort to violence to ensure access to basic goods has been undermined 
(at least in part – of course people do sometimes act like this) by studies done in the aftermath 
of natural and manmade disasters and the experiences of the people who are directly affected 
by such disasters. After hurricanes or earthquakes, great fires or terrorist attacks, when people 
are on the edge of life and access to resources cannot be guaranteed, we do not only see dog 
eat dog competition, but also altruism, solidarity, and empathy, often between people who 
under normal circumstances would not have reached out to each other (see Solnit 2009). Of 
course, there is a difference between scarcity due to a disastrous event, and prolonged scarcity 
due to material inequality. Any solidarity formed in the immediate aftermath of a disaster will 
have a hard time sustaining itself if conditions do not change and fatigue and frustrations set 
in.  However, the fact that people do bond together in this way suggests something about what 
humans are like, which goes against the Hobbesian narrative of human nature. It seems to me 
that the narrative of humans as inherently competitive, of survival of the fittest, is not based on 
reality but rather a tool in the hands of those in power, to legitimate their power. If we believe 
that instability and scarcity will necessarily lead to violence and a state similar to war, with 
every person acting solely in their interest, we more gladly give up our freedoms to ‘ensure’ 
stability. This is not an idea which I can develop in full here, although it would be worthwhile 
to pursue it. For my current purposes, it is enough to say that a counterstory based on altruism 
in the face of disaster, cooperation instead of competition, can have a powerful effect in 
changing how people think about human interaction and conflict under conditions of scarcity, 
especially as the ecological crisis we find ourselves in threatens our already scarce resources. 
1.2 Foreigners do not belong here 
The issue of belonging and membership is central to xenophobia, as we saw in Chapter 3. 
Xenophobia is, in one sense, a response to a feeling of not belonging (alienation, isolation), but 
also a way to define belonging – to draw borders between us and them, members and non-
members. Throughout this study, we have seen how belonging in South Africa specifically is 
linked in our minds to citizenship and indigeneity. Xenophobia, as argued in Chapter 1, is a 
form of exclusion or ostracism based on idea of foreignness. The broad narrative of foreigners 
not belonging here is not always explicitly expressed. Our narratives about our own belonging, 




can explicitly or implicitly exclude those who do not share in that identity. Our self-narratives 
and our narratives about others are intricately linked. Sometimes we define our identities based 
on what we are not, in the sense that we construct an other so that we can assert ‘I am not like 
that’. This is what Morrison (2017: 15) means when she speaks of our need for a stranger to 
define ourselves. This is not only applicable to individual identities, but especially to the 
creation of a unified national identities: “For autochthons, excluding visible others can 
strengthen loyalties to the space they occupy and ratify abstract notions of an indigenous 
nation” (Landau 2006: 126). Creating the nation in this way is part of South Africa’s historical 
heritage, with citizenship defined in terms of the racial other. At the end of Apartheid, the need 
for uniting the nation called for a new other: “South Africa’s redefinition of the boundaries of 
citizenship is based on the creation of a “new other”; the “non-citizen”, the “foreigner”, the 
“alien”” (Crush & Pendleton 2007: 64). 
Yet in a way our self-conceptions also determine which narratives about others we choose to 
believe. So South Africans believe narratives about other African nationals being 
“uneducated”, “primitive”, or “backwards” (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 39) because we believe the 
narratives of our own exceptionalism and our right to belong because we were born here, or 
our ancestors are from here.  
National identity therefore plays a determining role in how xenophobic people are. In Crush 
and Pendleton’s (2007) study, it was found that most respondents valued nationality and 
national identity very highly, with many expressing pride in their identity and the desire that 
their children should share that identity (ibid. 77). Importantly, the following was concluded: 
Birth is massively important to most people in the determination of “national 
belonging”, as is having parents and grandparents born in the country…Far less 
important in this regard is race…less than half the population in each country feels 
that it is essential to be ‘black’ in order to be a citizen. (ibid. 79) 
The ‘foreigners do not belong here’ narrative usually contains the following ideas: foreigners 
look different, act differently, speak differently – they are clearly not from here. To belong, 
you must be from here, and from nowhere else. It is not enough to have been born in South 
Africa. Your heritage must be purely South African, going back generations, to be able to say 
that you are from here. Your legal right to be in South Africa does not matter. Even South 




look or sound ‘South African’: “This stereotyping and lack of concern for immigrants’ rights 
was exemplified by a police officer who arrested a South African citizen, who was quickly 
deported because ‘he walked like a Mozambican’” (Desai 2008: 52). 
This is perhaps the biggest challenge facing any kind of anti-xenophobic project. A 
counternarrative would have to sever the links between citizenship, territory, birth(right), 
membership, and belonging, without losing sight of the importance of having a place to belong. 
This would require a reinterpretation of our membership norms and our borders. I return to this 
at greater length in Section 2. 
1.3 Foreigners pose a threat  
I have given considerable attention to the role that fear and perceived threats play in 
xenophobia, emphasising that xenophobic attitudes and violence are often a reaction not to an 
actual foreigner posing a threat (i.e. standing with a gun against one’s head), but a feeling of 
being threatened on the side of the xenophobe. The object of the xenophobe’s hatred is an 
object of his or her imagination. Relating this broad narrative back to the previous two, we see 
that foreigners are believed to pose a threat to the economic flourishing of the citizen, and to 
the citizen’s place in the world (Chapter 3). In Chapter 2, I discussed how the foreigner is also 
seen as an existential threat. Worldwide, this narrative of foreigners menacing our lives and 
livelihoods fuels xenophobia: 
There is a generalized perception amongst citizens in Southern Africa that their 
countries are under siege from outside. This perception, correct or not, is at the 
heart of any xenophobic discourse. (Crush & Pendleton 2007: 68) 
What sort of stories do we tell, other than ‘taking jobs’, that indicate that xenophobia is about 
feeling threatened? Foreigners are accused of being criminal, of bringing diseases like AIDS 
into the country, of being drug traffickers, stealing ‘our women’, exploiting women through 
prostitution, and a whole range of other crimes (ibid. 75; see also Matsinhe 2011: 298). These 
are all common stereotypes, widely believed and distributed by the South African Police 
Service, the Department of Home Affairs, the media, and political leaders. Following the most 
recent series of xenophobic violence (August-September 2019), which saw many people 
choosing to return to their countries of origin, President Cyril Ramaphosa not only denied that 
South Africans are xenophobic (during a speech in Zimbabwe to a crowd of Zimbabweans), 




laws, protocols, and regulations (Ntshidi 2019). This at a time when cities are burning and 
people are being killed for being foreign amounts to victim-blaming, and Ramaphosa’s 
comments supports the narrative that foreigners are criminal. While not denying that some 
foreigners engage in criminal activities – organised and opportunistic – this is also 
overestimated. The issue is that foreigners are assumed to be criminals based on their 
foreignness, and not on any behaviour on their side. Any foreigner can become the victim of 
xenophobic violence regardless of their criminality or, more likely, lack thereof.  
Foreigners are regarded as criminal not only based on their assumed activities (like dealing 
drugs), but also simply because they are here. This is a question of education and ignorance 
about the law. Locals (including public officials like police officers) tend to assume that 
nationals from other African countries are here illegally, vastly overestimating the number of 
undocumented immigrants in our borders. In our minds, we confuse immigration with illegality 
(Crush & Pendleton 2007: 68). There is also some confusion about the different potential legal 
statuses foreigners can have – naturalised citizens, permanent residents, refugees, and 
scepticism about whether refugees are ‘really’ refugees (ibid. 70). Here a more accurate 
understanding of the laws surrounding immigration and refugeehood, perhaps through public 
education programmes, would go some way in undoing the stereotyping narratives that brand 
all foreigners as ‘illegal’. A big part of the problem is also how the media reports on immigrants 
– research has shown that immigrants are often labelled ‘illegal’, regardless of their legal 
status.23 This reinforces the link between immigrant/alien/refugee and illegality/criminality. 
The South African government’s own mixed messages on this question exacerbate the problem, 
as public statements such as Ramaphosa’s (above) reinforce stereotypes, while the laws and 
policies relating to refugees and immigrants cause confusion. For example, the refugee system 
and the system of immigration control are governed by the same laws and policies, with the 
result that the refugee system cannot fulfil its duty of protection but rather becomes an 
immigration control mechanism (Amit 2011: 486). This makes it easier for the public to tar all 
foreigners with the same brush. 
                                                 




The kind of reinterpretation of membership norms, citizenship, and borders I discuss in Section 
2 will also go some way in solving the problem, as illegality is assumed because we cannot 
imagine that an outsider can legally (i.e. legitimately) belong. 
2. Stories for Change 
2.1 The question of institutional change 
In the previous chapter, the shortcomings of a narrative approach were discussed. One such 
shortcoming is the fact that the medium of narrative is limited – stories can open worlds, can 
help us get to know each other, can make us more sympathetic or empathetic, can build 
bridges…but only up to a point. Stories may inspire us for a moment, but we move on, or 
forget. Stories, being particular, may also blind us to institutional and structural injustices. We 
may interpret a person’s telling of their life story as an indication of their personal suffering, 
without asking how that suffering was brought about by racist, sexist, or xenophobic structures, 
or without connecting this story to other similar life-narratives and drawing any conclusions 
from that. Storytelling runs the risk of being too individual, changing some hearts and minds, 
but they do not necessarily bring about institutional or societal change. 
What is clear, when we study xenophobia, is that we need both a change of heart and mind, 
and institutional change. Individuals’ xenophobic attitudes, we have seen, are in part informed 
by the anti-foreigner narratives that political leaders and the media spew. Furthermore, the 
ways in which our institutions are structured, along with the underlying narratives that guide 
them, determine whether foreigners will be protected or not. Our laws and policies relating to 
immigration, our police, the asylum-process, Home Affairs – all these institutions play a 
cardinal role in the safety (or lack thereof) of foreigners who come to South Africa. Over time, 
if individual attitudes toward foreigners change, the institutions will also change. But 
institutions change slowly, and while we wait people are being ostracised and even killed. As 
with South Africa’s decision to legalise same-sex marriages in 2002, institutional change 
should sometimes come first and hope the people follow.  
Can the narrative approach be effective on an institutional level? For that to be the case, we 
need evidence that (a) institutions have identities, and (b) that institutions tell, or ascribe to, 
specific narratives that influence how they function. The second requirement is easily met –the 
rules governing institutions can be interpreted as narratives, as indeed South Africa’s 




(and a nation-shaping narrative at that) (see Motha 2011). One can think of other examples: 
The Declaration of Independence (USA), the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948). These institution-forming documents tell a narrative about the kind of people 
we (whether as a nation or humanity as a whole) want to be, and the kind of society we want 
to live in. These documents, read as narratives, imagine a better future for those involved – one 
that would not have the same injustices or systems of oppression as the system that went before.  
The question of institutional identity is perhaps a bit trickier. It may be better to speak of 
institutional culture (recognising the close link between culture and identity, on an individual 
as well as a group level). The idea that institutions or organisations – whether they are schools, 
businesses, the army or police forces – have specific, individual cultures originated in the 1950s 
(Jaques 1951) and became increasingly popular in recent decades.  Such cultures are governed 
by the history and traditions of the institution, the rules, regulations, policies, and codes of 
conduct. We can interpret these things as narratives, in the sense that they give expression to 
the view the institution has of itself (i.e. the kind of institution it is, or aims to be), and they 
provide the regulative ideals of the institution. Remember that narratives not only seek to give 
meaning, but that they are also normative, expressing not only who we are but also who we 
should be and who we want to become. This is a question of identity, and one which institutions 
are also concerned with. 
I will briefly illustrate how institutional identity relates to narrative at the hand of an example. 
Think of the difference between a police force that believes its goal is to serve the public, and 
that gains its legitimacy from the support and trust of the public, as opposed to a police force 
that sees itself as above the law, not only enforcers but creators of the law (as in a police state). 
The difference between the first and second kind of police force lies in the institutional culture 
of the force, and in what they believe their place in society is (to serve and protect, or to 
control). Members of the force will learn this by how the history of the force is presented to 
them and by what their superiors expect of them and permit them to do. The process of relating 
to the history of the institution, and of sharing that history and its accompanying traditions with 
new recruits, is an act of narration: organising facts and experiences with the goal of relaying 
information, including information about the kind of institution it is (i.e. its identity), and of 
providing norms for action. So the South African police force may see itself as an institution 
which has to protect the South African people, and given its historical role in upholding 




it has to protect, with ‘the people’ now being all South Africans, but not foreigners.24 In Chapter 
1 (Section 1.1), we saw how the transition into democracy did not end victimisation and 
oppression at the hands of those in power, but who the victims are (previously black South 
Africans, now African nationals) and who the powerful are (previously the white government, 
police force, and populace, now all South Africans) (see Matsinhe 2011: 296).  
Narratives can, perhaps, be seen as a necessary requirement for positive institutional change. 
Sceptics of the ‘power’ of storytelling may remark that stories cannot change the world, that 
they cannot bring liberation – only material change, and the change in social conditions, can. 
But how can we know that change is necessary, what form that change should take, or how 
society should look afterwards? To put it differently: is change, liberation, or emancipation 
possible if we cannot, or do not, imagine an alternative? In the precious chapter I said that 
stories can alert us to injustices we are unaware of. To know the way forward, we need a sense 
of where we are going. We need to be able to imagine a path forward and communicate it to 
those who will join us. In other words, we need a narrative that can inspire us. 
My question in this section is how anti-xenophobic narratives could be institutionalised, or the 
role of narratives in institutional formation and culture. We saw in the previous section that 
xenophobic narratives are broadcast from almost all the influential institutions in South Africa, 
from the media to the police, the Department of Home affairs, and prominent political leaders. 
In the most recent general election (May 2019), many parties including the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the Democratic Alliance (DA) made stronger immigration controls one 
of their campaign policies. In the United States and, most recently, the United Kingdom, the 
highest institutions (the presidency, the prime minister) are inhabited by two highly 
xenophobic, racist men who came into power, in part, because their anti-immigrant and anti-
foreigner stances enjoy wide support. How can narratives help us when xenophobic narratives 
are so entrenched in our public institutions? 
From the outset, I should make clear that what I am offering here is not an ‘easy solution’. 
Institutional change is slow, as is societal change – especially if it is in a positive direction 
(humans seem to be better at becoming suddenly bad, than suddenly good). I am not sure that 
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there are any fast solutions. Changing perspectives, changing narratives, will be a long and 
hard task. Fortunately, the world’s history of revolutions and rebellions show us that 
movements can gain massive support, and in rare cases seemingly overnight. Neither do I think 
a world without xenophobia is attainable, yet this should not discourage us from trying 
everything we can to combat xenophobia, and from doing the storytelling and educational work 
needed to achieve that. 
We face a further problem of circularity: for institutional change to happen, institutional and 
individual narratives need to change; for that to happen, the people in the institutions need to 
commit to activities and strategies such as story-sharing and imaginative judgments; however, 
to get them to do this, they need to be incentivised, and the most efficient way to do that would 
be if institutional culture changes. The best we can do, perhaps, is to rely on exemplary 
individuals within our institutions and society, as well as pressure groups, to put pressure on 
institutions to change. Such individuals and groups do exist, and historically great institutional 
change has been brought about through such pressure, including boycotting, revolutions, and 
civil protests. Such actions provide the incentive for institutional change. 
Douglass C. North (1990,1991) argues that institutions are fundamentally incentive structures 
that determine the shape or direction of our political, economic, and social interactions. 
Institutions provide us with the ‘rules of the game’, which incentivise individuals to act in 
certain ways and not others. These rules can be formal (laws, rulebooks) or informal (codes of 
conduct, conventions) that tell us what we can do and, when we break them, is used in 
determining the punishment (North 1990: 4). Importantly, institutional change is influenced by 
individual beliefs and ideologies, defined as “the subjective perceptions (models, theories) all 
people possess to explain the world around them” (ibid. 23, fn. 7), as individuals make their 
choices on the basis of their subjective perceptions. Although North does not use the term, 
narratives (as identity-giving stories) are the kinds of “subjective perceptions” North is 
concerned with. This does not only mean that subjective perceptions play a role in how 
individuals react to the incentives provided by institutions, but also that what is incentivised 
and what is punished is determined by our subjective perceptions, as our perceptions and 
incentives are socially transmitted and “part of the heritage we call culture” (ibid. 37). 
Institutional change, as I have suggested, therefore comes from the individual’s response to 




Msimang argued that stories only have a lasting power if those of us inspired by them, are also 
inspired to act (see Chapter 4, Section 2.2). To act, in this case, means to change our institutions 
and the incentives they embody through narratives that tell a different kind of story from the 
dominant, exclusionary, xenophobic narratives that shape institutional and individual 
identities. To summarise: Society and the individuals contained therein can become less 
xenophobic if not being xenophobic is incentivised through institutions, and this will happen 
when exemplary individuals decide to change the incentive structures in accordance with their 
anti-xenophobic counternarratives. This calls to mind the individuals Arendt (1970: ix) 
discusses in her Men in Dark Times:  
[E]ven in the darkest of times we have the right to expect some illumination [and] 
such illumination may well come less from theories and concepts than from the 
uncertain, flickering, and often weak light that some men and women, in their lives 
and works, will kindle under almost all circumstances and shed over the time span 
that was given them on earth… 
A sentiment that echoes Bertolt Brecht (2018: 787) 
In the dark times, will there also be singing? 
Yes, there will be singing 
About the dark times. 
Our task is clear: tell, listen, sing, and (as we will see), play. Do this to cast light on the harms 
done by xenophobic narratives. I now turn to the content of our ‘songs’. 
2.2 Citizenship and borders: a different approach25 
In the previous section, as well as Chapters 1 and 3, we saw that belonging or membership is 
closely linked with territory and (place of) birth (or indigeneity). This is common in South 
Africa, but also elsewhere in the world – remember Kim and Sundstrom’s (2014) point that 
some groups are ‘perpetually foreign’, regardless of how long they or their ancestors have been 
in the country. Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with valuing the place one is from. 
It becomes an issue when we make origin a necessary requirement for belonging, and when 
not belonging has a severely negative impact on the non-member’s life. That this is the case 
                                                 




with xenophobic discrimination should be clear by now. My concern here is providing a 
direction our counternarratives can take that would change the way we think of belonging, 
citizenship, and borders, but in a way that could (and should) be institutionally applied. In this 
I take my lead from Joseph Carens (1987, 2000, 2016) and his work on the ethics of 
immigration. 
Carens (2016: 425) argues that an ethical approach to immigration “will entail changing some 
rules and also paying attention to informal mechanisms like social norms, incentives, practices 
of recognition and conceptions of national identity, all of which affect inclusion and exclusion.” 
Carens is specifically concerned with (liberal) democratic states and their responsibilities 
toward refugees and immigrants. Xenophobia is not limited to such states, but the fact that it is 
present in states supposedly concerned with rights and the protection of freedoms, democratic 
states is of special concern here. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, the painful irony of xenophobia 
in South Africa is that it has increased drastically with the birth of our democracy. In his early 
work (1987), Carens argues for fewer restrictions on immigration and more open borders, as 
the main approaches to political theory, if taken to their logical conclusions, are 
commensurable with his conclusions (he specifically considers the theories of Rawls, Nozick, 
and utilitarian approaches). In brief: it is not hard to imagine how this argument can be made 
relating to Nozick’s libertarianism, as borders and restrictions on immigration hamper 
individuals’ ability to freely participate in the free-market (ibid. 253). Behind the Rawlsian veil 
of ignorance, Carens argues, nationality should also be arbitrary from a moral point of view, 
and nationality is precisely the “sort of specific contingency that could set people at odds” (ibid. 
256) which Rawls is concerned with when he excludes, for example, race and gender from 
being morally relevant in decisions about the principles of justice. 
Carens (2000) makes an interesting argument regarding citizenship and our feelings of 
connectedness with our compatriots. An argument often levelled against more lenient 
immigration policies and porous or open borders is that we have a stronger moral responsibility 
to those we share a community with, specifically those who are also from our own countries. 
Citizenship creates connections and relationships of reciprocity. Very often, the nation is 
compared to the family. Carens has a few points to make in response to these familiar kinds of 
arguments, two of which I will briefly consider. Firstly, leaving aside the question of whether 
we should view the nation as a family (Carens says no), what these kinds of arguments hope to 




unjust to favour one’s family members over others. However, this argument falls flat in its 
latter assumption, for there are indeed instances where we do think it is morally wrong to show 
favour to one’s family members. We see this in our laws against nepotism, or in family 
members of a company hosting a competition being prohibited from entering. It is therefore 
not always acceptable to favour one’s family over others: “our notions of justice constrain the 
extent and ways in which we think it is acceptable for us to favor family members” (ibid. 638). 
The analogy to the family does not do what those arguing for it intend. A further point can be 
made: people form meaningful connections with others outside their own families, often more 
meaningful than the relationships they have with their families. Even if the family analogy is 
accepted, it still does not necessarily support favouring your ‘family’ over others. 
Another important point that Carens makes, related to the previous one, is that people form 
strong connections across borders, not just within borders. ‘Connection’ and the reciprocity it 
entails can therefore not serve as a justification of more stringent immigration controls. This 
argument is circular – it intends to show that citizens are more strongly connected to one 
another than to non-citizens, but this only works if “the greater connection among citizens is 
treated as self-evident or citizenship itself is treated as the measure of connection” (ibid. 641). 
Saying that the connection between citizens has a stronger moral weight than between non-
citizens assumes that such connections are more special or stronger, which is not necessarily 
true. There is no necessary, inherent, or natural connection that binds citizens together. Unity 
is created or imposed. Once we realise this, the doors are opened for the possibility that others 
can also become citizens or members, and that new and alternative connections can be formed. 
An anti-xenophobic counternarrative will have to understand connection in this way – as 
something important, but not as something necessarily linked to citizenship.  
The implications are twofold: firstly, detaching ‘citizenship’ from ‘connection’ in the familial 
or ‘inherent’ sense will draw our attention to the fact that a personal sense of connection is not 
needed for us to consider ourselves morally responsible to others, or owing something to others 
as a matter of justice. Carens (2000: 641) points out that we cannot only understand justice in 
terms of reciprocity, for that would not explain why we owe something to compatriots who do 
not contribute to the society, nor would it explain why killing or robbing those who do not form 
part of our society would be unjust or wrong. Carens grants that reciprocity forms part of 
justice, but even with that granted “it does not follow that we are entitled to exclude others who 




responsibility that is not based only on reciprocity or on compatriot-connection will help us 
avoid the problems identified above regarding our duties toward non-contributors as well as 
non-compatriots. One way to do this is to understand our connection to our fellow ‘countrymen 
and women’ not in terms of legal status or origin, but in terms of the space we share and the 
institutions that shape that space. We already have a narrative that encapsulates this view: the 
Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa: “We, the people of South Africa 
[believe] that South Africa belongs to all who live in it” and, consequently, all who live in it 
belong here. 
For this counternarrative to gain traction, two more aspects relating to belonging and 
citizenship need to be addressed: firstly, the link between indigeneity, origin and citizenship 
and secondly, the related question of borders, belonging and territory. There are many 
strategies we can employ to construct counternarratives which would sever the links between 
indigeneity and citizenship and belonging and borders. Carens’ reading of Rawls provides us 
with one – emphasising the moral arbitrariness of being born in one place rather than another 
– or we can consider narratives that show how immigrants contribute to the health 
(metaphorical) and wealth of a country, or in countries with large and old immigrant 
populations (USA, Australia), how the cross-border movement of people is part and parcel of 
the country’s identity. Such narratives are inherently political, for they deal with our group 
identities and our relations to other groups. These narratives are already being told, from 
antifascist political protests to storytelling festivals to novels to political debates.   
The link between belonging and territory can be severed by emphasising the fluidity of borders 
over time, for example showing how our current borders are the product of a long history of 
conquests and conflicts, colonisation and decolonisation. In Chapter 3 I considered the role that 
place and belonging plays in xenophobia, specifically in relation to nationalist territoriality. 
Uncoupling citizenship from indigeneity will already lead us to question the ‘naturalness’ of 
the place in which we find ourselves (i.e. being ‘South African’), but we can go deeper by 
problematising the very idea that this place, in my case South Africa, necessarily exists in the 
shape it does now. The fact is that the current shape of South Africa is relatively new, a product 
of our most recent history. Added to that, most countries in Africa are, territorially, the result 
of the subdivision of the continent by colonial forces. After liberation, most of these borders 
remained intact, even if many consider them to be “artificial borders” (Nkiwane 1993: 67). The 




instances separating other groups who before had belonged together. This does not mean that 
in the interim new identities along national lines could not be formed, but it does recall 
Anderson’s point that nationalisms assume a long history where there is none. Historical 
narratives which emphasise the changing nature of borders, coupled with narratives which 
emphasise the historical movement of people and the accompanying changes in groups, can 
lead us to question what it means to be ‘South African’ or ‘French’ or ‘Australian’.  
This can be a useful strategy against xenophobic narratives, and one we should pursue. 
However, it is one we are already familiar with. I want to suggest a different strategy, one that 
can be combined with the more familiar ones. This strategy relates to the structure of our 
language – the words we use in our narratives – and our cognitive mechanisms that we employ 
to categorise what we encounter in the world. It provides us with practical advice on how to 
change the language of our narratives, which can be applied to individual as well as institutional 
and political narratives.  I refer to the work on generics by Sarah-Jane Leslie (2007, 2017). As 
we saw in Chapter 2, the reason why such a strong link exists between citizenship, belonging, 
and indigeneity, is because of the prejudices that result from group formation. When we 
distinguish between the ingroup and outgroup, we categorise and tend to essentialise 
characteristics of both groups. We see origin specifically as an essential characteristic of a 
person (which is why, as I suggested in the previous chapter, we have stereotypes about people 
from specific places). Leslie tells us why we essentialise in this way, how that negatively affects 
the world, and what strategies can be applied to our expressions. She therefore provides us with 
the linguistic tools with which we can tell less essentialist narratives. 
2.3 Against essentialist thinking 
‘Generics’ refers to generalised statements we make about the world, like ‘dogs are loyal’ and 
‘philosophers are quirky’. Relying on such statements to communicate information shows that 
we tend to generalise from our experiences with one thing (my dog) to other things (all other 
dogs) if they seem to belong to the same category, with the similarity often determined based 
on physical characteristics. This kind of generalisation seems to be a very basic thing humans 
do: “Long before we learn to talk, our expectations concerning novel members of a category 
are shaped by our experience with already-encountered members” (Leslie 2017: 393). So if I 
was bitten by a dog as a child, I may generalise that experience and live with a fear of dogs for 
the rest of my life. Most of the time, these generalisations are useful and innocuous. They help 




communication easier (if I ask you to meet me under the tree, you will not wait for me under a 
gazebo, even if you do not know which tree I meant). However, such generalisations can 
become problematic if they are used in service of a specific mechanism: “the route by which 
we reach general conclusions regarding dangerous or harmful features” which reveals “a 
cognitive bias that has contribute to certain virulent forms of prejudice” (ibid. 394). ‘Birds have 
feathers’ and ‘Muslims are terrorists’ are both generic statements, yet the latter is clearly 
harmful whereas the former is descriptive and uncontroversial.  
Leslie (ibid. 395) calls such generalisations about harmful features striking property 
generalisations. She (2007: 375) is concerned with whether we assign truth conditions to 
generic statements. A statement like “mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” (ibid. 376) is true, 
even if only a small number of mosquitoes do (conversely, the generic statement ‘mosquitoes 
don’t carry the virus’ will be false, even if most don’t). This is a striking property generalisation 
because mosquitoes who do carry the virus pose a threat to us. To be true, generic statements 
of this kind require only that some of the individuals in the category/kind possess the mentioned 
characteristic. Not all generic statements are intuitively true in this way. Striking property 
generalisations “are special in that their predicates express properties that we have a strong 
interest in avoiding” (2017: 396). Categorising in this manner is also a product of our evolution. 
The evolutionary advantage to this kind of thinking is clear – the person who believed ‘wolves 
kill people’ had a better chance of surviving than the one who waited for the wolf to make its 
intentions clear.  
How does this tie in with xenophobic narratives? Leslie argues that because this kind of 
thinking or generalisation works in some contexts, we assume that they work in all contexts.   
We draw no distinction between ‘hungry lions are dangerous’ and ‘foreigners are dangerous’. 
In the non-social realm this way of thinking may be useful, but in the social realm it does far 
more harm than good. The negative effect of this is compounded by the fact that we very easily 
obtain such generalisations but getting rid of them is harder. It is clear that the narrative themes 
identified in Section 1 exhibit this kind of thinking: ‘foreigners are criminals’, ‘foreigners bring 
disease’. Some of these generalisations may be based on personal experiences with individual 
foreigners, for there are without a doubt individuals who, for example, engage in criminal 
activities such as selling drugs. This poses a difficulty, for any narrative which tries to claim 
the contrary will be dismissed by xenophobes, who only have to point toward the nearest 




We only need one hungry lion, or one rabid dog, to be wary of them all: “Our most basic 
method of generalization seems to encourage us in reasoning from “some” to “many” or 
“most,” or even to “all,” at least when striking properties are in play” (ibid. 398) – Leslie calls 
this the introduction condition –  but even a considerable amount of healthy dogs or law-abiding 
foreigners will not make us give up our generalisation. While the introduction condition is 
“undemanding”, the elimination condition is more demanding. Where striking properties are 
concerned, we will continue making generalisations essentialising those properties “over and 
above our beliefs about the prevalence of the property” (ibid. 397, emphasis in the original). 
Taking this into account, one may despair of our ability to think in ways which do not 
essentialise. Leslie, however, provides us with two reasons to hope. 
Despite our very strong tendency to generalise in this way, rooted in our evolutionary history 
and in our psychology, this kind of generalisation is not inevitable. Increased interactions with 
individuals from the stereotyped or essentialised social group (e.g. ‘foreigners’) counteracts 
this kind of thinking: “Familiarity and knowledge can get us to view increasingly narrow kinds 
as the basic-level kinds” (ibid. 414). Through exposure we come to learn that ‘Muslims (basic-
level kind) are terrorists’ is false. We may define narrower kinds: ‘religious fundamentalists’, 
or ‘members of Al-Qaeda’.26 Through contact, we come to see that not all members of the 
group share the feared characteristic. Reading or hearing stories about other people can, in this 
case, also count as ‘contact’, as it can give us knowledge and insight into people we were 
ignorant of. Where stereotypes essentialise and generalise, stories individualise, helping us to 
narrow down our generalisations.  
This insight of Leslie’s echoes the contact hypothesis, discussed in Chapter 2. There we saw 
that specific forms of contact can be conducive to lowering prejudice. In the final section of 
this chapter, I will suggest a form of contact which will create the sense of a shared goal and 
promote collaboration, but for now I want to focus on one of the important processes which 
takes place during positive and especially sustained contact. Pettigrew et al. (1998) identifies 
the internal processes which take place during and after positive contact, which result in people 
being less prejudiced. Two of these we see in Leslie’s point above: learning about the outgroup, 
and ingroup reappraisal (ibid. 70, 72). Learning about the outgroup can help to work against 
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stereotypes and judgments based on ignorance or incorrect information or assumptions about 
the group. It gives the ingroup a fuller picture, which can help humanise the outgroup in their 
minds. As suggested above, this learning can take place in direct contact (e.g. storytelling 
sessions, facilitated interactions) but also through gaining more information about the 
outgroup. In Section 4.1 I suggest how we can approach our school curriculums narratively, 
and part of that should include subjects (such as history and life orientation, but also literature) 
which have modules focussing on telling stories about other places and people.27 
The second process relevant to our discussion which Pettigrew identifies is ingroup 
reappraisal. Prejudices are expressions of the kinds of generalised statements Leslie is 
concerned with, and positive interactions with others can not only lead us to question the 
essential characteristics we previously ascribed to them, or narrow down our generalisations, 
but it can also lead us to question what we held to be essential about our own identities. As 
xenophobia expresses both a belief that the xenophobe belongs necessarily or naturally, and 
the foreigner does not, addressing how we think about ourselves in this way is also crucial. 
This kind of reappraisal can sever the link between citizenship and indigeneity, as suggested 
in the previous section. The encounter with a stranger poses a challenge to our world views, 
because theirs may be (radically) different. Our understanding of our own identity is often 
formed in part by our understanding that we belong to this group instead of that group, with 
the accompanying assumptions about superiority and inferiority. In Chapter 1, I referred to the 
need for a stranger in order to define the self. Learning about and interacting with other groups 
will therefore also teach us something about ourselves, and more than just that we may have 
been wrong in our beliefs and assumptions. We may come to understand ourselves, as 
individuals and as groups, in a new way: 
Optimal intergroup contact provides insight about ingroups as well as outgroups. 
Ingroup norms and customs turn out not to be the only ways to manage the social 
world. This new perspective can reshape your view of your ingroup and lead to a 
less provincial view of outgroups in general (“deprovincializaiton”). (Pettigrew et 
al. 1998: 72) 
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Another strategy Leslie suggests for fighting the kind of bigotries that result from essentialising 
or generalisation thinking concerns the way in which prejudices are transferred (from one 
generation to the next) through our language. Our tendency to essentialise or think in terms of 
generics seems to be a universal feature in human cognition, but what we choose to essentialise 
(i.e. which kinds) varies across cultures and contexts. This means that “we are not hard-wired 
to form the specific social categories that we do” (Leslie 2017: 415). This raises the question 
of how and why we learn specific categories. Leslie suggests that our language contains cues 
that children pick up on, which indicates to them which groups should be essentialised: 
[O]ur very choice of words to describe racial, ethnic, and religious kinds may subtly 
communicate to children that these kinds are to be essentialized. We need not say 
anything negative about these groups – the use of generics or even simply labels 
may communicate that these are essentializable groups, and so open the door to 
prejudice. (ibid. 418) 
Cultural socialisation theories (Chapter 2.1.1) show us how prejudices are transferred across 
generations, as children learn both ingroup and outgroup bias from authority figures. Leslie’s 
findings support this. She refers to a study in which different groups of children were read 
different versions of the same story, the one frequently using generic language, while the other 
contained no generic language but used specific noun phrases (ibid. 416). The book was about 
creatures called Zarpies, and the first version would state “Zarpies hate…”, whereas the second 
version would say “this Zarpie hates…”. The results were conclusive: children in the first group 
treated Zarpies as an essentialised kind, whereas children in the second did not.  
This provides us with a way of working against our inherent tendency to make generalisations, 
where such generalisations have no place (i.e. as applied to human groups and affairs). Leslie 
suggests that instead of categorising, we should describe. Speaking of ‘the Zimbabwean poet’ 
instead of ‘the poet from Zimbabwe’, or ‘a Muslim person’ instead of ‘a person who follows 
Islam’ signals to children that there is something essential about being Zimbabwean or being 
Muslim and, consequently, something essential about nationality or religion. This insight need 
not only be applied to children. Changing how we speak or how we label can change how we 
think about people – how essential or natural we take certain characteristics or even identities 
to be. This change in how we speak and think provides us with a tool we can use alongside 




indigeneity. We can learn that there is nothing essential or natural about ‘being South African’, 
and that even being ‘from here’ is not inherent to our identity or personhood.  
The changes in our language which Leslie suggests can be implemented in how we report about 
incidents involving foreigners in the media, in our everyday speech, but perhaps most 
effectively in how we teach to our children. Leslie’s research shows how a very simple change 
in the stories our children are exposed to teaches them to essentialise or individualise different 
kinds of people. This can add to the transformatory potential that narratives have, making them 
more effective in bringing about real change. As I suggested in the previous section, narratives 
and stories can connect us to others in a special way, as they are often emotive and imaginative 
(an idea I return to in Section 3). If our narratives rely on a kind of language which has been 
shown to work against our tendency to overgeneralise and essentialise, their effect can go 
deeper. Those who wish to bring about change and to work against xenophobia should therefore 
be careful of the kind of language that they use, and create narratives (whether policies, 
everyday stories, public speeches, books for children, or games) which makes use of 
descriptions rather than essentialised categories. 
3. The Narrative Imagination and Judgment  
The previous section showed us the directions and themes our narratives can take to work 
against the negative effects of the kind of xenophobic narratives discussed in Section 1. Such 
narratives will have a profound effect on our identities and our institutions, especially 
institutions governing membership norms, borders, and citizenship. The question still remains 
how we can incorporate such narratives into the functioning of our institutions. In what ways 
can the exemplary individuals who want to change institutions to be less xenophobic, use 
narrative as a tool to achieve that change? In the final section of this chapter I will suggest the 
kinds of activities we can pursue to achieve this. Before we come to that I will consider how 
we can make narratives present in our judgments, including but not limited to the legal or 
judicial sense.   
3.1 Poetic Justice 
Understanding laws and regulations, or indeed institutions, as narrative-free things can limit 
the power or efficacy of such institutions or even obstruct justice. This is the basic idea behind 
Martha Nussbaum’s (1995) notion of poetic justice. Nussbaum (ibid. xiii) identifies a problem 




Very often in today’s political life we lack the capacity to see one another as fully 
human […] Often, too, these refusals of sympathy are aided and abetted by an 
excessive reliance on technical ways of modeling human behavior, especially those 
that derive from economic utilitarianism. 
This is arguably still as true today as it was in the 1990s, as we came to rely increasingly on 
technology to facilitate our interactions. New forms of interactions were made possible by the 
internet and especially by social media, and while this did create novel ways of connecting to 
people, it has not necessarily led to people forming more or better connections overall. While 
contributing to the formation of connections and promoting relationship formation in some 
instances, our new technologies also often contribute to our inability “to see one another as 
fully human”, as anyone and everyone is exposed to the wrath (bullying, trolling, death threats) 
of anonymous individuals. Social media for the most part remains a place where people can 
express their bigoted opinions about other races, nationalities, sexual minorities, or women 
with almost no consequences. This effect is compounded by the ‘bubbles’ that social media 
algorithms create, ensuring that you almost only see things that are in line with your own 
ideological beliefs. That our online interactions mirror the kind of economic utilitarianism 
Nussbaum is concerned with is evidenced by the politically irresponsible ways in which 
companies like Facebook ensure that they get as many users, clicks, and traffic as possible.  
Nussbaum is concerned with what falls through the cracks when we only rely on economic or 
utilitarian models. Such models, while useful in some contexts, cannot be relied upon as a 
complete guide to political relations, both among citizens, and between citizens and state 
institutions. In public discourse, in law-making, in politics, rational argumentation is enriched 
by adding storytelling and literary imagining. Nussbaum acknowledges the limitations of 
storytelling or her ‘literary imagination’, the same limitations we are concerned with here: 
The literary imagination has to contend against the deep prejudices of many human 
beings and institutions and will not always prevail. Many people who tell 
wonderful stories are racists who could not tell an individualized empathetic story 
about a black person […] Our society is full of refusals to imagine one another with 
empathy and compassion, refusals from which none of us is free […] Even when 
we have found a good story to tell, we should not hope to change years of 




fancy, even when adequately realized, is a fragile force in a world filled with 
various forms of hardness. (Nussbaum 1995: xvii) 
 Fancy, storytelling, and the literary imagination cannot stand alone. Yet a rationality without 
the “ingredient” of the literary imagination becomes purely instrumental, calculating. Such a 
rationality will fail in the aims of justice. Similarly, our contemporary dream of equality will 
remain a dream if we only rely on utilitarian calculations or imagination-free rationality, for 
the latter cannot “enter imaginatively into the lives of distant others” (ibid. xvi) and is therefore 
blind to their particular needs and struggles. 
For Nussbaum, we limit the power of fancy with our prejudice and our unequal and narrow 
cultivation of our sympathies for fellow humans. Instead of rejecting fancy because it is 
imperfect, Nussbaum suggests that we rather consistently and humanely cultivate fancy and 
construct “institutions, and institutional actors, who more perfectly embody, and by 
institutional firmness protect, the insights of the compassionate imagination” (ibid. xviii). This 
means recognising the ways in which certain kinds of narratives contribute to people’s 
oppression and suffering, or exhibit individual and societal prejudices, while at the same time 
telling different kinds of narratives that do the opposite. This also means that, for the literary 
imagination to be effective, its work needs to be public and not merely private. For Nussbaum, 
the literary imagination is essential to public rationality and it provides us with an ethical stance 
that allows space for rules and formal decision procedures. 
Our need for more tools in our rational toolbox is becoming more evident. The kind of 
rationality that Nussbaum criticises – a rationality that deems itself as superior to the emotions, 
as justifiably devoid of fancy, a purely logical and instrumental approach – is blind to so many 
realities of the human condition. While many problems can be reasoned away in this way, many 
problems we face cannot be solved through this kind of instrumental rationality, precisely 
because they spring from our emotional lives, if one considers the role that fear plays in 
xenophobia. One can, for example, try to counter a white supremacist’s narrative that white 
people are inherently intellectually superior by pointing toward the countless geniuses of colour 
and the large number of white people who are far from intelligent. This, however, seldom 
convinces those with deeply held prejudicial beliefs. The kind of rationality that Nussbaum 
criticises, is a rationality that believes that all we need to make our calculations are facts. But 
facts are not always convincing. While some people are swayed by evidence and empirical 




(e.g. climate change) when confronted with the evidence, while refusing to change their minds 
about another (e.g. that all foreigners are not criminals) when given those facts. This will 
depend on the kind of person, what they hold more or less important, and what they believe 
about themselves and the world (i.e. the narratives they choose to believe or not). 
This is not to say that facts and fact-checking, and reasoning based on those facts, are not 
important – I discussed this in the previous chapter with reference to Arendt’s emphasis on the 
importance of the factual matter in our judgments. Altering or changing facts, or positing 
‘alternative facts’ that are glaringly false, is a totalitarian strategy. Totalitarian movements 
shape and create ‘truths’ to suit their propagandistic needs. People fall for this trick, because 
these new ‘truths’ may align with their deeply-held prejudicial beliefs, or because they are 
comfortable to believe. The facts are changed and arranged in such a way that they seem to 
wholly explain everything – they do away with uncertainty completely – bringing into being a 
“lying world of consistency which is more adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality 
itself” (Arendt 1973: 353). The false narrative told by a totalitarian logic explains fully, and 
therefore relieves the masses form the responsibility of thinking and judging for themselves, 
of trying each on their own to make sense of the world. Factual truths are very often 
inconvenient or scary – think of the evidence supporting climate change, and its implications 
for our future as a species. It would perhaps be rational to believe the evidence, given that we 
will then be able to take the necessary steps to save what we can. However, if we look at how 
the world is reacting to facts like climate change, it is clear that humans very often choose 
comfort over truth. When confronted with facts, we often believe and act irrationally. For this 
reason, facts or reason alone cannot be relied upon to bring about positive change in any area 
where humans’ deepest fears and prejudices are concerned. 
The question arises that, if we cannot rely on rationality to counter the irrationality of prejudice, 
what can we do? Nussbaum may offer different reasons for why she is sceptical of ‘pure’ 
rationality than I do above, but her insights are useful. On the one hand, both Nussbaum and I 
recognise the value of rationality and facts. However, we both want to make the point that this 
does not tell the whole story – that our reality cannot be fully understood or wholly explained 
by relying only on rationality. And, I would add, nor can it change for the better. What is needed 
is a way to meet people where they are – in the messiness of life, with their biases and 
prejudices and irrational judgments and emotions. Narratives do this. Narratives illuminate and 




3.2 The literary imagination 
I have been speaking of ‘narratives’, ‘narrative identity’, and ‘public narratives.’ These 
concepts are not exactly the same as Nussbaum’s ‘literary imagination’ or ‘fancy’. To 
understand her relevance here, we must understand what is meant by the ‘literary imagination’, 
and how it links, to my mind, with narratives and narrative identity.  
When Nussbaum refers to the literary imagination, she is interested in it as a form of “public 
imagination, an imagination that will steer judges in their judging, legislators in their 
legislating, policy makers in measuring the quality of life of people near and far” (Nussbaum 
1995: 3). I am interested in both its public and personal forms, recognising as Nussbaum does 
the potential in both forms. Public institutions, after all, are made up of individuals, and one 
individual with a strong personal capacity for literary imagining may take the institution they 
form part of in new directions. Similarly, imaginative institutions may influence the thinking 
and imagination of the individual members in a positive way.  
Nussbaum’s specific focus is on the novel as literary genre, looking at the inner lives of the 
characters, but also the kind of feeling and imagining created by the telling and the reading of 
the text. It is not only the content of the novel that is important, i.e. what story is being told, 
but also the way in which the story is told, the shape it takes. A novel’s educational and 
illuminating potential lies on many levels: the actual story or plot, the inner lives of the 
character, the experience of the reader, and the author or novel’s intentions with the reader. 
When busy with literary analysis, all of these facets are considered. Similarly, we should 
question our own individual and group narratives, as well as the narratives of others, from all 
these perspectives. Not only to listen to the story itself, but to ask why is it being told, why in 
this specific way, why by this person, and why to oneself? One’s skill in this almost sceptical 
reading of or listening to stories can be sharpened by increased exposure to stories. To use 
Nussbaum’s terms, we build and strengthen our literary imagination by reading novels and by 
engaging with other forms of storytelling. 
The reason Nussbaum chooses to focus on the novel form is the special nature of novels: novels 
can be morally controversial because they provide us with a “normative sense of life” (ibid. 2). 
Novels are often descriptive, in that they show us how people who differ from us live, but they 
are normative in the sense that they can illuminate possibilities for a different kind of life or 




Like other forms of literature, novels focus on what is possible, what can happen, while also 
asking of readers “to put themselves in the place of people of any different kinds and to take 
on their experiences” (ibid. 5). It is this dual power of novels – to show new possibilities, to 
take on others’ experiences – which activates the literary imagination.  
The question is, how is such ‘taking on experiences’ possible? Narratives, especially the kind 
found in novels, work on two levels: the general and the particular. When reading, a reader can 
connect and emotionally invest in characters because of shared hopes, fears, and human 
concerns (the general aspect). We understand and sympathise with characters because we know 
what it is to feel what they feel. This creates the connection that allows us to ‘step in’. But we 
are also touched and, at times, transformed by the particular, concrete situations of the 
characters; by the ways in which their contexts differ from ours, or their reactions to situations 
familiar to us, or their unique struggles. Having already formed a bond with them, we are open 
to learn from the strange, new context of the characters. Nussbaum emphasises the usefulness 
for our own reasoning and judgment of this constant play between the general and the 
particular: 
In this way, the novel constructs a paradigm of a style of ethical reasoning that is 
context-specific without being relativistic, in which we get potentially 
universalizable concrete prescriptions by bringing a general idea of human 
flourishing to bear on a concrete situation, which we are invited to enter through 
the imagination (ibid.: 8) 
Nussbaum likens this way of ethical reasoning to Adam Smith’s notion of the ‘judicious 
spectator’, or ‘impartial spectator’. In asking how we can judge impartially, Smith is asking 
primarily how we can judge our own conduct. He offers the idea of an ‘impartial spectator’ as 
a reflective device – in our minds, when judging, we imagine what the judgments of others will 
be and measure our own against that. This prevents us from judging purely in our own self-
interest: 
In solitude, we are apt to feel too strongly whatever relates to ourselves […] The 
conversation of a friend brings us to a better, that of a stranger to a still better 
temper. The man within the breast, the abstract and ideal spectator of our 




If we cannot have a literal spectator (whether friend or stranger) against whom we can measure 
our judgments, we must call upon our inner impartial spectator. This spectator, as a reflective 
device, helps us to view our own sentiments and motives at a distance from us, allowing us to 
see them more clearly. Amartya Sen (2010: 70) also calls on Smith’s spectator in his criticism 
of the Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness. Smith’s spectator can help us understand 
justice in way that (i) uses comparative assessment instead of transcendental solutions; (ii) 
takes note of social realities; (iii) allows for incomplete social assessments, while still providing 
guidance for a move toward a more just society; and (iv) incorporating voices from those 
outside a specific group (in his discussion, a specific contractarian group).  
Smith’s idea is not unique – it has some things in common with Kant’s disinterested aesthetic 
judgments. Kant, in turn, inspired Hannah Arendt’s theory of political judgment alluded to 
above. There are therefore certain similarities between Arendt’s theory of judgment, and 
Nussbaum’s call for literary imagination in judges. Nussbaum is critical of Kant, while both 
Kant and Arendt would doubtless shudder at the thought of opening up political theory and 
policy-making to the emotions. For Arendt (1998: 243), emotions like love should have no 
bearing on the political sphere, as they are fundamentally apolitical and antipolitical. There is 
a difference, however, between using love as a driving-force behind political decision-making 
and judgments, on the one hand, and judging in such a way that it accounts for the role that 
emotions do play in human interactions, social and political, on the other. To ignore the latter 
would be to miss crucial information and insights. What Nussbaum and Arendt both recognise 
is the importance of the imagination in our political judgments. I will briefly consider Arendt’s 
theory of political judgment before returning to Nussbaum.  
Arendt’s (1982) incomplete theory of political judgment (incomplete due to her death) is a 
creative reading of Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment, as set out in his Critique of Judgment 
(Kant 2007). Where Kant was concerned with aesthetic judgment, Arendt saw the seeds for a 
theory of political judgment. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant is especially concerned with 
reflective judgment, where we judge from the particular to the universal (ibid.: 15). Reflective 
judgments, unlike determining judgments (judging from the universal to the particular), have 
the benefit of flexibility. Determining judgments rely on what we already know but cannot help 
us when we need to judge something new. Reflective judgments, because they start from the 
particular, can. When making aesthetic judgments, we judge from our own particular 




Kant also argues that such judgments are disinterested, because they are concerned with our 
experience of the beauty, and not with the objective existence of the object we are judging (we 
can find things in dreams beautiful). Our delight in an object is not dependent on that object’s 
existing, and because we are not concerned with its reality, we are able to judge it 
disinterestedly. However, because our particular judgments are disinterested (i.e. not springing 
from personal desires), we expect other people to share this judgment (ibid. 43). This gives the 
judgment a universal claim to validity. We therefore measure our own aesthetics judgments 
against those of others, which gives them a measure of objectivity. We look for confirmation 
of our taste in the tastes of others, and we feel that others should share our judgments. This 
measuring of our own judgments against those of others, and the expectation that others should 
agree, is based on what Kant (ibid. 68) calls the sensus communis, or common sense – 
something we all possess, evidenced by the fact that we are able to communicate our judgments 
and understand one another.  (I am simplifying greatly, for the sake of space, but the minute 
details of Kant’s argument are not directly relevant.) 
Kant’s notion of a form of judgment which is particular, but which gains universal validity by 
measuring it against the judgments of others, provides us, according to Arendt, with a 
framework from which we can make political judgments. The unpredictability of human action 
and the unprecedented events of the twentieth century (specifically the Holocaust), convinced 
Arendt that traditional forms of judgment are inadequate. We need a form of political judgment 
that is impartial yet takes the measure of complex human realities; that has universal validity 
but allows us to form judgments of the unprecedented; and, importantly, does not only ‘listen’ 
to one voice. In making political judgments, we should take everyone involved into account 
(incorporating voices from outside, as Sen suggests). To do this, we should share our judgments 
(Kant called this publicising) with others. This need not be understood literally. As with 
Smith’s impartial spectator, one can make others present in one’s mind by imagining the 
possible judgments of others. The person who opens their mind in this way, the person with an 
enlarged mentality, becomes a world-citizen. The point of this form of judgment, of this kind 
of mentality, is to avoid parochialism while still being rooted in the particular. What Arendt, 
Kant, Smith, and Nussbaum have in common, therefore, is an appreciation for the important 
role that a diversity of voices play in forming judgments, specifically (with the exception of 





Nussbaum’s literary imagination effects this – the imaginative act of making others present, of 
taking others into account – by valuing fancy. Stories are powerful and they exercise our 
literary imagination and our ability to make inclusive, disinterested judgments, because of 
certain features of the genre. In fictional storytelling, characters are distinct and they exhibit 
psychological depth and complexity. In stories, the flat images we have of strangers (like 
foreigners) are fleshed out and given life and we realise that there are similarities between those 
lives and ours even when there are differences in our concrete circumstances. We realise that 
characters have complex inner lives, and we wonder about these inner lives. Stories are also 
participatory. There is a writer or a teller, a reader or a listener. The former creates, the latter 
interprets (which is also a creative exercise). Readers and listeners can become emotionally 
involved with the stories, but can also appropriate the story as their own, “showing possibilities 
for human life and choice that are in certain respects their own to seize” (ibid.: 31). This 
investment in the characters also open our eyes to the fact that other people, people different 
from us (Nussbaum uses the example of the workers in a Dickens novel) have stories of their 
own to tell, which makes them profoundly human. This mind shift is important, for many forms 
of oppression are tolerated and supported because we cannot imagine the other as fully human. 
Dehumanisation starts in our minds and influence the material conditions that prevent some 
from flourishing: “Dehumanize the worker in thought, and it is far easier to deny him or her 
the respect that human life calls forth” (ibid.: 34). 
Importantly, the literary imagination should not replace the rational or scientific in our decision 
making but supplement it. Without it, citizens will fail to develop certain moral capacities that 
will allow them to apply the normative conclusions of moral and political theories to their own 
lives and realities. The literary imagination engages our emotions, because emotions are part 
of the structure of stories. Critics of the emotions see them as blind forces that prevent us from 
thinking rationally, as threats to good judgments, as a weak spot in humans who should strive 
to be stable and not needy. Nussbaum convincingly disproves these assumptions. Our emotions 
are not mere impulses – grief, anger and joy are not the same as hunger or thirst. She sees 
emotions as “ways of perceiving” the world, connected to our cognition and judgments, 
influenced by and influencing our more rational selves. Emotions are not necessarily 
‘irrational’ or ‘unchecked’ (ibid.: 61). Anger can be a completely rational response, for 
example, to abuse or injustice. And a person who does not respond to the loss of a beloved with 
grief is not a person I would trust. Yet, for some reason, we think this is the way we should act, 




Rationality helps us to determine how much it is reasonable or prudent to feel in a specific 
context (e.g. how much pity to feel for someone, based on the nature of their loss), whereas the 
literary imagination helps rationality see beyond figures, utilitarian calculations, and see the 
nuance and complexity of human lives, to find adequate solutions to problems.  
In arguing for room for the literary imagination in policy making, judgment, and political 
theory, Nussbaum is not asking us to do something wholly alien, or to learn a strange new skill. 
We already have this capacity in us, for “all of human life is a going beyond the facts, an 
acceptance of generous fancies, a projection of our own sentiments and inner activities onto 
the forms we perceive about us” (ibid.: 38). In fact, we use this capacity regularly, but not 
always in the positive way that Nussbaum envisions. Stereotyping, xenophobic and other 
discriminatory narratives are ways in which we go “beyond the facts”, in which we believe 
fictions, metaphors, and fanciful projections. The content of our stories matter – how they align 
with facts, how they interpret facts, but also how many stories (individual lives, different 
perspectives) are contained within our bigger stories. Fancy, in Nussbaum’s sense, is generous, 
it sees more than there is, but unlike negative stereotypes it is hopeful, giving and forgiving.   
Nussbaum’s main concern is with the institution of the judiciary. Can judges, in their 
interpretation of laws and constitutions, use and develop their literary imaginations? Nussbaum 
thinks this is possible. A judge’s technical and legal knowledge, legal reasoning, and the 
constraints put on interpretations of the law by precedents, form the structure within which the 
judge’s literary imagination can work. Without the law (or, in the broader context I am 
interested in, without institutional structures), judgment is not possible (ibid.: 117). Without 
the literary imagination, however, the judge’s judgments will not reflect the “historical and 
human complexities of the particular case” (ibid.: 81). Rather than clouding his or her 
judgment, the literary imagination and its basis in emotions commits the judge to neutrality, 
because the literary imagination allows us to place ourselves at a distance from our private 
concerns by incorporating the concerns of others into our judgments. Yet this neutrality does 
not mean that judges should distance themselves from social realities: 
[I]ndeed, she is enjoined to examine those realities searchingly, with imaginative 
concreteness and the emotional responses that are proper to the judicious spectator 




have suffered unequal disadvantages and therefore need more attention if they are 
to be shown a truly equal concern. (ibid.: 87) 
The literary imagination is attentive to inequalities and disadvantages because it opens our eyes 
to other forms of life, other people’s struggles, and it illustrates how those struggles may have 
been caused by the world. Literature and narratives more broadly can make us attentive to 
injustices on a personal and global scale, to the inequalities between groups, but also to the 
personal struggles and strivings of individuals. For Nussbaum, the literary imagination 
importantly allows us to individualise people in the way I suggested in my discussion of 
generics, to look at them as equals and not purely members of a (despised) group: 
Group hatred and the oppression of groups is very often based on a failure to 
individualize. Racism, sexism, and many other forms of pernicious prejudice 
frequently ground themselves in the attribution of negative characteristics to the 
entire group […] portraying the group as altogether subhuman […] This does not 
mean that even in contact with an individual one cannot find many ways of 
dehumanizing him or her in thought. It means, however, that when one does 
manage for whatever reason to take up to the individual the literary attitude of 
sympathetic imagining, the dehumanizing portrayal is unsustainable, at least for a 
time. (ibid.: 92) 
Nussbaum recognises that many public servants may not list ‘reading novels’ as their favourite 
pastime (although it may be more popular among judges). This poses a serious challenge to the 
incorporation of the literary imagination into political, economic, and legal theory as well as 
practice. As I said above, all humans have the ability to think fancifully. But the literary 
imagination is fancy that is cultivated for the purpose of recognising oppression, injustice, and 
the disadvantages people face, and also for the purpose of recognising the common yet unique 
humanity of others. Simply reading novels will not necessarily do this (not all well-read people 
are necessarily morally exemplary individuals). But even if one granted that reading or 
listening to stories can have a positive effect, can open people up towards others in many 
instances (which Nussbaum argues for, and I agree with), we would still face the problem of a 
broader public that generally does not read. In South Africa, there is the added problem of a 
lack of access to books, even where there may be a desire to read. This is why literacy 




change every single person’s heart or prejudices (once again, unattainable), but to change 
enough perspectives to bring about societal change.  
A further point should be made in response to this problem. Reading novels is by far not the 
only way with which we can engage people’s imaginations or change their xenophobic 
perspectives. Nussbaum chooses to focus on novels, but my focus throughout has been all kinds 
of storytelling, and all genres of narrative (from history writing to everyday conversations). 
Below, I even discuss games as narratives. On grassroots levels, initiatives exist that bring 
people together to share their stories. One such initiative is the Human Library, an organisation 
that organises story-sharing events worldwide. The basic idea is that the library contains 
‘human books’ and it provides a safe space in which ‘readers’ can engage in dialogue with the 
human books, asking and answering difficult questions. The ‘books’ are volunteers who want 
to share their stories, and generally come from groups that are “often subjected to prejudice, 
stigmatization or discrimination because of their lifestyle, diagnosis, belief, disability, social 
status, ethnic origin etc.” (Human Library, n.d.). It may sound strange to ‘take out’ a person as 
one would a book. However, given that all participants consented and did so because they 
believe their story can have a positive effect, the idea holds promise.  
The Human Library works with a wide variety of organisations and institutions, from public 
libraries to private sector companies. Similar work is done by the Centre for Stories mentioned 
in Chapter 4. Elsewhere, such storytelling happens in more informal contexts, for example with 
churches and NGOs organising facilitated workshops in which people from different 
communities and backgrounds come together to share, listen, and connect. What is needed is 
institutional commitment to make such meetings possible – not only from institutions such as 
the church or the NGO sector, but especially from the public sector.  
Nussbaum’s ‘literary imagination’ provides us with an ideal of how we should think and judge, 
as well as with examples of legal judgments made where she thinks the judge employed the 
literary imagination (ibid.: 99-117). However, her theory does not solve the problem of 
developing the will to acquire or cultivate the literary imagination. Any strategy that we 
develop, any course of action we propose, will face this problem. Novel reading is limited, for 
the accessibility reasons given above, but also due to the history of the novel, and the form that 
novel-reading takes. As an activity, reading novels can isolate us from the world, or keeps us 




others, sometimes on public forums, or even when the subject of the novel is political. 
Historically, reading novels is also an activity pursued by the bourgeoisie. Although this pursuit 
is by no means exclusive to the middle classes, the novel even in its modern form (and 
consumption) to some extent retains that link. Furthermore, many novels do not seek to form 
connections or sympathies, or even to educate – many, if not most, seek simply to thrill or 
entertain. One can question Nussbaum’s choice of the novel, but the novel is by no means the 
only genre of storytelling that can cultivate the literary imagination. Below, I propose two 
alternative types of narrative that might play the same role as the one Nussbaum envisages for 
the novel.  
4. New narratives 
4.1 Curriculum as narrative 
I will briefly consider a single context or public institution in which we can promote the literary 
imagination and storytelling, which to my mind will have the largest impact: education. A 
child’s formal education serves two purposes. Firstly, to develop the child through the 
transference of knowledge and skills, which in turn will help the child navigate the world (e.g. 
get a job when they become adults). Education therefore enables a child to participate in 
society. Secondly, where public education is concerned, education is a means through which a 
state can shape its citizens and so its future (Hjerm 2005: 291). Narratives to counter 
xenophobia can be incorporated into children’s education in two ways: (i) through promoting 
diversity in schools; and (ii) through the curriculum (understood as a narrative, or containing 
narratives, itself), which would include the teaching of democratic values. 
The role of storytelling in curriculum development and teaching has been a subject of inquiry 
in pedagogical studies for a couple of decades. Stories are recognised as part of the classroom: 
“Textbooks tell stories and teachers bring stories to tell, stories about the subject matter they 
teach, or curriculum stories. These stories are narratives that organize the curriculum and are 
communicated in the classroom throughout the school year” (Gudmundsdottir 1991: 201). The 
curriculum serves as a kind of grand narrative, with teachers telling shorter stories to fit and 
give meaning to specific modules. Storytelling is used as a strategy in answer to “a special 
teachers’ problem” (ibid. 208) that of translating what they know into words for the children 
to be able to acquire that knowledge. Weaving the contents of the curriculum into a story aids 
learning, more so than merely relaying facts. It better captures the attention of learners, while 




ordering principle and a structure of meaning that is, at its root, fundamentally moral” (Sandlos 
2010: 5). So history lessons, life orientation classes on diversity, and even economics classes 
can become meaningful to students in a way it would not if they merely approached the 
knowledge as a list of facts. They will be able to recognise the moral implications of those facts 
(e.g. the fact of colonialism) and gage appropriate responses.  
The education system often falls prey to the kind of rationality Nussbaum criticises, with 
schools chasing pass rates and academic goals set by education departments, and less ‘useful’ 
directions of study (music, art) battling for funds while other school-related activities, notably 
boys’ sports like rugby, are funded. Teaching and learning are approached like one would 
approach a to-do list, with ‘knowledge’ measured according to how well a student can answer 
test questions. This kind of instrumental approach to education is limited (in terms of what can 
be truly learned) and limiting (in the sense of limiting the potential of the learners). Where 
curricula are designed in this to-do-list fashion, they may seem meaningless to both learner and 
educator. Through approaching the curriculum as a narrative, educators create meaning by 
relating the facts to the lives of students and the contexts they find themselves in (see 
Gudmundsdottir 1991 for discussion). An educator who does this exhibits Nussbaum’s literary 
imagination, for they do not approach education instrumentally – i.e. meeting targets, ensuring 
good grades, and merely relaying facts – but they ask how and why what they teach is 
meaningful, and how their subjects are relevant to the lives of their students and to the world 
outside. This kind of imagination will also enable teachers to adapt their teaching styles and 
curriculum stories to face particular challenges, for instance in dealing with a particular learner 
who has difficulty concentrating, or who exhibits behavioural problems like aggression in 
class. Here storytelling also comes into play: teachers share their experiences and strategies 
with one another, and experienced teachers exhibit a kind of practical case knowledge, or 
‘recipe knowledge’, about what works and what does not, in general but also in response to 
specific students (ibid. 211).  
We should not only approach teaching and the curriculum narratively, but also incorporate the 
kinds of narratives suggested in Section 2 into the curriculum, using the non-essentialist 
language that Leslie proposes. So we can learn in history lessons about a war between France 
and England, but fought by ‘soldiers on the French/English’ side, or about the contribution of 
migrants to industrialisation and mining in South Africa, and speak of ‘migrants from the rest 




able to acquire this specialised kind of knowledge, and imaginatively create meaningful 
narratives about their subject matter. Subject matter (especially where it relates to our social 
and political lives) should include a diversity of perspectives and lend itself to the medium of 
storytelling. The biggest change should come in how we approach knowledge acquisition, and 
here I do not have any suggestions other than stating that we should not view knowledge in 
purely instrumental terms, but as part of the human story. I leave it to the pedagogical experts 
to work out how we can achieve this, but I make one suggestion in this direction when I 
consider guided play in Section 4.2 below. 
4.2 Social play and narrative games 
4.2.1 Our evolutionary heritage 
As has been argued above, any response to xenophobia or attempt to make people less 
xenophobic must take place on the institutional and individual levels. Institutional change is 
only effective in so far as institutions are deemed legitimate by the people and are accepted by 
the people. Individual change, on the other hand, is only broadly effective if it has an impact 
on institutions. On both these levels, xenophobic narratives have to be countered with new 
narratives. But our whole notion of narratives and narrative identity faces a problem. In Chapter 
2, I considered the possibility that the phenomenon of xenophobia may have a basis in 
evolutionary biology. Xenophobia, in its broadest sense, seems to exist in human cultures 
across the world, and throughout the ages, and even in the animal kingdom. Out of this 
instinctive fear, many forms of xenophobia and discrimination arose, taking different forms 
depending on the context. If xenophobia, broadly defined, is innate or instinctive, then the idea 
that we can somehow change who we are and how we react to others by simply telling stories 
seems frivolous. But ‘phenomenon x gave early humans an evolutionary advantage’ does not 
mean: ‘humans evolved (genetically) to necessarily exhibit phenomenon x tendencies.’ When 
I argued in Chapter 2 that xenophobia seems to be instinctive, I did not mean that it was 
inescapable. While our genetic and evolutionary history, just like our social norms and 
traditions, play an important role in who we are and how we act, it does not tell the whole story: 
‘“Built-in” does not mean unmalleable; it means “organized in advance of experience”’ 
(Marcus 2004: 40).  
To say that humans have an innate tendency to react fearfully to strangeness, is not to say that 
humans are innately violent. Some may be more open to strangeness than others, and even 




and determination instead of violence. This means that we can understand xenophobia as a very 
old phenomenon, shared with other animals, and connected to our innate fear of strangeness, 
while also understanding xenophobia in its current form as a product of our narratives. We can 
understand our narratives as stories about that fear, or reactions to that fear. Seeing this fear as 
innately human, we still have room for the possibility that we can act and react in ways that are 
not xenophobic.  
When speaking of xenophobia in the animal world, I do not refer to aggression between 
different species, but rather to aggression between different groups of the same species, such 
as two prides of lion in adjacent territories. I suggested, in Chapter 2, that if we want to 
understand xenophobia fully, we need to look at instances of it in the animal kingdom. Our 
closest biological relatives, chimpanzees, are highly aggressive and highly xenophobic. Yet 
other primates, such as bonobos, are friendlier and more open to strangers from other bonobo 
groups. Bonobos, like humans, have the capacity to be xenophilic as well as xenophobic, 
dependent on the circumstances. Xenophilic, in this context, means “prosociality toward 
unfamiliar individuals” (Tan, Ariely & Hare 2017: 14733). It is this prosociality that enabled 
early humans to form large societies built on trust. Prosociality in animals (including humans) 
is communicated using signals of positivity, which establishes trust between the sender and 
receiver. There are various theories about why humans developed this ability more than other 
animals: we inherited it from our primate ancestors; it developed through uniquely human 
institutions such as intermarriage, or it is a product of group selection. Tan et al. suggest that 
prosocial responses to strangers are found in species other than humans as well “where the 
selfish benefits of bonding with new partners outweigh the costs” (ibid.). The benefit here 
would be expanding social networks, and the costs of potential aggression from the stranger. 
Bonobos exhibit such traits, for example choosing to share food with a strange bonobo instead 
of a familiar one, even when there is no possibility for social reward (ibid.). Another way to 
check prosociality is to look for contagious yawning, which indicates social rapport between 
the yawners. Chimpanzees yawn when members of their group yawn, but not when group 
outsiders yawn, whereas bonobos yawn for both (ibid.). Of course, in the bonobo world as in 
the human one, there is often aggression between strangers. Yet these findings indicate that 
being xenophobic is not the only way that animals have evolved to deal with strangers, or that 




Animals use different strategies to survive. Aggression is not always the only means to secure 
survival. Cooperation, evasion, submission, and most importantly for our purposes, curious 
and playful interactions, are often more effective to ensure survival. It is in these kinds of 
reactions which, I believe, an alternative reaction to fear and strangeness can be found, which 
would counter our seemingly innate xenophobic tendencies. Our fear of strangeness stems from 
how uncomfortable and insecure we feel when faced with the chaos of unpredictable life and 
unknown others. Writing on this reaction of ours to chaos, Toni Morrison (2019: viii) has the 
following to say: 
I have been told that there are two human responses to the perception of chaos: 
naming and violence. When the chaos is simply the unknown, the naming can be 
accomplished effortlessly […] When chaos resists, either by reforming itself or by 
rebelling against imposed order, violence is understood to be the most frequent 
response and the most rational… 
However, argues Morrison, our response to control either through categorisation or through 
force is not the only response to chaos (in whatever form): 
There is, however, a third response to chaos […] which is stillness. Such stillness 
can be passivity and dumbfoundedness; it can be paralytic fear. But it can also be 
art. (ibid.) 
Art – whether storytelling (Morrison is of course concerned with the importance of writers and 
literature), painting, dancing, or developing games – is as much an ‘instinctive’ reaction to the 
unfamiliar, as is violence and control. But unlike violence and control, art can be creative and 
not destructive. Art is also, usually, collaborative (even if sometimes in small ways – the writer 
writing, the reader reading).  
4.2 Play as a tool to moderate xenophobia 
Our fear of strangeness and strangers is fortunately not the only remnant of our evolution. We 
already know that we are also storytellers, but another innate trait of humans is that we like to 
play. We share this trait with almost all other animals. We rely on play and games to gain 
knowledge (think of animals learning to hunt and fight through play), to form social bonds, to 
let off steam in a non-aggressive way, and simply to entertain us. In a recent study on 
xenophobia in wild lemurs, a group of scientists (Antonacci et al. 2010) investigated the role 




In ancient times, the Olympic Games were staged after (according to mythology) the Oracle of 
Delphi said that a sport competition would end the Peloponnese wars (and, in fact, the Games 
were followed by the Olympic Truce). It is not only formal or structured play that holds this 
potential. Research in child development found that “play fighting (or rough and tumble) leads 
to the direct inhibition and regulation of aggression, thus improving social integration” (ibid. 
1). The potential of play to reduce xenophobia is down to the flexibility and improvisation 
found in play, which inspires cognitive and behavioural innovation. The impact on people when 
working together for a common goal (e.g. to score a goal) should also not be underestimated. 
For me, play is also effective because it is fun and, one can assume, doing fun things together 
strengthens relationships. 
So, how did the lemurs act? The question the study poses is what the benefits of play between 
adult lemurs are, as adult-adult play is relatively scarce, and more specifically whether it is 
used to manage xenophobia. They selected a specie of lemur, the sifaka, where adult-adult play 
occurs. Like most lemurs, the sifaka live either dispersed (solitary or in pairs), or in xenophobic 
groups sealed to outsiders. The only time the group composition varies is during mating season, 
when males visit other groups in search of receptive females. The researchers (ibid.: 2) made 
several predictions, of which the following are relevant here: 
i. Play is not solely affinitive behaviour (unlike grooming).  
ii. Under certain circumstances, males would modulate and moderate their xenophobic 
response (to prevent females from mating with unfamiliar males), as more males can 
be beneficial to the group (increased vigilance and protection). Play is used as an ice-
breaker to curb the xenophobic response, so a higher level of play is expected between 
males unfamiliar with each other, and a decrease of violent or agonistic interactions 
after play. 
iii. Rough play will be more common among in-group males than between strangers, as 
playmates must trust each other during rough play, to avoid escalation into serious 
fights. 
Prediction one was supported by their findings: grooming mostly took place among group 
members and was clearly an affinitive behaviour. Play, however, took place between in-group 




…ingroup males engaged in play with outgroup males more than with ingroup 
ones, [while] females engaged in play with ingroup and outgroup males at 
comparable levels. Hence, male-male adult play seems not to be a purely affinitive 
behaviour, but mostly a means to test emergent relationships between strangers. 
(Antonacci et al. 2010: 4) 
The second prediction was supported. The researchers found that adult play is utilised to 
manage new social relationships, rather than as a means to maintain existing relationships:   
[Our] results indicate not only that play is the interface between strangers, but also 
that it has a specific function in reducing xenophobia […] normally expressed by 
this species via aggressive chases. Aggressions by ingroup males were 
preferentially directed toward outgroup males […] After play, conflicts between 
unfamiliar males plunged to the levels observed between familiar males. 
(Antonacci et al. 2010: 6). 
Prediction four was partially supported – ingroup males engaged in aggressive play with 
outgroup males, but for shorter periods of time than with ingroup members. An explanation for 
this could be animals’ reaction to social stress. Studies have shown that there is an increase in 
social play when rats who were separated are reunited again. Social play appears to be a toolkit 
for controlling aggression and overcoming stress and, in this instance, of curbing xenophobia, 
which ultimately allows outgroup males to become part of the group. Note that some aggression 
remains but the nature of or motivation behind that aggression changes – in-group males start 
treating out-group males in the same way as they treat each other. While social play has the 
potential to decrease instances of certain kinds of aggression, it cannot prevent all forms of 
aggression.  
I suggest that there is great potential in using play to mediate between ingroup and outgroup 
individuals, of curbing xenophobia and building relationships of trust and cooperation. That 
play can have positive social impact is clear from the studies done on animals (as above) and 
children, which indicate that the mere fact of playing together is already beneficial. Playing 
can also be an educational tool, an important point to note when thinking about strategies to 
educate people about ‘foreigners’ and for incorporating anti-xenophobic narratives into school 
curricula. Above, the issue was raised that people may simply choose to ignore facts about 




Fortunately, a simple relaying of facts is not the only way to transfer information or to educate. 
Studies done on language acquisition and mathematical teaching among children indicate that 
games, or guided play, is often the best way for a child to learn. Guided play can take a narrative 
form, with children being asked to tell a story as they play with objects.28 One challenge very 
young children face as they learn language is to identify objects which belong to the same 
category – to know that a palm and a baobab and an oak all belong to the category ‘tree’, or 
that elephants and humans and dolphins are all ‘mammals’. The same problem arises in 
teaching children geometric shapes, especially unusual instances of shapes. Yet multiple 
studies have found that children acquire the ability to transfer their existing shape knowledge 
to new, atypical shapes if they are taught those shapes through guided play with adults. 
Recognising that children thrive in free play, ‘guided play’ utilises the combined benefits of 
free play and adult supervision to attain specific learning goals (Weisberg et al. 2016: 178). 
Children taught in this manner can identify far more shapes than children taught by didactic 
instruction (Verdine et al. 2016: 157). Guided word play also help with language acquisition, 
with adults “[providing] new information for children to learn while playing and guiding 
children to think and explore ideas and experiences that they may not have thought of on their 
own” (Wasik & Jacobi-Vessels 2016: 772).  
Through play, children also receive a social education. They learn to share, to trust, to play by 
the rules, to formulate rules, and importantly to get along with other children (see Gagnon and 
Nagle 2004). As a young pre-schooler, games such as ‘cops and robbers’ were very popular 
among my peers, as were games that imitated what we saw adults doing (work-work, marry-
marry, teach-teach, etc.). These games always involved an element of role-playing and 
storytelling, but also of othering, with clear normative implications (good cops vs bad robbers). 
Perhaps we were taught some of these games (the first is certainly played more widely than my 
rural hometown), but even when we made them up we used the games to draw distinctions, 
enforce moral norms, and even sometimes create hierarchies. Playing seems to be a way in 
which children get to know the world, but also a way in which they attempt to make sense of 
it and navigate through it. 
                                                 
28 This is the approach taken in narrative play therapy, a form of therapy which in part aims to help children 




An important aspect of play is this fact that it teaches us cooperation, and the ability to 
construct, follow, and enforce rules. This ability has clear political advantages. In my 
discussion of contact theory in Chapter 2, I emphasised the fact that contact can only have a 
positive effect (i.e. lessen prejudice) if it is of the kind that promotes intergroup cooperation, 
as cooperation requires trust, and together they are the foundations for relationship-building. 
Playing, within the confines of the rules set by the game (whether formal or informal), allows 
players to test one another and determine the trustworthiness of the other. Even games in which 
players all compete against one another rely on cooperation, not in the sense of helping each 
other out but in the sense of cooperating with the rules of the game. This is in the interest of all 
the players. Even if a cheater may be having fun by not cooperating, once the cheating is 
discovered fun is no longer possible (because other players will refuse to continue playing). 
Cooperation and trust as necessary aspects of games is what leads political theorists to see 
political life as a kind of cooperation game, in which individuals may have diverging goals, but 
such goals can only be achieved if we all follow the rules of the game. I will consider one area 
of game-playing to illustrate the ways in which we can use games to tell anti-xenophobic 
narratives, which includes sharing facts in a manner that, like the teaching of facts in school, 
would be more effective if done narratively. 
4.3 Games and gaming: unlikely allies to our cause? 
In recent years, a new trend in the gaming world saw video games starting to take a more 
narrative form, with players investing more in their characters’ well-being, even where the 
characters and their circumstances may differ radically from the players. Game developers are 
including philosophical ideas (often relating to questions around AI, which is also a form of 
otherness) into their games. Like other forms of narrative fiction, video games often offer 
alternative realities or counter-factuals, asking the player to imagine a different kind of world 
in comparison to the one they live in. Games of all sorts are also ideal mediums for 
philosophical thought experiments. The benefit of games, especially video or digital games, is 
the immersive experience offered. Games offer accessible, sustained immersion and, on top of 
that, they are interactive in ways that books and films, for example, rarely are. What you do in 
a game matters. 
It is a stretch to say that the road to world peace is paved with gaming consoles. Many games 
do not promote peace – the enduring popularity of first-person shooter games is a clear 




an issue. However, gaming is becoming more popular as younger generations increasingly live 
their lives online (think of the current worldwide popularity of Epic Games’s 2017 release 
Fortnite, with 250 million players in March 2019). The increasing pervasiveness of games and 
gaming, as well as other relationship-forming digital interactions (e.g. social media) should not 
be underestimated. For decades, parents, politicians and the media have fearfully wondered 
about the negative impact games have, to the extent that criminal activities are sometimes 
blamed on games. We are ready to accept that games have a deep impact, if that impact is 
negative, but we rarely ask about potential positive impacts.  
As game developers increasingly incorporate narratives and philosophical ideas in their games, 
sometimes consulting professional philosophers as part of the development process, the 
potential to develop games that would encourage openness to others, curiosity, and cooperation 
increases. Video games are also recognised as a means to teach philosophical concepts to the 
public (i.e. outside of academia) in a way that is accessible and applicable to people’s everyday 
lives (see Webber & Griliopoulus 2017). 
Video games may be the newest form of gaming we do, but developments in more traditional 
forms of game-playing also create room for new, non-xenophobic narratives, or promote 
cooperation. Tabletop games (such as card games, board games, or dice games) are prevalent 
throughout history, in cultures across the globe. Such games are still very popular today. A few 
games exist that deal specifically with questions relating to refugees and immigrants, such as 
the United Nation’s Refugee Agency (UNHCR 1995) simulation or role-playing game (RPG) 
Passages, and the The Migrant’s Journey series (Migrant Journeys, n.d.). In the Journey games, 
each player is assigned a character and the game represents the journey of that character – a 
migrant or asylum seeker – from their country of origin to the new country where they try to 
build a new life. Along the way they meet with challenges (such as crossing the border with no 
papers), and they learn about migration, immigration laws, and the obstacles migrants have to 
overcome. The game is facilitated by people who are familiar with the realities migrants face 
on their journey and in their new country (ibid.). 
With Passages, the UNHCR recognised that  
Games are one of the best methods to help people understand phenomena which 




to experience emotions in a very personal and enduring manner, but on a smaller 
scale than in real life. (UNHCR 1995) 
Passages is a simulation game or RPG, in which players literally have to pretend to be their 
character. RPGs like Passages are perhaps our richest potential resource if our aim is to change 
xenophobic attitudes through play. RPGs can take various forms – online, in person, table-top. 
Importantly, RPGs are by definition narrative, cooperative, collaborative, and interactive. 
Moreover, they require more imaginative ‘work’ from the player than your standard computer 
or mobile game. The player is given descriptions and perhaps even images, but imagining the 
stories and the worlds fully is the player’s responsibility. It follows that the better you imagine 
the world, the more you will be immersed, and the better you will play.  
What is most interesting about RPGs is the nature of such games. If we understand RPGs as 
exercises in collaborative narration, they offer us a tool with which pro-‘stranger’, anti-
xenophobic narratives can be told and, what is more, this tool can function on both an individual 
and institutional level. Individuals play these games, but institutions can facilitate or host such 
games. Many organisations, especially in the corporate world, already have resources set aside 
for ‘team building’ exercises, of which some could be categorised as social play. It is not 
inconceivable that RPGs similar to Passages could be played in such contexts. A closer look 
at the motivation behind Passages and the rules of play will illustrate how RPGs are 
collaborative narratives. 
The aim of Passages is to create awareness among young people specifically about what the 
UNHCR calls the “refugee tragedy” (UNHCR 1995). Part of this tragedy is the xenophobia 
that refugees face in their host countries and the fact that “xenophobic tendencies threaten the 
centuries old tradition of granting asylum” and, therefore, the UNHCR’s strategy for protecting 
refugees includes “explaining to the public exactly who refugees are and what they have been 
through”, because people need to “understand that refugees are not a threat to them, but are 
themselves threatened” (UNHCR 1995). The agency’s reason for developing a game to achieve 
these ends is quoted above. They chose a simulation (or RPG) game specifically because it 
works through the creation of a simplified but dynamic scale model of reality. It is 
an effective way of allowing people to live and feel a remote situation. This 
particular game is designed to help create awareness, arouse emotions and 




The more concrete goals of the game is to have participants discover the struggles that refugees 
face, feel something of the psychological anguish caused by being displaced and fleeing to a 
new place, understand the process refugees go through to become refugees, think about 
solutions to the problems, change their attitude to be more welcoming to refugees, and 
encouraging them to take action on refugees’ behalf (UNHCR 1995). These are high goals, and 
it is unlikely that every individual who plays a game like Passages will achieve them all, or 
that any changes that may occur during the game will be sustained for a long enough period in 
every single instance. Games are not the tool to end xenophobia, but they offer a tool (or a few 
tools) that may help in that struggle. The likelihood of failure, the imperfection of the outcomes, 
should not be a deterrent to try and use this tool. We saw, with the lemurs and studies done on 
children, that social play can and does work. 
Participants in a game of Passages are divided into ‘families’ and each given a character. They 
are expected to study this character, and during play to become that person. The players learn 
of a terrible event that occurred, which forces them and their family to flee. They enact the 
separation from home and social connections, and the anxiety of escape. They decide what to 
take with them and what to leave behind, and how they will make the journey. All decisions 
they make will have an impact on their journey and the outcome of the game. Other realities 
faced by refugees are enacted: finding shelter, dealing with overcrowded conditions, filling in 
forms in foreign languages, dealing with hostile border officials, living in the refugee camps, 
applying for asylum, trying to ‘fit in’ in a new cultural context. After playing the game, 
participants attend a debriefing session where they share what they felt and thought while 
playing, and what they learned (UNHCR 1995).  
The narrative aspect of RPGs is clear – the game tells a story, but the players also become 
actors or participants in that story. Through their decisions, the shape of the story is changed, 
and potentially its outcomes. Moreover, players do not play only as individuals but as teams or 
at the very least they have important interactions with others. In this way, players collaborate 
in telling the story, even if they may be in conflict in the game. The skills learned in RPGs 
should be transferrable to real-life situations. Many games are very complex and require 
problem solving skills, often requiring players to work together to solve the problems. Any 
actions have real (in the game) consequences, and players can clearly see what caused them to 
be denied asylum. Of course, in life we cannot always identify causes as easily, but the games 




of action may be. Because there is sometimes an element of chance in such games, players 
need to think strategically, and they know that violence does not necessarily bring success. 
Games need not necessarily be explicitly philosophical or about xenophobia or immigration to 
foster relationships (the lemurs certainly weren’t playing The Journey). Once again, the point 
is playing with other people, whether the game’s content is concerned with xenophobia or not. 
Even a game like chess, which is highly competitive and arguably has a xenophobic tinge – it 
is about war, after all – can bond people together. However, it should be noted that games can 
have a serious negative effect on us as well, depending on the kind of game. There are without 
a doubt games, and gaming communities, that are explicitly xenophobic, racist, sexist, etc., just 
as there are games and gaming communities that actively promote and celebrate aggression 
and violence. Many mass shootings, from those at Sandy Hook (2012) to the 2011 attacks in 
Norway, are perpetrated by avid gamers who, indeed, practice their tactics in video games. The 
popular imagination quickly grasps at this as an explanation of the violence and games 
doubtless have an influence in some instances, yet it should be noted that this influence is often 
overestimated, and the data is by no means conclusive (see Ferguson 2014 for discussion). Yet 
many online games do become meeting places for white supremacists and other groups with 
oppressive, violent ideologies. Furthermore, there are games that actively promote violence 
against women and minority groups. For example, in 2002 a game called Ethnic Cleansing 
(National Alliance 2002) was published, in which neo-Nazi or KKK characters have the 
opportunity to kill Jews, Muslims, African-Americans, and other minorities.  
Even more ‘tame’ games that do not expressly promote extremist ideologies sometimes 
become sites of xenophobic, racist, sexist, and homophobic discrimination and abuse. Massive 
online multiplayer games like EVE Online (CCP Games, 2003) draw players from across the 
globe, yet players seem to prefer allying themselves according to national identity. 
Furthermore, some nationalities are viewed especially negatively. In EVE, Russian players are 
accused of being aggressive, unnecessarily violent, insular (for speaking Russian and not 
English on forums, and only forming alliances with other Russians), and cheaters, violating 
game rules for their own gain (Goodfellow 2015: 344). They are considered “other”, different 
from other players, and this is often explained with reference to their “Soviet” nature and 
cultural differences. Some players call for the removal of the Russians from the global servers 
to their own, Russian server – an online version of ‘go back to where you came from’. Russian 




Real world prejudices and animosities are replicated in the virtual world, with similar narratives 
being told. 
The existence of games such as Ethnic Cleansing and the real-life horrors they echo and inspire 
do not, however, disprove my point. Nationalists, terrorists, white supremacists recognise the 
potential of games to create community, to train, to tell their desired stories and, sadly in this 
instance, it is often effective. Fortunately, these are not the only or even the majority of games 
in existence. The challenge is to create games based on different kinds of narratives. There are 
countless games in which the focus is not conflict, violence, warfare, or national or ethnic 
difference. As we see with EVE, the absence of nationality in a game’s design does not prevent 
national alliances from forming. However, other online games are designed in a way that 
actively counteracts such alliances.  
I will briefly discuss one example, to show how this is possible: the indie adventure game 
Journey (Thatgamecompany 2012). In Journey, players find themselves in a seemingly empty 
world. The aesthetics remind one of the Middle East without stereotyping or exoticisation. The 
player follows a journey through the desert, with the goal of reaching a high mountaintop. What 
makes this game interesting is the way players encounter other players when played online. As 
you go on your journey, you may be joined by another player. You do not have any information 
about this player (who they are, where they are from) during the game, although you can find 
out after completing it. The only means of communication is to signal the other player with 
your unique musical chime. This chime easily becomes a way of greeting, of calling, and of 
thanking. As the two players continue their journey, they can help each other by recharging 
flight power, showing in which direction to go, etc., but they cannot harm each other or prevent 
the other from continuing on the journey. Journey also has a narrative aspect (even if it is not 
explicit), as your journey follows a tapestry that was woven about your life. What this game 
shows us (and there are many games that do this) is that it is possible to create games which 
(a) are representative of cultures other than the dominant European/American cultures (even if 
it is not specific), and in a positive way; and (b) allow for collaboration without the option of 
harm (i.e. allows only for positive interactions). Even given the choice to ‘go your own way’, 
players usually choose to collaborate and help each other. 
Another beneficial skill taught by many games is effective communication, both in speaking 




game Dixit (Libbelud 2008), in which players share clues describing illustrated cards. Each 
player gets a turn to share a clue based on a card of theirs, and the other players have to pick a 
card from their pile that matches the clue. The players then vote on which card they think is 
the original card. The game requires players to be imaginative in two respects: firstly, thinking 
of a clue (each card has a different, fantastical and weird illustration), and secondly to imagine 
what the other players are thinking (in order to interpret the clue and vote for the correct card). 
Games such as these require players to step outside of their own minds and ways of thinking, 
and into the minds of other people, in a way not dissimilar from the kind of representative 
judgments proposed by Nussbaum, Arendt, and Smith. 
Granted that video and board games can do the things I suggest (develop narrative skills, 
strengthen bonds), the problem of unequal access remains. Being able to play games means 
that one has the time, the resources, and the digital and/or analogue literacy. This excludes a 
large portion of the world population. It is unlikely that gaming is a pastime that many people 
have access to in the communities in South Africa where violence typically breaks out. In 
response to this problem, I offer a few points. Firstly, I suggest gaming as a tool in a whole 
toolbox of strategies to tell anti-xenophobic narratives. As such, I think this is a novel 
suggestion that can only increase in potential as games and technologies become more 
accessible. We need new and innovative ways to share stories and promote philosophical (i.e. 
critical) thinking, and I think gaming or playing can do this. 
Secondly, while video games as an example because they offer a particular kind of immersive 
experience which holds great potential for my purposes, I am not only concerned with video 
games or, for that matter, any kind of formal game. I am talking about all kinds of games, and 
all forms of social play. It is hard to imagine a community existing that does not engage in 
some form of play at some time (whether through sport, or ritualised dancing, or culture-
specific games). At the very least, where children are present games will be played. Children 
have an astonishing capacity to develop games with the most meagre resources (a box, a tin, a 
handful of pebbles holds a world of possibilities). Creating open access games can also work 
against this limitation. 
Thirdly, many public institutions are set up in such a way that incorporating play would not be 
difficult or require much resources. I already mentioned the corporate world’s love of ‘team 




many religious institutions already have these structures in place, the former because play is 
often already part of the educational toolbox, the latter because their aims are (in part) to create 
community. It is perhaps not wise to ask a philosopher for practical advice on how to apply 
their idea(l)s to the world, but even a glance at our curriculum and community institutions 
should convince one that it is possible to incorporate game-playing of the kind I suggest 
(especially games such as Passages, which are open access). 
An area of play I did not consider, but which has a strong potential in achieving similar aims – 
cooperation, relationship building, communication – is of course sport. Sport is not as clearly 
narrative as the other forms of playing I discussed. Nevertheless, love of a sport and support of 
a team is an important factor in the identities of sport-lovers, and it is true that narratives are 
constructed around these identities and specific sports events (think, for example, of the 
legendary status of the 1995 Rugby World Cup Final). I chose to focus on video and board 
games, as they have a clearer narrative purpose and structure, and as little research has been 
done in this direction (compared with sport).29 I will, however, briefly discuss sport as a form 
of anti-xenophobic play. The first thing to mention is the fact that sport, just like play between 
lemurs or dogs, is often seen as a proxy for war – George Orwell (1945) famously said that 
“sport is war minus the shooting”. The positive aspect of this is that it can diffuse tensions, as 
we saw with the lemur study. The negative side is that sport can become a site of virulent and 
even violent nationalism. Just as with video games, the potential of sport to bind people 
together is used by nationalists to suite their purposes. So authoritarian and totalitarian regimes 
promoted mass sport as a nation-building strategy, and support of elite sport (e.g. national 
teams) as unifying (see Koch 2013 for discussion). However, studies also support the claim 
that sport can improve intergroup relations, among other positive benefits: “It has been shown 
that sport events can enhance individual and collective capacities, improve efficacy, create 
social capital and, where poverty is implicated, promote social and economic justice and well-
being” (Schulenkorf & Edwards 2012: 380).  
It is conceivable that, as with gaming, the ability of sport to have a positive effect depends on 
the context. Sport on a national level may too easily promote nationalism or competition, 
whereas sport on an informal level (friendly games, but perhaps even if competitive) is more 
                                                 
29 The distinction between video game or board games and sport is misleading. Some table-top games, like chess, 
are considered forms of sport, while Esports (electronic sports), i.e. competitive gaming, is a rapidly growing 




likely to achieve the kinds of ends we are after. Sporting days and matches that are facilitated 
in such a way that it promotes positive interaction and having fun can be organised at schools 
and in communities where there is tension between foreigners and citizens. Here team sports 
like soccer would work best, with low stakes (so that competition is not too fierce) and ‘mixed’ 
teams (i.e. not different nationalities playing against each other).  
The biggest benefit of play, in whatever form, is that it promotes the kind of imagination 
Nussbaum and Arendt are after, through activities and resources that are more accessible than 
novel reading. I have already shown how the imagination can be activated in games, but even 
in team sports imaginative judgment is necessary, for a player cannot act on her own but has 
to think about the movements of other players in relation to her. Whether games will promote 
xenophobia, or help fight xenophobia, depends on the content of the game and the culture of 
the gaming or sporting community in which it is played. We are quick to condemn the negative 
potential of (competitive) games, when we should be focusing on the potential positive impact 
that other kinds of games can and do have. The benefit of cooperative games, whether online, 
at a workshop, or in a sports stadium, is that they shift our attention away from ourselves. I 
almost want to call it the Playful Veil of Ignorance. Playing together, even if it is a competition 
creates a sense of camaraderie. The aim of most games is, primarily, to have fun. And when 
we have fun, we more easily form a connection with those we are having the fun with. Yet 
even when we are not playing with a stranger, the mere act of play can teach us valuable skills. 
Games require trust (that everyone will play by the rules) and cooperation. Depending on the 
kind of game, they can strengthen our narrative skills, our imagination, our communication 
skills, and our ability to ‘walk in another’s shoes.’ We can also learn about the world and about 
other people through games, which can be a powerful counter to harmful prejudices that are 
often the product of ignorance and isolation. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I joined my earlier discussion of xenophobia to the theory of narrative identity, 
to show how our narratives about ourselves and about foreigners contribute to creating a 
xenophobic world in which foreigners are unsafe and reviled, but also to show how we can 
retell our narratives, or tell new narratives, in a way that would work against the negative effects 
of xenophobia. The intention here was not to provide us with a detailed action plan against 




In the first section, I looked at the kinds of justifications that are given for xenophobia, or the 
‘facts’ about foreigners that people believe in. I identified three broad narrative themes – that 
foreigners are harmful to the economy, that they do not belong ‘here’, and that they pose some 
kind of threat – underlying xenophobic attitudes and discourses. I discussed these with specific 
reference to the South African context and showed how they are either based on false 
assumptions (e.g. about who has a right to what, or about the responsibilities of the state), false 
‘facts’, or half-truths. The intention here was to show how we should measure narratives 
against known or discoverable facts, but also to show how our beliefs, assumptions, and 
prejudices about foreigners find expression in narratives, and how those narratives in turn lead 
to specific actions or harmful practices such as civic ostracism and violence. However, the 
problem of getting people to believe the facts still remained, as did the question of how 
counternarratives can effectively work against the effects of xenophobic narratives.  
Section 2 addressed the latter point, identified in Chapter 4 as one of the limitations of narrative 
views: the problem of the limited potential narratives have to effect societal change. For 
narratives to really change anything, I argued, they should not only inspire individuals but 
should also be institutionalised. Only through institutional change can real change come about. 
I argued that institutions, like individuals and groups, have identities and that these identities 
are also informed by certain narratives (e.g. institutional policies). Depending on the shape they 
take, some institutions provide us with identity-shaping narratives, as is the case with 
constitutions. The problem of institutional change is circular: society can only change if 
institutions change, but institutions only change if the individuals that form part of institutions 
desire a change. What we need, I argued, is exemplary individuals who can inspire other to put 
pressure on institutions to change.  
Before showing how such individuals should act or judge (this was discussed later on), I first 
had to look at where institutional narratives can have a positive effect. In Section 2.2 I therefore 
provided some markers for the directions which our political narratives can take, focussing on 
the most effective areas of our public institutions we can target to bring about change that 
would be beneficial for those of foreign descent who live in our borders. These targets are our 
borders and the laws governing them, and our membership norms and our ideas of citizenship. 
I provided arguments for why we should reinterpret how we understand borders and 
citizenship, and suggestions for what ideas we should base our new narratives on. Instead of 




into all our narratives that would effectively undermine the kind of essentialist thinking we see 
in xenophobic narratives. I showed that our connection between borders, belonging, 
indigeneity, and citizenship, boils down to how we categorise people through forming 
prejudices and shaping our identities. Leslie’s work on generics showed us how our 
generalisations about people can lead to essentialist thinking, where we see the generalised 
properties as necessarily part of everyone belonging to the essentialised group. So we come to 
see nationality and origin as essential characteristics. Leslie’s suggestion that we should change 
our language, from referring to people using generalisations to rather offering descriptions 
about people, was accepted and I suggested that our narratives adopt this kind of language, 
especially the narratives which we tell children given, as we saw in Chapter 2, that children 
learn who they should be biased against through socialisation. 
In Section 3, I returned to the question of institutionalising narratives, and specifically of how 
exemplary individuals should contribute to bringing narrative to institutions. I looked at how 
narratives or narrative thinking can be incorporated into our judgments, political and legal. I 
relied on Nussbaum’s idea of poetic justice and the literary imagination, and Arendt’s theory 
of political judgment, for this. Both theories require us to employ our imaginations, so that we 
are able to recognise the struggles of others and measure our judgments against theirs. This 
prevents us from being parochial, and also from instrumentalising or dehumanising others. For 
this study’s purposes, the kinds of judgment Nussbaum and Arendt call for demands that we 
not only listen to foreigners but take them (their lives and opinions) into consideration and 
involve them when making decisions, especially policy decisions, which would affect them. 
In the final section, I discussed the possibility of incorporating narratives into our education 
system, by approaching teaching the curriculum narratively, but also by including the 
narratives and language strategy suggested in Section 2 in curriculum content. Within the 
education system, the kind of judgment suggested in Section 3 can be implemented to great 
effect. I showed how a narrative approach to teaching makes learning more efficient, as it gives 
meaning to the facts and allow students to relate such facts to their own lives. What they learn 
in lessons about the historical movement of people, the ways in which national borders were 
determined, or about unfamiliar cultures, can lead them to question their own world-views and 





Finally, I considered a novel way to reduce xenophobia: through play. This section builds on 
the conclusion of my second chapter: that deep down xenophobia is a response to a primal fear 
of strangers, and a product of our evolution. The question here was therefore whether the 
natural world provides us with examples of how we can reduce outgroup aggression, and I 
discussed a study which showed that lemurs reduce xenophobic tension through play. This led 
me to consider games as a possible way in which we can incorporate narratives into our 
interactions. This section addressed both the question of making facts believable and effecting 
real change, as I argued that games can be played in public and in private, and that structured 
play, which has a narrative element to it, has been shown to be a more effective teaching tool 
than a mere relaying of facts. I showed how playing is often a narrative exercise, as any game 
has rules of some sort, often an aim, and sometimes a backstory. I discussed video games, 
board games, and sports as tools we can use in schools, organisations, and informal settings to 
foster the kind of imagination required in our judgments and to immerse ourselves in the 
experiences of others, and in so doing gaining some understanding. Play, I argued, is effective 
because it allows people to bond while having fun, because it can open our minds to new ideas 
and new narratives, and because it teaches us crucial cooperation skills that we can apply when 
cooperating with others in the world. In the act of play we can set our rigid identities to the 
side, and the relationships created and knowledge gained may provide the basis for new 








The poem with which I started asks the question, “How much of your flame did Ernesto 
Nhamuave need?” (Shoro 2017: 25-26). This question goes to the heart of what I uncovered 
over the course of this study: that xenophobia in all its forms and manifestations, is not about 
the foreigner. The presence of strangers, the political and economic context one finds oneself 
in, all of these things exacerbate the situation and contribute to xenophobic attitudes being 
expressed and acted upon. But the fact that humans are xenophobic, in their thinking and in 
their feelings as well as in their actions, is primarily due to how they think and feel about their 
own place in the world, their own apprehensions about belonging and anxieties about their 
existence. The flames burn in the xenophobes, and the foreigners in our midst become the 
scapegoats for our own pain, failings as a society, and rigid yet insecure identities. 
At the outset of this dissertation I set out two aims: firstly, to make sense of xenophobia as a 
specific idea of belonging and exclusion based on the idea of foreignness (Chapters 1-3), and 
secondly to determine how our individual and political identities contribute to individual 
xenophobic prejudices and acts of discrimination, as well as the construction and upholding of 
a xenophobic social and political order, and how we can construct a less xenophobic world 
(Chapters 4-5). These combined aims contribute toward our philosophical understanding of 
xenophobia as a distinct phenomenon, a topic which receives relatively little attention in 
academic philosophy in comparison with other forms of prejudice, discrimination, or 
oppression. 
The first step in my argument was to provide a conceptual analysis of xenophobia by 
investigating its origins, expressions, and its moral harms and general effects. Chapter 1 
considered xenophobia as a contemporary phenomenon, and one which has close ties with 
racism. Because xenophobia and racism so often go hand in hand, we tend to equate them or 
to see xenophobia as a form of racism. I provided an overview of xenophobia in South Africa, 
with the aim of showing how the two overlap, but also how our understanding of racism could 
prevent us from identifying and condemning xenophobic discrimination. The link between 
xenophobia and racism is enforced in the way it manifests in South Africa, as xenophobic 
violence in South Africa is directed primarily at people of colour and specifically other African 
nationals. This is a product of our very specific colonial and Apartheid history. In other 
countries, anti-immigrant or anti-foreigner sentiments are also mostly directed at outsiders who 




is undermined, as xenophobic violence is often perpetrated by black South Africans and 
directed at black Africans. Even considering the possibility that the racist logic of colonialism 
and Apartheid had been internalised by some black South Africans, a superficial equation of 
racism and xenophobia leaves us without the conceptual tools to make sense of anti-foreigner 
discrimination where both the perpetrators and the victims are of the same race. I explained 
this with reference to Kim and Sundstrom’s argument that our national narratives and rhetoric 
of race only recognises certain forms of discrimination as racist and therefore morally harmful, 
and that equating xenophobia with racism therefore shelters xenophobia. 
For this reason, I argued that we need a distinct conception of xenophobia. This does not mean 
that I denied its connection to racism, but rather that I saw them as often reinforcing forms of 
oppression that also manifests separately in some contexts or instances. I considered Kim and 
Sundstrom’s attempt to distinguish xenophobia from racism, where they looked at the effects 
of xenophobia to find its distinguishing characteristic. They argued that the core of xenophobia 
is civic ostracism, and that this also constitutes its moral harm as outsiders are prevented access 
from certain goods. While agreeing broadly with their argument, for indeed xenophobia does 
harm foreigners in this way and it is morally condemnable for that reason, I argued that this 
does not yet provide us with a distinct conception of xenophobia. Other groups are also 
ostracised in remarkably similar ways. We should rather ask what the motivations behind civic 
ostracism are. The difference between xenophobia and racism therefore lies primarily in the 
driving motivations behind each. I argued that xenophobia is civic ostracism based on an idea 
of foreignness that is informed by how we think about belonging. This points towards the 
prepolitical and psychological origins of xenophobia, to which I turned in the second chapter. 
Before I did that, however, I showed how these ideas about foreignness and belonging find 
political expression in how we think about citizenship. I argued that xenophobic ostracism is 
the result of a conception of citizenship that is linked with indigeneity and origin, and that this 
also determines who we identify as scapegoats to blame for all manner of societal ills. This 
chapter showed that xenophobia is a reaction to our apprehensions about belonging, but it also 
becomes a way in which we regulate belonging. 
To understand contemporary xenophobia as a distinct phenomenon, I therefore had to ask 
where our ideas about belonging, and foreignness originated. This was the aim of Chapter 2. I 
first looked at xenophobia as a form of prejudice, where our prejudices are the result of ingroup-




strangers. This argument was made by drawing on four theories that seek to explain prejudice: 
the social identity theory, the cultural socialisation theory, the isolation thesis and contact 
hypothesis, and group threat theory. In my discussion, it became clear that these four theories 
each highlight specific aspects of prejudice and that these theories, rather than standing in 
opposition to one another, can be brought into conversation with one another. The social 
identity theory and cultural socialisation theory showed us how individual prejudices are the 
result of the process of identification or identity formation, and how such prejudices are then 
shared and transmitted socially as we become part of groups. For this reason, I turned to the 
question of individual and group identity and the role they play in xenophobia later in the study. 
The final two theories pointed toward our emotional and psychological response to strangers, 
and I argued that isolation and superficial contact contribute to prejudice formation, whereas 
positive contact lessens prejudice. The latter point was further investigated in Chapter 5, where 
I looked at solutions to the problem of xenophobia. 
That we react fearfully in the presence of strangers, as the discussion on group threat theory 
showed us, led me to look at the primal origins of this fear. I situated the origins of the fear 
driving xenophobia in our evolutionary history, where aggression toward outgroups gave the 
aggressors the advantage. Thus our tendency to be hostile towards outsiders is born out of a 
survival instinct, of which we see evidence in other social animals as well. I suggested that we 
have this reaction to outsiders because we fear what they may do to us, and over time we gave 
political and cultural meaning to this instinct-driven tendency. While we are dealing here with 
a generalised fear which at face value may seem too broad to give us insights into contemporary 
xenophobia, I suggested that on the contrary a further investigation in this direction can provide 
us with insights into alternative ways to deal with our fear of strangers. This is a suggestion 
that future studies on xenophobia can take up. Alternative strategies for dealing with strangers 
and our fear of them are found in the world of animals, where some species react not with 
aggression but with collaboration or with tension-diffusing play. These strategies were also 
developed in Chapter 5. Recognising this early, prepolitical origin of xenophobia can also help 
us make sense of its contemporary manifestations as a search for belonging and excluding 
others from belonging are reactions to a deep sense of insecurity about our place and continued 
existence in the world.  
Having established that xenophobia, whether expressed through prejudice or through violent 




to be investigated. In Chapter 3, I did this by looking at belonging from the perspective of the 
xenophobe and the perspective of the victim of xenophobia. This strategy helped me make 
sense of how our old insecurities surrounding belonging contribute to us becoming xenophobic 
today and how our xenophobia then precludes the possibility of belonging for foreigners or 
outsiders, which relates to civic ostracism and the harms of xenophobia as discussed in the first 
chapter. The first part of this section established the connection between place and belonging. 
While acknowledging that group-belonging can be separated from place or territory, this link 
needed to be established for in our current political circumstances we tend to think of belonging 
and foreignness along national lines and consequently along territorial lines. This connection 
is not necessary, but it is common. I also explained the role place plays in how we define 
ourselves, a point which would become important in my later discussion of narrative identity. 
Here I relied on Malpas’ idea that being in a place is a precondition for developing a 
subjectivity, and that the shape the latter takes is dependent on the conditions in the former. 
This includes the other people we encounter in the places we find ourselves in, and how we 
relate to them and interact within in those places, as Arendt showed us. 
This discussion established that who we are is deeply tied to where we are, and the implicit 
question then is what happens when we feel disconnected from the world around us, when we 
feel that we do not belong. With reference to Arendt’s discussion on superfluity and the dangers 
of rootlessness, I argued that people who feel insecure in their belonging seek security. This 
security is often, although not always, found in the false home offered by the nation and 
nationalism. I argued that it was a false home, because as Anderson showed us the nationalist’s 
home is not what he thinks it is – it is not historical, nor homogenous and pure – and nations 
are imagined communities where belonging is withheld from those who do not conform to the 
rigid and homogenised identity of the nation. This does not create true security, and the 
nationalist turns to xenophobia to cement his own belonging, by defining himself in opposition 
to outsiders. In the twisted logic of xenophobia, one’s own belonging is ensured by preventing 
others from belonging. 
This point brought me to the second part of the chapter, where I looked at what the implications 
of not belonging are for the person against whom xenophobia is directed. In Chapter 1, we 
already saw how foreigners are excluded. Here I argued that exclusions and displacement 
amount to a complete loss of freedom, for having a place in which one can exist is a 




where he showed that the homeless person cannot freely act or even freely perform the simple 
deeds to take care of his or her basic needs, because they have no place where they are free 
from the interference and domination of others. I showed how the situation of foreigners in a 
host country is analogous to that of the homeless, in that their ability to exercise basic freedoms 
is curtailed by their struggle to find safe places to live and prevented if they are completely 
denied a place to live. This then led me to a discussion on statelessness, the most radical form 
of not belonging or not having a place. The danger of not having a place is not only in losing 
one’s freedom but, under extreme circumstances, in ceasing to exist. The position of the 
stateless, and the ways in which historically they were treated, showed us how exclusion is the 
first step toward extermination. Therefore it is crucial to secure a place of safety for foreigners, 
and while we have reason to be critical of the idea of ‘home’ (as my brief discussion of feminist 
critiques of homes showed), this part of the chapter showed that the harms of not having a 
home far outweigh those concerns. Being without a home is not only harmful in big ways, but 
also in smaller ways which directly impact the foreigner’s ability to participate in their new 
communities. In the final section of this chapter I therefore looked at the personal harms of 
displacement, arguing along with Nine that displacement of any sort has a severe negative 
effect on one’s cognitive and emotional functioning, but that foreigners are especially 
vulnerable to these negative effects, as their precarious position and their political vulnerability 
prevents them from creating the kinds of niches and cognitive tools in their homes which other 
people, over time, can.  
 Chapter 3 served as a bridge between the chapters that achieved the first aim of this 
dissertation, and the final two chapters that were concerned with meeting its second aim, for 
what we saw in Chapter 3 was that how we answer the question of belonging is tied to how we 
think about ourselves, i.e. to our identities. To belong to a group is to accept a certain kind of 
identity, and we think about our identities also in terms of the places where we are from. 
Chapter 4 therefore looked at how our identities are shaped, and specifically how our identities 
contribute to us being more or less xenophobic. The aim of this chapter was primarily to defend 
the narrative theory of identity, which I then applied to the problem of xenophobia in Chapter 
5. The first section set out the theory of narrative identity, while the second dealt with criticism 
and limitations of the theory. The idea that our identities contribute to narratives came not only 
from the previous chapter, but also from the discussion on Chapter 2 on how our identities are 
constituted through a process of socialisation and incorporation into groups. This chapter 




individuals and groups, are through the narratives we tell about ourselves. This has implications 
for how we view others, because this too is shaped by how we portray them in our narratives. 
I argued that narratives are the stories we tell to interpret and give meaning and structure to our 
experience, and that narratives are also normative. Applied to narrative identity, this means that 
our narratives about ourselves and others indicate which identities are acceptable or legitimate, 
and which ones are not, and also how we should then act toward those with unacceptable 
identities. 
To understand how narratives shape identities, I gave an overview of Schechtman’s narrative 
self-constitution view. While her theory applies to individual identities, I argued that we can 
extrapolate from that to the question of group and political identity. Schechtman’s theory 
incorporates the idea that our identities are the products of our socialisation into groups, a 
process that requires of us to be able to articulate our self-conception, which we consciously 
do through narratives which bind our past, present, and future selves together. I concluded that 
on a very basic level, our identity-constituting narratives are the stories we tell about ourselves 
in response to the question, ‘Who are you?’ 
After establishing that, I asked how identities relate to personhood, as how we conceive of 
personhood has historically contributed to the exclusion and oppression of specific groups not 
deemed persons. I briefly considered the differences between traditional Western and 
traditional African conceptions of personhood, although a comprehensive discussion of such 
differences was beyond my current scope. Identity is linked to personhood, for we think of 
persons as beings who have unique identities, or personalities. I showed how Schechtman’s 
narrative self-constitution view implies a more communal approach to personhood, which she 
herself later formulated, and concluded that our identities and our personhood are not separate 
from the places we find ourselves in and the people we share them with, but rather that we are 
recognised as persons through expressing our identities through narrative. Because of this 
relational or communal aspect to both personhood and narrative identity, what I argued up to 
this point had political consequences and I therefore turned to the idea of political narratives. I 
defined political narratives as those that are told in public which pertain to our political lives, 
i.e. group life. Where individual narratives shape individual identity, political narratives shape 
group-identity. The two are not disconnected, as our individual identities situate us in relation 
with others, and individuals rely on the normative components of political narratives to show 




group identities tell us how people, or persons, should look and act and be, and also how those 
who deviate from the prescriptions of that identity should be treated. 
My discussion on narrative identity provisionally indicated that we interpret belonging, 
including who belongs and who does not, based on our understanding of ourselves as 
individuals and as groups. However, I had not considered criticisms of the narrative view, and 
I therefore turned to that before I asked what the implications of the view are for my study of 
xenophobia. I discussed three criticisms, one which had to be addressed because it disputed the 
validity of the view, and the final two because they posed specific challenges that needed to be 
overcome in my final argument (Chapter 5) that we can reduce xenophobia by telling anti-
xenophobic narratives. The first criticism considered was that levelled by Strawson, who 
argued that narrative theories are not only wrong but dangerous, as the normative claims they 
make – that you should live your life narratively – can become a basis of exclusion and 
discrimination, for there are people who do not think of their lives in terms of narratives. I 
agreed that his arguments hit the mark concerning strongly narrative theories, but that 
ultimately his arguments do not hold up for, according to the weaker theories I endorsed, which 
merely see one’s life-narrative as a response to the question ‘Who are you?’, Strawson’s 
argument provides us with a narrative about his life. The narrative theory therefore still 
remained the most comprehensive explanation of identity formation. 
The final two points of criticism I discussed but elaborated on and responded to in Chapter 5. 
These were: (i) the question whether narratives can bring about societal change, given that they 
are often told at grass roots level and that they individualise and may therefore blind us to 
structural and societal forms of oppression and injustice; and (ii) the fact that we often tell false 
narratives, which may result in delusional identities or which may have harmful effects given 
the normative nature of narratives. I suggested that the latter challenge can be met by holding 
narratives to account and measuring them against what we can know about reality, but that this 
is a limited strategy given our reluctance to accept inconvenient facts, or facts which do not 
align with our existing world-views. Responding to these two criticisms was therefore the task 
of Chapter 5, where the specific question I addressed was how xenophobic narratives contribute 
to discrimination and violence against foreigners, and whether we can tell counternarratives 




In Chapter 5 I did four things: (i) I identified narrative themes which contribute to xenophobia, 
and showed how they constitute the kinds of false narratives warned against in the previous 
chapter; (ii) I provided directions for counternarratives which would undermine our 
xenophobic assumptions about belonging; (iii) I suggested how such narratives can be 
institutionalised, in response to the challenge that narratives on their own cannot bring about 
societal change; and (iv) I provided contexts and mechanisms we could rely on to incorporate 
anti-xenophobic narratives in our individual and political lives. Note that the claim was never 
made that xenophobia will disappear, or that the strategies and directions I suggested are the 
only ones we should follow. Rather, I offer them as my unique contribution to the greater 
project of fighting against the presence of xenophobia in our societies, recognizing that while 
we cannot do away with it completely, we can certainly strive to be less xenophobic. 
The first section of this chapter offered three main narrative themes found in anti-foreigner 
public discourse in South Africa, which express prejudices and beliefs about foreigners: that 
they are harmful to the economy, that they do not belong here, and that they pose a threat. As 
themes, the latter two had already been addressed and I therefore only briefly considered them 
with reference to specific utterances. The first theme we find in many different narratives about 
foreigners, usually centring around the idea that foreigners are taking jobs and illegitimately 
using up state resources, at the cost of citizens having access to such resources, such as 
healthcare. I showed how these narratives misinterpret facts or are based on false assumptions, 
but ultimately, they boil down to the idea that only those who belong deserve access to goods, 
and therefore we are dealing here once again with ideas about belonging and foreignness. I 
therefore turned my attention to the question of what kind of narratives we can tell that would 
counteract the effect of xenophobic narratives. 
For any counternarrative or anti-xenophobic narrative to be effective, I argued, they must be 
able to be told on an institutional level. This raised the question of institutional change, and I 
showed how institutions also have identities which are formed by the narratives they tell about 
their histories, purpose, and goals. I argued that the problem of institutional change is circular, 
for institutional change is necessary to bring about societal change, as institutions offer us 
incentives to act in certain ways and not in others (North), but that institutions will only change 
if the individuals who form part of institutions change. For this reason I argued that our hope 
lies in exemplary individuals and organisations who put pressure on institutions to change. 




considered the kinds of directions our narratives can take and which areas of our public 
institutions should be targeted for the best results. These targets are our borders and the laws 
governing them, and our membership norms and our ideas of citizenship. Targeting them will 
sever the link between citizenship and indigeneity, discussed in Chapter 1, as well as the idea 
that there is something essential about being of a certain place, or belonging to a certain group. 
While I provided theoretical directions which future studies can investigate – emphasising that 
one’s place of birth is morally arbitrary (Carens, Rawls), or that the shapes of our national 
territories are relatively recent and the product of a long and fluctuating history – I chose to 
rather provide a strategy which could be implemented in all counternarratives. I did not want 
to be too prescriptive about the content of such narratives. I suggested that we look at the kind 
of language we use when we speak about others, and for this I relied on Leslie’s work on 
generics. This showed us how our reliance on generic statements lead us to essentialise salient 
characteristics about other groups, which in turn contributes to prejudice and discrimination. 
Leslie suggested that instead of generalising we should describe, as studies done on children 
show this to be an effective strategy in preventing essentialist thinking. If we speak of “the 
Zimbabwean person” instead of “the person from Zimbabwe”, we signal that being 
Zimbabwean, and by implication nationality, are essential characteristics. This is the kind of 
thinking exhibited by xenophobes.  
In Section 3, I returned to the question of how narratives can be told on an institutional level, 
and specifically of how exemplary individuals should contribute to bringing narrative to 
institutions. In this discussion I followed Nussbaum and Arendt, who connected narration to 
the imaginative transposition into the lives of other people. Nussbaum was specifically 
concerned with judgment in a legal sense, and Arendt in a political sense, therefore their 
theories lend themselves to telling narratives in institutions. Nussbaum showed us how judges 
can incorporate the literary imagination into their judgments, which would allow them to take 
the fullness of human life into account, where Arendt’s theory of judgment requires of us to 
incorporate the possible judgments of all effective parties into account. This means that when 
we form judgments on foreigners, we should measure our judgments against theirs and adjust 
accordingly, implying taking their needs and existence seriously. I argued that these models of 
judgement provide us with a way forward: they enable us to let go of restrictive stereotypes, to 
imagine ourselves in the place of the foreigner, and to imagine a world in which foreigners also 
have a place. I followed this with a short section discussing the potential of incorporating 




and by incorporating the kinds of narratives around citizenship and borders, suggested above, 
into curriculum content. This line of thought is one which future research projects in education 
and curriculum studies can pursue. 
Finally, I ended this study on a hopeful note. Throughout it I indicated how ingrained 
xenophobia, or more broadly the fear of strangers, is in the human psyche and in our societies. 
We saw how animals also exhibit a form of xenophobia (Chapter 2), and earlier in Chapter 5 
how the essentialist thinking that forms part of xenophobia and other forms of prejudice is 
expressed in our language and a product of our cognitive development. Leslie indeed suggests 
that the ability to generalise gave some early humans the evolutionary advantage. This final 
section, however, showed us that this is not the whole story, but that humans, like some other 
animals, have other strategies they can rely on when confronted with strangers. I discussed one: 
play. I showed how play helps children to gain knowledge about the world, including 
information about the social world and their place in society. Play also teaches children 
collaboration and promotes relationship formation. The latter we see in animals as well, and I 
discussed a study which found that play is used as an effective tool to manage xenophobic 
tensions in lemur populations.  
I suggested that play provides us with the kind of positive interactions which social contact 
theory argues will reduce prejudice. I then considered the kinds of games we can play to 
promote collaboration, the transfer of information about other people, and relationship 
formation. Video games and board games were discussed, but I left open the possibility that 
other forms of play can also be effective (such as sport). I chose the former two forms of play 
as they have strong narrative elements, which provides us with a way of incorporating anti-
xenophobic narratives, and as they are deeply immersive forms of play. Specific games were 
referred to, notably role-playing games which focus on the challenges faced by refugees and 
migrants. Such games activate the kind of imaginative thinking Nussbaum and Arendt were 
after.  While by no means claiming that games will be our salvation, I argued that play and 
narrative games offer a novel way to reduce xenophobia that can be implemented in our social 
contexts, schools, community events, organisations and companies, and public institutions.  
The ability of play to reduce tension between strangers, and specifically tension created by our 
xenophobic tendencies, deserves further attention and study. This last section of this 




convince us otherwise. Play, being fun and often frivolous, is often accompanied by laughter, 
and as Walter Benjamin (in Knott 2014: 10) wrote, “there is no better starting place for thought 
than in laughter”. To only think ‘seriously’ on matters such as xenophobia, important as it is, 
can lead us to despair for the future. 
This dissertation contributes to the study of xenophobia, in all fields, by providing a 
philosophical analysis of a phenomenon which has been relatively neglected in philosophical 
studies, while also bringing theories into conversation with the realities of xenophobia. My 
particular contribution is the recognition that xenophobia is first and foremost a response to 
deeply human anxieties about belonging, and further studies in the field can build on my 
conclusions reached above to think about ways in which a sense of secure belonging can be 
guaranteed for all, without reverting to exclusionary, rigid, and isolationist means to construct 
homes. The harms of xenophobia are clear, as is the need to fight it in any way and on every 
level we can. I have suggested two main, and related, strategies for how this can be achieved – 
through storytelling, and through play – which provide ample material for further study. The 
latter, brought into relation with narrative identity and the problem of xenophobia in human 
societies, is a direction which to my knowledge has not yet received serious consideration 
elsewhere. As our world is facing uncertain times, with global political instability, the threat 
posed by the climate crisis, and economic uncertainty and scarcity hanging over our heads, the 
likelihood that individuals and communities will become more xenophobic is a real danger. 
For this reason, it is crucial that we understand xenophobia fully – its origins, its effects, and 
the harms that result from it. This dissertation did not aim to be a definitive and final study of 
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